

*Nicholas Machiavel's*  
**P R I N C E.**

ALSO,  
The life of *Castruccio Castracani*  
of *Lucca*.

AND  
The meanes Duke *Valentine* us'd  
to put to death *Vitellozzo Vitelli*, *Oli-*  
*verotto* of *Fermo*, *Paul*, and the  
Duke of *Gravina*.

Translated out of *Italian* into *English*,  
By *E. D.*

With some Animadversions noting  
and taxing his errors.

LONDON,  
Printed for *Daniel Pakeman*,  
1661.







To the most noble and Ill-  
lustrious, JAMES Duke  
of Lenox, Earle of March, Baron  
of Settrington, Darnly, Terbanten,  
and Methuen, Lord Great  
Chamberlain and Admiral of  
Scotland, Knight of the most  
Noble Order of the Garter,  
and one of his Majesties  
most honourable Privy  
Counsel in both  
kingdomes.



Oysones are not all of that malign-  
nant and noxious quality,  
that as destruktives of Nature,  
they are utterly to be abhord; but  
we find many, nay most of them  
have their medicinal uses. This  
book carries its poyson and ma-  
lice in it; yet mee thinks the judicious peruser  
may honestly make use of it in the actions of his  
life, with advantage. The Lamprey, they say,  
hath a venomous string runs all along the back of  
it; take that out, and it is serv'd in for a choyce  
dish to dainty palates; Epictetus the Philosopher

## Dedicatory.

*sayes, Every thing hath two handles, as the fire brand, it may be taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt: the other being laid hold on, will cleave to the very flesh, and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart. Sin hath the condition of the fiery end; the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the soule: nay it is worse; one sin goes not alone but hath many consequences. Your Grace may find the truth of this in your perusal of this Author: your judgement shall easily direct you in finding out the good uses of him: I have pointed at his chiefest errors with my best endeavors, and have devoted them to your Graces service: which if you shall accept and protect, I shall remain*

Your Graces

humble and devoted servant,

**EDVVARD DACRES.**



## *The Epistle to the Reader.*

Questionless some men will blame me for making this Author speak in our vulgar tongue. For his Maximes and Tenents are condemn'd of all, as pernicious to all Christian States, and hurtfull to all humane Societies. Herein I shall answer for my self with the Comœdian, *Placere Studeo bonis quam plurimis, & minimè multos ledere*: I endeavor to give content to the most I can of those that are well disposed, and no scandal to any. I grant, I find him blamed and condemned: I do not less my self. Reader, either do thou read him without a prejudicial opinion, and out of thy own judgement take his errors; or at least, if thou canst stoop so low, make use of my pains to help thee; I will promise thee this reward for thy labor: if thou consider well the actions of the world, thou shalt find him much practis'd by those that condemn him; who willingly would walk as thieves do with close lanternes in the night, that they being undescried, and yet seeing all, might surprise the unwary in the dark. Surely this book will infect no man: out of the wicked treasure of a mans own wicked heart, he drawes his malice and mischief. From the same flower the Bee sucks honey, from whence the Spider hath his poyson. And he that means well,

## To the Reader.

shall be here warnd, where the deceitfull man  
learnes to set his snares. A judge who hath  
often used to examine theeves, becomes the  
more expert to sift out their tricks. If mis-  
chief come hereupon, blame not me, nor  
blame my Author: lay the saddle on the right  
horse: but *Hony soit qui mal y pense*: let  
shame light on him that hatcht the mis-  
chief.

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Nicholas

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*Nicholas Machiavelli,*  
to the Magnificent *Law-*  
*rence sonne to Peter of Medicis*  
health.



Hey that desire to ingratiate themselves with a Prince, commonly use to offer themselves to his view, with things of that nature as such persons take most pleasure and delight in: whereupon we see they are many times presented with Horses and Armes, cloth of gold, pretious Stones, and suchlike ornaments, worthy of their greatness. Having then a mind to offer up my self to your Magnificence, with some testimony of my service to you, I found nothing in my whole inventory, that I think better of, or more esteeme, than the knowlege of great mens actions, which I have learned by a long experience of modern affairs, and a continual reading of those of the aucients. Which, now that I have with great diligence long worke it out, and thoroughly sifted, I commend to your Magnificence. And however I may well think this work unworthy of your view; yet such is your humanity, that I doubt not but it shall find acceptance, considering, that for my part I am not able to tender a greater gift, than to present

you with the means, whereby in a very short time you may be able to understand all that, which I, in the space of many years, and with many sufferances and dangers, have made proof and gained the knowledge of. And this work I have not set forth either with elegancy of discourse or stile, nor with any other ornament whereby to captivate the reader, as others use, because I would not have it gain its esteem from elsewhere than from the truth of the matter, and the gravity of the subject. Nor can this be thought presumption, if a man of humble and low condition venture to dilate and discourse upon the governments of Princes; for even as they that with their pensils designe out countreys, get themselves into the plains below to consider the nature of the mountains, and other high places above; and again to consider the plains below, they get up to the tops of the mountains; in like manner to understand the nature of the people, it is fit to be a Prince; and to know well the dispositions of Princes, suits best with the understanding of a subject. Your Magnificence then may be pleased, to receive this small present, with the same mind that I send it; which if you shall thoroughly peruse and consider, you shall perceive therein that I exceedingly wish, that you may attain to that greatness, which your own fortune, and your excellent endowments promise you: and if your Magnificence from the very point of your Highness shall sometime cast your eyes upon these inferior places, you shall see how undeservedly I undergoe an extreame and continuall despight of Fortune.

THE



# THE P R I N C E

Written by  
*Nicholas Machiavelli,*  
Secretary and Citizen of *Flo-*  
*rence.*

CHAP. I.  
*How many sorts of Principalities there are, and  
how many wayes they are attained to.*

**A**Ll States, all Dominions  
that have had, or now have  
rule over men, have been  
and are, either Republicues  
or Principalities. Princip-  
alities are either heredi-  
tary, whereof they of the  
blood of the Lord thereof have long time been  
Princes; or else they are new; and those  
that are new, are either all new, as was the  
Dutchy of Millan to *Francis Sforce*; or are as  
members adjoynd to the hereditary State of  
the

the Prince that gains it; as the Kingdom of *Naples* is to the King of *Spain*. These Dominions so gotten, are accustomed either to live under a Prince, or to enjoy their liberty; and are made conquest of, either with others forces, or ones own, either by fortune, or by valor.

## CHAP. II.

*Of Hereditary Principalities.*

I Will not here discourse of Republicques, because I have otherwhere treated of them at large: I will apply my self only to a Principality, and proceed, while I weave this web, by arguing thereupon, how these Principalities can be governed and maintained. I say then that in States of inheritance, and accustomed to the blood of their Princes, there are far fewer difficulties to keep them, than in the new: for it suffices only not to transgress the course his Ancestors took, and so afterward to temporise with those accidents that can happen; that if such a Prince be but of ordinary industry, he shall allwaies be able to maintain himself in his State, unless by some extraordinary or excessive power he be deprived thereof; and when he had lost it, upon the least sinister chance, that befalls the usurper, he recovers it again. We have in *Italy* the Duke of *Ferrara* for example hereof, who was of ability to resist the *Venetians*, in the year 84. and to withstand Pope *Julius* in the tenth for no other reason, than because he had of old continued in that rule; for the natural Prince hath fewer occasions, and less heed to give offence, whereupon of necessity he must



must be more beloved ; and unless it be that some extravagant vices of his bring him into hatred, it is agreeable to reason, that naturally he should be well beloved by his own subjects : and in the antiquity and continuation of the Dominion, the remembrances and occasions of innovations are quite extinguished : for evermore one change leaves a kind of breach or dent, to fasten the building of another.

## CHAP. III.

*Of mixt Principalities.*

**B**UT the difficulties consist in the new Principality ; and first, if it be not all new, but a member, so that it may be termed altogether as mixt ; and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from a natural difficulty, which we commonly finde in all new Principalities ; for men do willingly change their Lord, beleeving to better their condition ; and this beliefe causes them to take armes against him that rules over them, whereby they deceive themselves, because they find after by experience, they have made it worse : which depends upon another natural and ordinary necessity, forcing him alwaies to offend those, whose Prince he newly becomes, as well by his soldiers he is put to entertain upon them as by many other injuries, which a new conquest draws along with it ; in such manner as thou findest all those thine enemies, whom thou hast endammaged in the seizing of that Principality, and afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it.

for not being able to satisfie them according to their expectations, nor put in practice strong remedies against them, being obliged to them. For however one be very well provided with strong armies, yet hath he alwaies need of the favor of the inhabitants in the Countrey, to enter thereinto. For these reasons, *Lewis* the twelfth, King of *France*, suddenly took *Milan*, and as soon lost it; and the first time *Lodwick* his own forces served well enough to wrest it out of his hands; for those people that had opened him the gates, finding themselves deceived of their opinion, and of that future good which they had promised themselves, could not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them. True it is, that Countreys that have rebelled again the second time, being recovered, are harder lost; for their Lord, taking occasion from their rebellion, is less respective of persons, but cares only to secure himself, by punishing the delinquents, to clear all suspicions, and to provide for himself where he thinks he is weakest: so that if to make *France* lose *Milan* the first time, it was enough for Duke *Lodwick* to make some small stir only upon the confines; yet afterwards, before they could make him lose it the second time, they had need of the whole world together against him, and that all his armies should be wasted and driven out of *Italy*; which proceeded from the forenamed causes: however though both the first and second time it was taken from him. The generall causes of the first we have treated of; it remains now that we see those of the second; and set down the remedies that he had, or any one else can have that should chance to be in those termes he was,

was, whereby he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than the King of France did. I say therefore, that these States which by Conquest are annexed to the ancient States of their conqueror, are either of the same province and the same language, or otherwise; and when they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially when they are not used to live free; and to enjoy them securely, it is enough to have extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them. For in other matters, allowing them their ancient conditions, and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them, men ordinarily live quiet enough; as we have seen that *Burgundy* did, *Britany*, *Gascony*, and *Normandy*, which so long time continued with *France*: for however there be some difference of language between them, yet can they easily comport one with another; and whosoever makes the conquest of them, meaning to hold them, must have two regards; the first, that the race of their former Prince be quite extinguish'd; the other, that he change nothing, neither in their lawes nor taxes, so that in a very short time they become one entire body with their ancient Principality. But when any States are gaine'd in a Province disagreeing in language, manners, and orders, here are the difficulties, and here is there need of good fortune, and a great industry to maintain them; and it would be one of the best and liveliest remedies, for the Conqueror to goe in person and dwell there; this would make the possession here of more secure and durable; as the Turk hath done in *Greece*; who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold that State, had he

not gone thither himself in person to dwell, it had never been possible for him to have kept it: for abiding there, he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings, and forthwith can remedy them; whereas being not there present, they are heard of when they are grown to some height, and then is there no help for them. Moreover, the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither: the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the Prince near at hand, whereupon have they more reason to love him, if they mean to be good; and intending to do otherwise, to fear him: and forrein Princes will be well aware how they invade that State; insomuch, that making his abode there, he can very hardly lose it. Another remedy, which is also a better, is to send Colonies into one or two places, which may be as it were the keys of that State; for it is necessary either to do this, or to maintain there many horse and foot. In these colonies the Prince makes no great expence, and either without his charge, or at a very small rate; he may both send and maintain them; and gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses, to bestow them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that State; and those that he offends, remaining dispersed and poore, can never hurt him: and all the rest on one part, have no offence given them, and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet: on the other side, they are wary not to erre, for fear it befalls not them, as it did those that were dispoilt. I conclude then, that those colonies that are not chargeable, are the more trusty, give the less offence; and

and they that are offended, being but poor and scattered, can do but little harme, as I have said; for it is to be noted, that men must either be dallyed and flattered withall, or else be quite crusht; for they revenge themselves of small damages; but of great ones they are not able; so that when wrong is done to any man, it ought so to be done, that it need fear no return of revenge again. But in lieu of Colonies, by maintaining soldiers there, the expence is great; for the whole revenues of that State are to be spent in the keeping of it; so the conquest proves but a loss to him that hath got it, & endammages him rather; for it hurts that whole State to remove the army from place to place, of which annoyance every one hath a feeling, and so becomes enemy to thee; as they are enemies, I wis, who are outraged by thee in their own houses, whensoever they are able to do thee mischief. Every way then is this guard unprofitable. Besides, he that is in a different Province, (as it is said) should make himself Head and defender of his less powerfull neighbors, and devise alwaies to weaken those that are more mighty therein, and take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreigner as mighty as himself; for it will alwaies come to pass, that they shall be brought in by those that are discontented, either upon ambition, or fear; as the *Eto'ians* brought the *Romans* into *Greece*; and they were brought into every countrey they came, by the Natives; and the course of the matter is, that so soon as a powerfull Stranger enters a countrey, all those that are the less powerfull there, cleave to him, provoked by an envy they beare him that is more mighty than they; so that for  
these

these of the weaker sort, he may easily gain them without any pains: for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that he hath gotten: He hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths, nor their authorities, and so he shall easily be able by his own forces, and their assistances, to take down those that are mighty, and remain himself absolute arbitre of that Countrey. And he that playes not well this part, shall quick'y lose what he hath gotten; and while he holds it, shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations. The *Romans* in the Provinces they seiz'd on, observed well these points, sent colonies thither, entertained the weaker sort, without augmenting any thing their power, abated the forces of those that were mighty, and permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gain too much reputation there. And I will content my self only with the countrey of *Greece* for example hereof. The *Achayans* and *Etolians* were entertained by them, the *Macedons* kingdome was brought low, *Antiochus* was driven thence, nor ever did the *Achayans* or *Etolians* deserts prevail so far for them, that they would ever promise to enlarge their State, nor the perswasions of *Philip* induce them ever to be his friends, without bringing him lower; nor yet could *Antiochus* his power make them ever consent that he should hold any State in that countrey: for the *Romans* did in these cases that which all judicious Princes ought to do, who are not only to have regard unto all present mischiefs, but also to the future; and to provide for those with all industry; for by taking order for those when they are a farre off, it is easie to

to prevent them; but by delaying till they come near hand to thee, the remedy comes too late; for this malignity is grown incurable: and it befalls this, as the physicians say of the hecrick feaver, that in the beginning it is easily cur'd, but hardly known; but in the course of time, not having been known in the beginning, nor cured, it becomes easie to know, but hard to cure. Even so falls it out in matters of State; for by knowing it aloof off (which is given only to a wise man to do) the mischiefs that then spring up, are quickly helped; but when, for not having been perceived, they are suffered to increase, so that every one sees them, there is then no cure for them: therefore the *Romans*, seeing these inconvenients a far off, alwaies prevented them, and never suffered them to follow; for to escape a war, because they knew that a war is not undertaken, but deferred for anothers advantage; therefore would they rather make a war with *Philip* and *Antiochus* in *Greece*, to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in *Italy*, though for that time they were able to avoid both the one and the other, which they thought not good to do: nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouthes of the Sages of our dayes, to enjoy the benefits of the present time; but that rather, to take the benefit of their valor and wisdom; for time drives forward every thing, and may bring with it as well good as evil, and evil as good. But let us return to *France*, and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them: and we will speak of *Lewis*, and not of *Charles*, as of whom by reason of the long possession he held in *Italy*

we

we better knew the wayes he went: and you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a State of different Language and conditions. King *Lewis* was brought into *Italy* by the *Venetians* ambition, who would have gotten for their shares half the State of *Lombardy*: I will not blame his coming, or the course he took, because he had a mind to begin to set a foot in *Italy*; but having not any friends in the country, all gates being barred against him, by reason of King *Charles* his carriage there, he was constrained to joyn friendship with those he could; and this consideration well taken, would have proved lucky to him, when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any error. The King then having conquered *Lombardy*, recovered presently all that reputation that *Charles* had lost him; *Genoa* yielded to him, the *Florentines* became friends with him; the Marquess of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Ferrara*, the *Bentivolti*, the Lady of *Furli*, the Lord of *Faenza*, *Pesaro* *Rimino*, *Camerino*, and *Piombino*, the *Lucheses*, *Pisans* and *Sieneſes*, every one came and offered him friendship: then might the *Venetians* consider the rashness of the course they had taken, who, only to get into their hands two Townes in *Lombardy*, made the King Lord of two thirds in *Italy*. Let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the King have maintained his reputation in *Italy*, if he had followed these aforementioned rules, and secured & defended those his friends, who because their number was great, and they weak and fearful, some of the Church, and others of the *Venetians* were alwaies forced to hold with him, and by  
their



their means he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest: but he was no sooner got into *Milan*, than he took a quite wrong course, by giving ayd to Pope *Alexander*, to seize upon *Romania*, and perceiv'd not that by this resolution he weakened himself, ruining his own friends, and those had cast themselves into his bosom, making the Church puissant, by adding to their spiritual power, whereby they gaind their authority, and so much temporal estate. And having once got out of the way, he was constrained to go on forward; insomuch as to stop *Alexanders* ambition, and that he should not become Lord of all *Tuscany*, of force he was to come into *Italy*: and this sufficed him not, to have made the Church mighty, and taken away his own friends; but for the desire he had to get the Kingdome of *Naples*, he divided it with the King of *Spain*: and where before he was the sole arbitre of *Italy*, he brought in a competitor, to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country, and all that were ill affected to him, might have other where to make their recourse: and whereas he might have left in that Kingdome some Vice-King of his own, he took him from thence, to place another there, that might afterward chace him thence. It is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary, to desire to be of the getting hand: and alwaies when men undertake it, if they can effect it, they shall be prais'd for it, or at least not blam'd: but when they are not able, and yet will undertake it, here lies the blame, here is the error committed. If *France* then was able with her own power to assaile the Kingdome of *Naples*, she might well have done it; but not being able,

able, she should not have divided it: and if the division she made of *Lombardy* with the *Venetians*; deserv'd some excuse, thereby to set one foot in *Italy*; yet this merits blame, for not being excus'd by that necessity. *Lewis* then committed these five faults; extinguish't the feeble ones, augmented the State of another that was already powerful in *Italy*, brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner, came not thither himself to dwell there, nor planted any colonies there: which faults while he liv'd, he could not but be the worse for; yet all could not have gone so ill, had he not committed the sixth, to take from the *Venetians* their State; for if he had not enlarg'd the Churches territories nor brought the *Spaniard* into *Italy*, it had bin necessary to take them lower; but having first taken those other courses, he should never have given way to their destruction; for while they had been strong, they would alwaies have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of *Lombardy*. For the *Venetians* would never have given their consents thereto, unless they should have been made Lords of it themselves; and the others would never have taken it from *France*, to give it them: and then they would never have dar'd to go and set upon them both together. And if any one should say, that King *Lewis* yeelded *Romania* to *Alexander*, and the Kingdome of *Naples* to *Spain*, to avoid a war; I answer with the reasons above alledged, that one should never suffer any disorder to follow, for avoiding of a war; for that war is not sav'd, but put off to thy disadvantage. And if any others argue, that the King had given his word to the Pope, to do that exploit for him, for dissolving of his marriage, and for giving the

the Cardinals Cap to him of Roan; I answer with that which hereafter I shall say touching Princes words, how they ought to be kept. King Lewis then lost Lombardy, for not having observ'd some of those termes which others us'd, who have possessed themselves of countries, and desir'd to keep them. Nor is this any strange thing, but very ordinary and reasonable: and to this purpose I spake at Nantes with that French Cardinal, when Valentine (for so ordinarily was *Caesar Borgia* Pope Alexanders son call'd) made himself master of *Romania*; for when the Cardinal said to me, that the *Italians* understood not the seats of war; I answered, the *Frenchmen* understood not matters of State: for had they been well vers'd therein, they would never have suff'r'd the Church to have grown to that greatness. And by experience we have seen it, that the power hereof in *Italy*, and that of *Spain* also, was caused by *France*, and their own ruine proceeded from themselves. From whence a general rule may be taken, which never, or very seldom fails, That he that gives the means to another to become powerful, ruines himself; for that power is caus'd by him either with his industry, or with his force; and as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant.

## CHAP. IV.

Wherefore Darius his Kingdome taken by Alexander, rebelled not against Alexanders Successors after his death.

THE difficulties being consider'd, which a man hath in the maintaining of a State new

new gotten, some might marvaile how it came to pass, that *Alexander* the great subdued all *Asia* in a few years; and having hardly possessed himself of it, died; whereupon it seemed probable that all that State should have rebelled; nevertheless his Successors kept the possession of it, nor found they other difficulty in holding it, than what arose among themselves through their own ambition. I answer, that all the Principalities, whereof we have memory left us, have been governed in two several manners; either by a Prince, and all the rest Vassals, who as ministers by his favor and allowance, do help to govern that Kingdom; or by a Prince and by Barons, who not by their Princes favor, but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree. And these kinds of Barons have both states of their own, and Vassals who acknowledge them for their Lords; and beare them a true natural affection. Those States that are govern'd by a Prince and by Vassals, have their Prince ruling over them with more authority: for in all his countrey, there is none acknowledged for superior, but himself: and if they yeeld obedience to any one else, it is but as to his minister and officer, nor beare they him any particular good will. The examples of these two different Governments now in our dayes, are, the *Turk*, and the King of *France*. The *Turks* whole Monarchy is govern'd by one Lord, and the rest are all his Vassals; and dividing his whole Kingdom into divers Sangiacques or Governmen's, he sends several thither, and those he chops and changes, as he pleases. But the King of *France* is seated in the  
midst

midst of a multitude of Lords, who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by their subjects, and being belov'd by them, enjoy their preheminencies; nor can the King take their States from them without danger. He then that considers the one and the other of these two States, shall find difficulty in the conquest of the *Turks* State; but when once it is subdu'd, great facility to hold it. The reasons of these difficulties in taking of the *Turks* Kingdom from him, are, because the Invader cannot be called in by the Princes of that Kingdom, nor hope by the rebellion of those which he hath about him, to be able to facilitate his enterprize: which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid; for they being all his slaves, and oblig'd to him, can more hardly be corrupted; and put case they were corrupted, little profit could he get by it, they not being able to draw after them any people, for the reasons we have shewed: whereupon he that assails the *Turk*, must think to find him united; and must rather relie upon his own forces, than in the others disorders: but when once he is overcome and broken in the field, so that he cannot repair his armies, there is nothing else to be doubted than the Royal blood, which being once quite out, there is none else left to be feard, none of the others having any credit with the people. And as the conqueror before the victory could not hope in them; so after it, ought he not to fear them. The contrary falls out in Kingdoms govern'd as is that of *France*: for it is easie to be enter'd by the gaining of any Baron in the Kingdom; for there are alwaies some malecontents to be found, and those that are glad of innovation. Those for the reasons alledg'd are  
able

able to open thee a way into that State, and to further thy victory, which afterwards to make good to thee, draws with it exceeding many difficulties, as well with those that have ayded thee, as those thou hast suppress. Nor is it enough for thee to root out the Princes race: for there remaine still those Lords who quickly will be be the ring-leaders of new changes; and in case thou art not able to content these, nor extinguish them, thou loest that State, whensoever the occasion is offerd. Now if thou shalt consider what sort of government that of *Darius* was, thou shalt find it like to the *Turks* dominion, and therefore *Alexander* was necessitated first to defeat him utterly, and drive him out of the field; after which victory *Darius* being dead, that State was left secure to *Alexander*, for the reasons we treated of before: and his successors, had they continued in amity, might have enjoy'd it at ease: nor ever arose there in that Kingdome other tumults, than those they themselves stir'd up. But of the States that are order'd and grounded as that of *France*, it is impossible to become master at such ease: and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of *Spain*, *France*, and *Greece* against the *Romans*, by reason of the many Principalities those States had: whereof while the memory lasted, the *Romans* were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them; but the memory of them being quite wip't out, by the power and continuance of the Empire, at length they enjoy'd it securely; and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another, each of one them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces, according as their authority

authority had gain'd them credit therein : and that because the blood of their ancient Lords was quite spent, they acknowledg'd no other but the *Romans*. By the consideration then of these things, no man will marvel that *Alexander* had so little trouble to keep together the State of *Asia* ; and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest, as *Pyrrhus*, and many others ; which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour, but from the difference of the subject.

## CHAP. V.

*In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be govern'd, which, before they were conquer'd, liv'd under their own Laws.*

**W**Hen those States that are conquered, as it is said, have been accustomed to live under their own Laws, and in liberty, there are three wayes for a man to hold them. The first is to demolish all their strong places ; the other, personally to goe and dwell there ; the third, to suffer them to live under their own Laws, drawing from them some tribute, and creating the rein an Oligarchy, that may continue it in thy service : for that State being created by that Prince, knowes it cannot consist without his aid and force, who is like to doe all he can to maintain it ; and with more facility is a City kept by meanes of her own Citizens, which hath been us'd before to live free, than by any other way of keeping. We have for example the *Spartans* and the *Romans* ; the *Spartans* held *Athens* and *Thebes*, creating

creating there an Oligarchy : yet they lost it. The Romans to be sure of *Capua*, *Carthage*, and *Numautia*, dismantell'd them quite, and so lost them not : they would have kept *Greece* as the *Spartans* had held them, leaving them free, and letting them enjoy their own Laws; and it prospered not with them : so that they were forc'd to deface many Cities of that province to hold it. For in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under, than by demolishments; and whoever becomes master of a City us'd to live free, and dismantells it not, let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it; for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of liberty for refuge, and the ancient orders it had; which neither by length of time, nor for any favours afforded them, are ever forgotten; and for any thing that can be done, or order'd, unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and dispers'd, that name is never forgotten, nor those customes: but presently in every chance recourse is thither made: as *Pisa* did after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the *Florentines*. But when the Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a Prince, and that whole race is quite extirpated; on one party being us'd to obey; on the other, not having their old Prince; they agree not to make one from among themselves: they know not how to live in liberty, in such manner that they are much slower to take armes; and with more facility may a Prince gaine them, and secure himselfe of them. But in Republicques there is more life in them, more violent hatred, more earnest desire of revenge; nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them



them, or suffer them to rest: so that the safest way, is, either to ruine them, or dwell among them.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of new Principalities, that are conquer'd by ones own armes and valour.*

**L**ET no man marvaile, if in the discourse I shall make of new Principalities, both touching a Prince, and touching a State, I shall alledge very famous examples: for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others, and proceed in their actions by imitation; and being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd, nor their vertues, whose patterne thou set'st before thee, attain'd unto; a wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons, and imitate those that have been the most excellent: to the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto, at least if may yeeld some savour thereof, and doe as good Archers use, who thinking the place they intend to hit, too farre distant, and knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry, they lay their ayme a great deale higher than the mark; not for to hit so high with their arrow, but to bee able with the help of so high an ayme to reach the place they shoot at. I say, that in Principalities wholly new, where there is a new Prince, there is more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them, as the vertue of their Conquerour is greater or lesser. And because this successe, to become

a Prince of a private man, presupposes either vertue, or fortune; mee thinks the one and other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties; however he that hath lesse stood upon fortune, hath maintain'd himselfe the better. Moreover it somewhat facilitates the matter in that the Prince is constrain'd, because he hath not other dominions, in person to come and dwell there. But to come to these who by their owne vertues, and not by fortune, attain'd to be Princes; the excellentest of these are *Moses*, *Cyrus*, *Romulus*, *Theseus*, and such like; and though of *Moses* we are not to reason, he onely executing the things that were commanded him by God; yet meritis he well to be admir'd, were it only for that grace that made him worthy to converse with God. But considering *Cyrus*, and the others, who either got or founded Kingdomes, we shall find them all admirable; and if there particular actions and Lawes be thoroughly weigh'd, they will not appeare much differing from those of *Moyse*, which he receiv'd from so Sovraigne an instructor. And examining their lives and actions, it will not appeare, that they had other help of fortune, than the occasion, which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce whatforme they then pleas'd; and without that occasion, the vertue of their mind had been extinguish'd; and without that vertue, the occasion had been off'r'd in vaine. It was then necessary for *Moses* to find the people of *Israel* slaves in *Ægypt*, and oppress'd by the *Ægyptians*, to the end that they might get out of their thraldome, shou'd bee willing

ling to follow him. It was fit that *Romulus* should not be kept in *Albia*, but expos'd presently after his birth, that he might become King of *Rome*, and founder of that City. There was need that *Cyrus* should find the *Persians* discontented with the *Medes* government, and the *Medes* delicate and effeminate through their long peace. *Theseus* could not make proof of his vertue, had not he found the *Athenians* dispers'd. These occasions therefore made these men happy, and their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken notice of, whereby their countrey became enobled, and exceeding fortunate. They, who by vertuous waies, like unto these, become Princes, attain the Principality with difficulty, but hold it with much ease; and the difficulties they find ingaining the Principality, arise partly from the new orders and courses they are forc'd to bring in, to lay the foundation of their State, and work their own security. And it is to be consider'd, how there is not any thing harder to take in hand, nor doubtfuller to succeed, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to be the chief in bringing in new orders; for this Chief finds all those his enemies, that thrive upon the old orders; and hath but luke warme defenders of all those that would do well upon the new orders, which luke-warmie temper proceeds partly from fear of the opposers who have the laws to their advantage; partly from the incredulity of the men who truly believe not a new thing, unless there be some certain proof given them thereof. Whereupon it arises, that whensoever they that are adversaries, take the occasion to assaile, they do it factiously; and these others defend but coolly, so that their whole

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party

party altogether runs a hazzard. Therefore it is necessary, being we intend throughly to discourse this part, to examine if these innovators stand of themselves, or if they depend upon others; that is, if to bring their work to effect, it be necessary they should intreat, or be able to constrain; in the first case they allwayes succeed ill, and bring nothing to pass; but when they depend of themselves, and are able to force, then seldom it is that they hazzard. Hence came it that all the prophets that were arm'd, prevail'd; but these that were unarm'd, were too weak: for besides what we have alledg'd, the nature of the people is changeable, and easie to be perswaded to a matter; but it is hard also to settle them in that perswasion. And therefore it behoves a man to be so provided, that when they beleve no longer, he may be able to compel them thereto by force. *Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus* would never have been able to cause their Laws long to be obey'd, had they been disarm'd; as in our times it befel Fryer *Jerome Savanarola*, who perish'd in his new constitutions, when the multitude began not to beleve him; neither had he the means to keep them firme, that had beleev'd; not to force beleefe in them that had not beleev'd him. Wherefore such men as these, in their proceedings find great difficulty, and all their dangers are in the way, and these they must surmount by their vertue; but having once master'd them, and beginning to be honored by all, when they have rooted those out that envi'd their dignities, they remain powerful, secure, honorable, and happy. To these choice examples, I will add one of less remark; but it shall hold some proportion with

wirhthem, and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind, which is *Hiero the Siracusan*. He of a private man, became Prince of *Siracusa*, nor knew he any other ayd of fortune than the occasion: for the *Siracusans* being oppress'd, made choyce of him for their Captain, whereupon he deserv'd to be made their Prince: and he was of such vertue even in his private fortune, that he who writes of him, sayes, he wanted nothing of reigning, but a Kingdom; this man extinguisht all the old soldiery, ordaind the new; left the old allyances, entertained new; and as he had friendship, and soldiers that were his own, upon that ground he was able to build any edifice; so that he indured much trouble in gaining, and suffered but little in maintaining.

## CHAP. VII.

*Of new Principalities, gotten by fortune, and other mens forces.*

They who by fortune only become Princes of private men, with small pains attain to it, but have much a do to maintain themselves in it; and find no difficulty at all in the way, because they are carried thither with wings: but all the difficulties arise there, after they are plac'd in them. And of such sort are those who have an estate given them for money, by the favor of some one that grants it them: as it befell many in *Greece*, in the cities of *Jonia*, and *Hellepont*; where divers Princes were made by *Darius*, as well for his own safety as his glory; as also them that were made Emperors; who from private men by

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corrupting

corrupting the soldiers, attaind to the Empire. These subsist meerly upon the will, and fortune of those that have advanced them; which are two voluble and unsteady things; and they neither know how, nor are able to continue in that dignity: they know not how, because unless it be a man of great understanding and vertue, it is not probable that he who hath always liv'd a private life, can know how to command: neither are they able, because they have not any forces that can be friendly or faithful to them. Moreover those States that suddenly fall into a mans hands, as all other things in nature that spring and grow quickly, cannot well have taken root, nor have made their correspondencies so firm, but that the first storm that takes them, ruines them; in case these, who (as it is said) are thus on a sudden clambred up to be Princes, are not of that worth and vertue as to know how to prepare themselves to maintain that which chance hath cast into their bosoms, and can afterwards lay those foundations, which others have cast before they were Princes. For the one and the other of these wayes about the attaining to be a Prince, by Vertue, or by Fortune, I will alledge you two examples which have been in the dayes of our memory. These were *Francis Sforza*, and *Casar Borgia*; *Francis* by just means and with a great deal of vertue, of a private man got to be Duke of Millan; and that which with much pains he had gaind, he kept with small ado. On the other side *Casar Borgia* (commonly termed Duke *Valentine*) got his state by his Fathers fortune, and with the same lost it; however that for his own part no pains was spar'd, nor any thing omitted, which by a discreet

discreet and valorus man ought to have been done, to fasten his roots in those Estates, which others armes or fortune had bestowed on him; for (as it was formerly said) he that lays not the foundations first, yet might be able by means of his extraordinary vertues to lay them afterwards, however it be with the great trouble of the architect, and danger of the edifice. If therefore we consider all the Dukes progressses, we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power, which I judge a matter not superfluous to run over; because I should not well know, what better rules I might give to a new Prince, than the pattern of his actions; and however the courses he tooke, availed him not, yet was it not his fault, but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extreame malignity of fortune. Pope Alexander the sixt, desiring to make the Duke his son a great man, had a great many difficulties, present and future: first he saw no way there was whereby he might be able to make him Lord of any State, that was not the Churches; and if he turned to take that from the Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan, and the Venetians would never agree to it; for Faenza and Rimini were under the Venetians protection. Moreover, he saw that the armes of Italy, and those whereof in particular he might have been able to make some use, were in their hands, who ought to fear the Popes greatness: and therefore could not any wayes rely upon them: being all in the Orsins and Colonies hands, and those of their faction. It was necessary then, that those matters thus appointed by them should be disturbed, and the States of Italy disordered, to be able safely

to master part of them, which he then found easie to do, seeing the *Venetians* upon three considerations had us'd the means to bring the *French* men back again into *Italy*: which he not only did not withstand, but furthered, with a resolution of King *Lewis* his ancient marriage. The King then past into *Italy* with the *Venetians* ayd, and *Alexanders* consent; nor was he sooner arrived in *Milan*, than the Pope had soldiers from him for the service of *Romania*, which was quickly yeilded up to him upon the reputation of the Kings forces. The Duke then having made himself master of *Romania*, and beaten the *Colonies*, desiring to hold it, and proceed forward, two things hindered him: the one, his own soldiers, which he thought were not true to him; the other, the *French* mens good wills; that is to say, he feared that the Princes soldiers, whereof he had served himself, would sail him, and not only hinder his conquest, but take from him what he had gotten; and that the King also would serve him the same turn. He had experience of the *Orsini* upon an occasion, when after the taking of *Faenza* he assaulted *Bolonia*, so which assault he saw them go very cold. And touching the King, he discovered his mind, when having taken the Duchy of *Urbino*, he invaded *Tuscany*; from which action the King made him retire; whereupon the Duke resolved to depend no more upon fortune, and other mens armes. And the first thing he did, was, to weaken the *Orsini*, and *Colonnies* factions in *Rome*: for he gain'd all their adherents that were gentlemen, giving them large allowances,  
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and honoring them according to their qualities with charges and governments: so that in a few months the good will they bare to the parties was quite extinguish'd, and wholly bent to the Duke. After this, he waited an occasion to root out the *Orsini*, having before dispers'd those of the family of *Colonna*, which fell out well to his hand; and he us'd it better. For the *Orsini* being too late aware, that the Dukes and the Churches greatness was their destruction, held a Council together in a dwelling house of theirs in the country adjoining to *Perusia*. From thence grew the rebellion of *Urbino*, and the troubles of *Romania*, and many other dangers befell the Duke, which he overcame all with the help of the *French*: and having regained his reputation, trusting neither *France*, nor any forrein forces, to the end he might not be put to make trial of them again, he betook himself to his sleights; and he knew so well to disguise his intention, that the *Orsini*, by the mediation of *Paul Orsini*, were reconciled to him, to whom the Duke was no way wanting in all manner of courtesies whereby to bring them into security, giving them rich garments, money, and horses, till their own simplicities led them all to to *Sinigellia*, into his hands. These heads being then pluck'd off, and their partisans made his friends, the Duke had laid very good foundations, to build his own greatness on, having in his power all *Romania* with the Duchy of *Urbino*, and gained the hearts of those people, by beginning to give them some relish of their well being. And because this part is worthy to be taken notice of, and to be

imitated by others, I will not let it escape. The Duke, when he had taken *Remania*, finding it had been under the hands of poor Lords who had rather pillag'd their subjects, than chastis'd or amended them, giving them more cause of discord, than of peace and union, so that the whole countrey was fraught with robberies, quarrels, and other sorts of insolencies; thought the best way to reduce them to termes of pacification, and obedience to a Princely power, was, to give them some good government: and therefore he set over them one *Remiro D' Orco*, a cruel hasty man, to whom he gave an absolute power. This man in a very short time settled peace and union amongst them with very great reputation. Afterwards the Duke thought such excessive authority serv'd not so well to his purpose, and doubting it would grow odious, he erected a civil Iudicature in the midst of the countrey, where one excellent Judge did Preside, and thither every City sent their Advocate: and because he knew the figors past had bred some hatred against him, to purge the minds of those people, and to gain them wholly to himself, he purpos'd to shew, that if there was any cruelty used, it proceeded not from any order of his, but from the harsh disposition of his Officers. Whereupon laying hold on him, at this occasion, he caus'd his head to be struck off one morning early in the market place at *Cesena*, where he was left upon a gibbet, with a bloody sword by his side; the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people. But to return from whence we have digress'd: I say, that the Duke finishing

ding himself very strong, and in part out of doubt of the present dangers, because he was arm'd after his own manner, and had in some good measure suppress'd those forces, which, because of their vicinity, were able to annoy him, he wanted nothing else to go on with his Conquest, but the consideration of *France*: for he knew, that the King, who now, though late, was advis'd of his error, would never suffer him: and hereupon he began to seek after new alliances, and to waver with *France*, when the *French* came towards *Naples* against the *Spaniards*, who then besieged *Gagetta*; and his design was only to be out of their danger, which had been effected for him, had Pope *Alexander* lived. And thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate. As for the future, he had reason to doubt lest the new successor to the Papacy would not be his friend, and would endeavor to take that from him that *Alexander* had bestowed on him; and he thought to provide for this foure waies: First by rooting out the races of all those Lords he had dispoyled, whereby to take those occasions from the Pope. Secondly, by gaining all the gentlemen of *Rome*, whereby he might be able with those to keep the Pope in some awe. Thirdly, to make the Colledge of Cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be. Fourthly, by making of so large Conquests, before the Popes death, as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of his enemies. Three of these sower at Pope *Alexanders* death he had effected, and the fourth he had neare brought to a point. For of those Lords he had stript, he put to death as many as  
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he could come at, and very few escap'd him : he gain'd him the *Roman* Gentlemen: and in the Colledge he had made a great faction. And touching his new Conquest, he had a desigine to become Lord of *Tuscany*. And he had possessed himself already of *Perusia*, and *Pombin*, and taken protection of *Pisa*: and so soon as he should have cast off his respect to *France* (which now he meant to hold no longer) being the *French* were now driven out of the Kingdome of *Naples* by the *Spaniards*, so that each of them was forc'd to buy his friendship at any termes; he was then to leap into *Pisa*. After this *Lucca* and *Siena* were presently to fall to him, partly for envy to the *Florentines*, and partly for fear. The *Florentines* had no way to escape him: all which, <sup>1</sup> ad it succeeded with him, as without question it had, the very same year that *Alexander* dy'd, he had made himself master of so great forces, and such reputation, that he would have been able to have stood upon his own bottom, without any dependance of fortune, or resting upon others helps, but only upon his own strength and valor. But *Alexander* dy'd five years after that he had begun to draw forth his sword: and left him settled only in the State of *Romania*, with all his other designs in the ayre, sick unto death, between two very strong armies of his enemies; and yet was there in this Duke such a spirit and courage: and he understood so well, how men are to be gain'd, and how to be lost, and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time, that, had he not had these armies upon his back, or had been in health, he would have carried through his purpose in spite of all opposition.

opposition; and that the foundations he grounded upon were good, it appeared in that *Romania* held for him above a moneth, and he remained secure in *Rome*, though even at deaths doore: and however the *Baglioni*, *Vitelli*, and *Orsini* came into *Rome*; yet found they none would take their parts against him. And this he was able to have effected, that if he could not have made him Pope whom he would, he could have hindered him that he would not should be Pope. But had he been in health when *Alexander* dy'd, every thing had gone easily with him; and he told me on that day that *Julius* the second was created Pope, that he had fore-thought on all that which could happen, in case his father chanc'd to dye, and for every thing provided its remedy, this onely excepted, that he foresaw not that he himself should at the same time be brought unto deaths doore also. Having then collected all the Dukes actions, we thinks I could not well blame him, but rather (as I have here done) set him as a pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others armes have been exalted to an Empire. For he being of great courage, and having lofty designs, could not carry himself otherwise; and the only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of *Alexanders* life, and his own sickness. Whoever therefore deemes it necessary in his entrance into a new Principality, to secure himself of his enemies, and gain him friends, to overcome either by force, or by cunning, to make himself beloved, or feared of his people, be followed and revered by his soldiers, to root out those that

can, or owe thee any hurt, to change the ancient orders with new wayes, to be severe, and yet acceptable, magnanimous, and liberrall; to extinguish the unfaithfull soldiery, and create new; to maintain to himself the amities of Kings and Princes, so that they shall either with favor benefit thee, or be wary how to offend thee; cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this man. He deserves to be found fault withall for the creation of *Julius* the second, wherein an evil choice was made for him: for, as it is said, not being able to make a Pope to his mind, he could have withheld any one from being Pope; and should never have consented that any one of those Cardinals should have got the Papacy, whom he had ever done harme to; or who having attained the Pontificate were likely to be afraid of him: because men ordinarily do hurt either for fear, or hatred. Those whom he had offended, were among others, he who had the title of *St. Peter ad Vincula*, *Colonna*, *St. George*, and *Ascanius*; all the others that were in possibility of the Papedom, were such as might have feared him rather, except the Cardinal of *Roan*, and the *Spaniards*; these by reason of their allyance and obligation with him, the other because of the power they had, having the Kingdom of *France* on their party; Wherefore the Duke above all things should have created a *Spaniard* Pope, and in case he could not have done that, he should have agreed that *Roan* should have been, and not *St. Peter ad Vincula*. And whoever beleeves, that with great personages new benefits blot on the

the remembrance of old injuries, is much deceived. The Duke therefore in this election, was the cause of his own ruine at last.

*Till we come to this seaventh Chapter, I find not any thing much blame-worthy, unlesse it be on ground he layes in the second Chapter; whereupon hee builds most of this Fabrick, viz. That Subjects must either be dallyed or flattered withall, or quite crushed. Whereby our Author advises his Prince to support his authority with two Cardinall Vertues, Dissimulation and Cruelty. He considers not herein that the head is but a member of the body, though the principall; and the end of the parts is the good of the whole. And here he goes against himselfe in the twenty sixt Chapter of his Rep. l. i. where hee blames Philip of Macedon for such courses, terming them very cruell, and against all Christian manner of living; and that every man should refuse to be a King, and desire rather to live a private life, than to reigne so much to the ruine of mankind. The life of Caesar Borgia, which is here given as a paterne to new Princes, we shall find to have been nothing else but a cunning arriage of things so, that he might thereby first deceive and inveigle, and then suppress all those that could oppose or hinder his ambition. For if you runne over his life, you shall see the Father Pope Alexander the sixt and him, both imbarqued for his advancement, wherein they engag'd the Papall authority, and reputation of Religion; for faith and conscience these men never knew, though they exacted it of others: there was never promise made, but it was only so farre kept as servd for advantage; Liberalitie was made use of; Clemency and Cruelty*

Cruelty, all alike, as they might serve to worke with their purposes. All was sacrific'd to ambition; no friendship could ye these men, nor any religion: and no marvell: for ambition made them forget both God and man. But see the end of all this cunning: though this Cæsar Borgia contrived all his businesse so warily, that our Author much commends him, and hee had attained neere the pitch of his hopes, and had provided for each misadventure could befall him its remedy; Policy shewd it selesse short-sighted; for hee foresaw not at the time of his Fathers death, he himself should bee brought unto deaths doore also. And we think this Example might have given occasion to our Author to confesse, that surely there is a God that ruleth the earth. And many times God cuts off those cunning and mighty men in the hight of their purposes, when they think they have neare surmounted all dangers and difficulties. To the intent that the living may know, that the most high ruleth in the Kingdome of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men. Daniel. 4. 17.

## CHAP. VIII.

Concerning those who by wicked meanes have attained to a Principality

**B**Ut because a man becomes a Prince of a private man two wayes, which cannot wholly be attributed either to Fortune or Vertue, I think not fit to let them passe me: howbeit the one of them may be more largely discoursed upon, where the Republicks are treated of. These are, when by some wicked  
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and unlawfull meanes a man rises to the Principality; or when a private person by the favour of his fellow Citizens becomes Prince of his countrey. And speaking of the first manner, it shall be made evident by two Examples, the one ancient, the other moderne, without entring otherwise into the justice or merit of this part; for I take it that these are sufficient for any body that is forc'd to follow them. *Agathocles the Sicilian*, not of a private man onely, but from a base and abject fortune, got to be King of *Siracusa*. This man borne but of a Potter, continued alwayes a wicked life throughout all the degrees of this fortune: neverthelesse he accompanied his lewdnesse with such a courage and resolution, that applying himselfe to military affaires, by the degrees thereof he attained to bee Prætor of *Siracusa*, and being seised in that degree, and having determined that he would become Prince, and hold that by violence and without obligation to any other, which by consent had been granted him: and to this purpose having had some private intelligence touching his designe with *Amilcar the Carthaginian*, who was imployd with his army in *Sicily*, one morning gathered the people together and the Senate of *Syracusa*, as if he had some what to advise with them of matters belonging to the Commonwealth; and upon a signe given, caus'd his souldiers to kill his Senatours, and the richest of the people; who being slaine, he usarp'd the Principality of that City without any civill strife: and however he was twice broken by the *Carthaginians*, and at last besieged, was able not onely to defend his

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own City, but leaving part of his own army at the defence thereof, with the other invaded *Affrique*, and in a short time freed *Siracusa* from the siege, and brought the *Carthaginians* into extreme necessity, who were constrained to accord with him, be contented with the possession of *Affrique*, and quit *Sicily* to *Agathocles*. He then that should consider the actions and valour of this man, would not see any, or very few things to be attributed unto Fortune; seeing that as is formerly sayd, not by any ones favour, but by the degrees of service in warre with many sufferings and dangers, to which he had risen, he came to the Principality; and that hee maintaned afterwards with so many resolute and hazardous undertakings. Yet cannot this be term'd vertue or valour to slay his own Citizens, betray his friends, to be without faith, without pittie, without religion, which wayes are of force to gaine dominion, but not glory: for if *Agathocles* his valour bee well weighd, in his enturing upon, and comming off from dangers, and the greatnesse of his courage, insupporting and mastering of adversities, no man can see why he should be thought any way inferiour even to the ablest Captaines. Notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with innumerable wickednesses, allow not that he should be celebrated among the most excellent men. That cannot then be attributed to Fortune or Vertue, which without the one or the other was attained to by him. In our dayes, while *Alexander* the sixth held the sea, *Olivierotte* of *Fermo*, who some few yeeres before had been left young by his parents, was brought up under

under the care of an uncle of his on the mothers side, called *John Foliani*, and in the beginning of his youth given, by him to serve in the warres under *Paulo Vitelli*: to the end that being well instructed in that discipline, he might rise to some worthy degree in the warrs. Afterwards when *Paulo* was dead, he served under *Vitellozzo* his brother, and in very short time, being ingenious, of a good personage, and brave courage, he became one of the prime men among the troops he served in: but thinking it but servile to depend upon another, he plotted by the ayd of some Citizens of *Fermo* (who lik'd rather the thraldome of their City than the liberty of it) and by the favour of the *Vitelli*, to make himselfe master of *Fermo*; and writ to *John Foliani*, that having been many yeeres from home, he had a mind to come and see him and the City, and in some part take notice os his own patrimony; and because he had not imployd himselfe but to purchase honour, to the end his Citizens might perceive, that he had not vainely spent his time, he had a desire to come in good equipage and accompanied with a hundred horse of his friends and servants; and he intreated him that he would be pleas'd so to take order, that he might be honourably received by the inhabitants of *Fermo*, which turnd as well to his honor that was his uncle, as his that was the nephew. In this, *John* faild not in any office of courtesie due to his nephew: and caus'd him to be well receivd by them of *Fermo*, and lodged him in his own house: where having passed some dayes, and stayd to put in order somewhat that was necessary

necessary for his intended villany, he made a very solemne feast, whether he invited *John Foliani*, and all the prime men of *Fermo*; and when all their chear was ended, and all their other entertainments, as in such feasts it is customary, *Oliverotto* of purpose mov'd some grave discourses; speaking of the greatnesse of Pope *Alexander*, and *Cesar* his son, and their undertakings; where unto *John* and the others making answer, he of a sudden stood up, saying, that those were things to be spoken of in a more secret place, and so retir'd into a chamber, whether *John* and all the others Citizens followd him; nor were they sooner set downe there, than from some secret place therein came forth diverse souldiers, who slew *John* and all the others: after which homicide *Oliverotto* got a horsebacke and ravaged the whole towne, and besieged the supreme Magistrate in the palace, so that for feare they were all constrained to obey him, and to settle a government, whereof hee made himselfe Prince; and they being all dead who, had they been discontented with him, could have hurt him; he strengthened himselfe with new civill and military orders, so that in the space of a yeer that he held the Principality, he was not only secure in the City of *Fermo*, but became fearefull to all his neighbours; and the conquest of him would have prov'd difficult, as that of *Agathocles*, had he not let himselfe been deceivd by *Cesar Borgia*, when at *Sinigallia*, as before was said, he took the *Orsini* and *Vitelli*: where he also being taken a yeere after he had committed the parricide, was strangled together with *Vinellozzo* (whome he had had for master

master both of his vertues and vices.) Some man might doubt from whence it should proceed, that *Agathocles*, and such like, after many treacheries and cruelties, could possibly live long secure in his own conatrey, and defend himselfe from his forreine enemies, and that never any of his own Citizens conspir'd against him, seeing that by means of cruelty, many others have never been able even in peaceable times to maintaine their States, much lesse in the doubtfull times of warre. I beleeve that this proceeds from the well, or ill using of those cruelties: they may bee termed well us'd (if it bee lawfull to say well of evill) that are put in practice only once of necessity for securities sake, not insisting therein afterwards; but there is use made of them for the subjects profit, as much as may be. But those that are ill us'd, are such as though they bee but few in the beginning, yet they multiply rather in time, than diminish. They that take that first way, may with the help of God, and mens care, find some remedy for their State, as *Agathocles* did: for the others, it is impossible they should continue. Whereupon it is to be noted, that in the lay ing hold of a State, the usurper thereof ought to runne over and execute all his cruelties at once, that he be not forced often to returne to them, and that he may be able, by not renewing of them, to give men some security, and gaine their affections by doing them some courtesies. Hee that carries it otherwile, either for searefullnesse, or upon evill advice, is alwayes constrained to hold his sword drawne in his hand; nor ever can hee rely upon his subjects, there being no possibility

possibility for them, because of his daily and continuall injuries, to live in any safety: for his injuries should bee done altogether, that being seldemer tsted, they might lesse offend; his favours should bee bestowed by little, and little to the end they might keep their taste the better; and above all things a Prince must live with his subjects in such sort, that no accident either of good or evill can make him vary: for necessity comming upon him by reason of adversities, thou hast not time given thee to make advantage of thy cruelties; and the favours which then thou bestowest, will little help thee, being taken as if they came from thee perforce, and so yeeld no returne of thanks.

## CHAP. IX.

*Of the Civill Principality.*

**B**Ut comming to the other part, when a principall Citizen, not by villany, or any other insufferable violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens becomes Prince of his native countrey: which we may terme a Civill Principality; nor to attaine hereunto is Verue wholly, or Fortune wholly necessary, but rather a fortunate cunning: I say, this Principality is climb'd up to, either by the peoples help, or the great mens. For, in every City we finde these two humours differ; and they spring from this, that the people desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are desirous to command and oppresse the people: and from these two severall appetites, arise in the City one of these three effects, either a Principality, or Liberty, or Tumultuary licentiousnesse. The Principality is caused either

either by the people, or the great ones, according as the one or other of these factions have the occasion offerd; for the great ones seeing themselves not able to resist the people, begin to turne the whole reputation to one among them, and make him Prince, whereby they may under his shadow vent their spleenes. The people also, not being able to support the great mens insolencies, converting the whole reputation to one man, create him their Prince, to be protected by his authority. He that comes to the Principality by the assistance of the great ones, subsists with more difficulty, than he that attaines to it by the peoples favour; for he being made Prince, hath many about him, who account themselves his equals, and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure. But he that gaines the Principality by the peoples favor, finds himselfe alone in his throne, and hath none or very few neare him that are not very supple to bend: besides this, the great ones cannot upon easie termes be satisfied, or without doing of wrong to others, where as a small master contents the people: for the end which the people propound to themselves, is more honest than that of the great men, these desiring to oppresse, they only not to be oppressed. To this may be added also, that the Prince which is the peoples enemy, can never well secure himselfe of them, because of their multitude; well may hee bee sure of the Nobles, they being but a few. The worst that a Prince can look for of the people become his enemy, is to be abandoned by them: but when the great ones once grow his enemies, he is not only to  
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fear their abandoning of him, but their making of a party against him also: for there being in them more forecast and craft, they alwayes take time by the forelocks whereby to save themselves, and seeke credit with him who they hope shall get the mastery. The Prince likewise is necessitated alwayes to live with the same people, but can doe well enough without the same great men; he being able to create new ones, and destroy them again every day, and to take from them, and give them credit as he pleases: and to cleare this part, I say, that great men ought to be considered two wayes principally, that is, if they take thy proceedings so much to heart, as to engage their fortunes wholly in thine, in case they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle, they ought to be well honoured and esteem'd: those that bind themselves not to thy fortune, are to be considered also two wayes; either they doe it for lack of courage, and naturall want of spirit, and then shouldst thou serve thy selfe of them, and of them especially that are men of good advice; for if thy affaires prosper, thou dost thy selfe honour thereby; if cross, thou needst not feare them: but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose, and upon occasion of ambition, it is a signe they think more of themselves than of thee: and of these the Prince ought to beware, and account of them as his discovered enemyes: for alwayes in thy adversity they will give a hand too to ruine thee. Therefore ought hee that comes to be Prince by the peoples favour, keepe them his friends: which he may easily doe, they desiring only to live free from oppression



pression : but he that becomes Prince by the great mens favour, against the will of the people, ought above all things to gaine the people to him, which he may easily effect, when he takes upon him their protection ; And because men when they find good, where they look for evill, are thereby more endered to their benefactour. therefore growes the people so pliant in their subjection to him, as if by their favours he had attained his dignity. And the Prince is able to gaine them to his side by many wayes, which because they vary according to the subject, no certaine rule can be given thereupon ; wherefore we shall let them passe I will only conclude, that it is necessary for a Prince to have the people his friend ; otherwise in his adversities he hath no helpe. *Nabis* Prince of the *Spartans* supported the siege of all *Greece*, and an exceeding victorious army of the *Romans*, and against those defended his native countrey and State, and this suffic'd him alone, that as the danger came upon him, he secur'd himself of a fewer ; whereas if the people had been his enemy, this had nothing availd him. And let no man think to overthrow this my opinion with that common proverb, that He who relyes upon the people, layes his foundation in the dirt ; for that is true where a private Citizen grounds upon them. making his account that the people shall free him, when either his enemies or the Magistrates oppresse him : In this case he should find himself often deceiv'd, as it befell the *Gracchyes* in *Rome*, and in *France* *George Scali* : but he being a Prince that grounds thereupon, who can command, and is a man of courage, who hath his wits about him

him in his adversities, and wants not other preparations, and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and orders, shall not prove deceiv'd by them, and shall find he hath layd good foundations. These Principalities are wont to be upon the point of falling when they goe about to skip from the ciuil order to the absolute: for these Princes either command of themselves, or by the Magistrate; in this last case their State is more weak and dangerous, because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these Citizens, who then are set over the Magistrates, who especially in adverse times are able with facility to take their State from them either by rising up against them, or by not obeying them; and then the Prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him: for the Citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the Magistrates, are not like in those factions to obey his: and in doubtfull times he shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom he may trust; for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times, when the Citizens have need of the State; for then everyone runs, and every one promises, and very one will venture his life for him, when there is no danger neare; but in times of hazzard, when the State hath need of Citizens, there are but few of them then, and so much the more is this experience dangerous, in that it can be but once made. Therefore a prudent Prince ought to devise a way whereby his Citizenis alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government, and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to him.

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## CHAP. X.

*In what manner the Forces of all Principalities ought to be measured.*

**I**T is requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities, to have another consideration of them, that is, if a Prince have such dominions, that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself, or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend him. And to clear this point the better, I judge them able to stand of themselves, who are of power either for their multitudes of men, or quantity of money, to bring into the field a compleat armie, and ioyn battel with whoever comes to assail them: and so I think those alwaies to stand in need of others help, who are not able to appear in the field against the enemy, but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them. Touching the first case, we have treated already, and shall adde somewhat thereto as occasion shall require. In the second case, we cannot say other, save only to encourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their own Capital city, and of the countrey about; nor to hold much account; and whoever shall have well fortified that town, and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects, as hath been formerly said, and hereafter shall be, shall never be assaild but with great regard; for men willingly undertake not enterprises, where they see difficulty to work them through; nor can much facility be there found, where one assails him, who hath his town strong and well guarded,

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guarded, and is not hated of his people. The cities of *Germany* are very free ; they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them; and they obey the Emperor, when they please, and they stand not in fear, neither of him nor any other Potentate about them : for they are in such a manner fortified, that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious: for all of them have ditches and rampires, and good store of Artillery, and alwaies have their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeer : besides this, whereby to feed the common people, and without any loss to the publick, they have alwaies in common whereby they are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city, and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves : they hold up also the military exercises in repute, and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them. A Prince then that is master of a good strong city, and causeth not himself to be hated, cannot be assaulted ; and in case he were, he that should assail him, would be faine to quit him with shame : for the affairs of the world are sovarious, that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incamp before a town for the space of a whole yeer : and if any should reply, that the people having their possessions abroad, in case they should see them a fire, would not have patience, and the tedious siege and their love to themselves would make them forget their Prince : I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious, will easily master those difficulties, now giving his subjects hope, that

that the mischief will not be of durance; sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies, and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy. Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey, upon his arrival, and at those times while mens minds are yet warme, and resolute in their defence: and therefore so much the less ought a Prince doubt: for after some few dayes, that their courages grow coole, the dammages are all done, and mischiefs received, and there is no help for it, and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince, thinking he is now more bound to them, their houses having for his defence been fired, and their possessions wasted; and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindneses they do, as for those they receive; whereupon if all be well weigh'd, a wise Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his Citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege, when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition.

## • CHAP. XI.

*Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities.*

Here remains now only that we treat of the Ecclesiastical Principalities, about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten: for they are attained to either by vertue, or Fortune; and without the

one or the other they are held: for they are maintained by orders inveterated in the religion, all which are so powerfull and of such nature, that they maintain their Princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live. These only have an Estate and defend it not; have subjects and govern them not; and yet their States because undefended, are not taken from them; nor their subjects, though not govern'd, care not, think not, neither are able to aliene themselves from them. These Principalities then are only happy and secure: but they being sustained by superior causes, whereunto humane understanding reaches not, I will not meddle with them: for being set up and maintained by God, it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them. Yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds, that the Church in temporal power hath attained to such greatness, seeing that till the time of *Alexander the sixt*, the *Italian* Potentates, and not only they who are entituled the potentates, but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition, in regard of the temporality, made but small account of it; and now a King of *France* trembles at the power thereof; and it hath been able to drive him out of *Italy*, and ruine the *Venetians*; and however this be well known, me thinks it is not superfluous in some part to recall it to memory. Before that *Charles* King of *France* past into *Italy*, this countrey was under the rule of the Pope, *Venetians*, the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines*. These Potentates took two things principally

pally to their care; the one, that no forreiner should invade *Italy*; the other, that no one of them should enlarge their State. They, against whom this care was most taken, were the Pope and the *Venetians*; and to restrain the *Venetians*, there needed the union of all the rest, as it was in the defence of *Ferrara*; and to keep the Pope low, they served themselves of the Barons of *Rome*, who being divided into two factions, the *Orsini* and *Colonnese*, there was alwaies occasion of offence between them, who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope, held the Popedom weak and feeble: and however sometimes there arose a courageous Pope, as was *Sextus*; yet either his fortune, or his wisdom was not able to free him of these incommodities, and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof; for in ten years, which time, one with another, Popes ordinarily liv'd, with much ado could they bring low one of the factions. And if, as we may say, one had near put out the *Colonnese*, there arose another enemy to the *Orsini*, who made them grow again, so that there was never time quite to root them out. This then was the cause, why the Popes temporal power was of small esteem in *Italy*; there arose afterwards Pope *Alexander* the sixth, who of all the Popes that ever were, shewed what a Pope was able to do with money and forces: and he effected, by means of his instrument, Duke *Valentine*, and by the occasion of the *French* mens passage, all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions: and however his purpose was nothing at all to enlarge the Church dominions, but to make

the Duke great; yet what he did, turnd to the Churches advantage, which after his death when the Duke was taken away, was the heir of all his pains. Afterwards succeeded Pope *Julius*, and found the Church great, having all *Romania*, and all the Barons of *Rome* being quite rooted out, and by *Alexanders* persecutions, all their factions worne down; he found also the way open for the heaping up of moneys, never practised before *Alexanders* time; which things *Julius* not only follow'd, but augmented; and thought to make himself master of *Bolonia*, and extinguish the *Venetians*, and chase the *French* men out of *Italy*: and these designs of his prov'd all lucky to him, and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the Church, and in no private regard: he kept also the factions of the *Orsini* and *Colonne*, in the same State he found them: and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration; yet two things have held them quiet; the one the power of the Church, which somewhat affrights them; the other because they have no Cardinals of their factions, who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them: nor shall these parties ever be at rest, while they have Cardinals; because they nourish the factious both in *Rome*, and abroad; and the Barons then are forced to undertake the defence of them: and thus from the Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons. And now hath Pope *Leo* his Holiness found the Popedome exceeding puissant, of whom it is hoped, that if they amplified it by armes

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he by his goodness, and infinite other virtues, will much more advantage and dignifie it.

## CHAP. XII.

*How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching Mercenary soldiers.*

**H**AVING treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities, which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon, and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being, and shewd the waies whereby many have sought to gain, and hold them, it remains now that I speak in general of the offences and defences, that may chance in each of the forenamed. We have formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good foundations laid; otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack. The Principal foundations that all States have, as well new, as old, or mixt, are good laws, and good armes; and because there cannot be good laws, where there are not good armes; and where there are good armes, there must needs be good laws, I will omit to discourse of the laws, and speak of armes. I say then that the armes, wherewithall a Prince defends his State, either are his own, or mercenary, or auxiliary, or mixt. Those that are mercenary and auxiliar, are unprofitable, and dangerous, and if any one holds his State founded upon mercenary armes, he shall never be quiet, nor secure, because they are never well united,

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ambitious, and without discipline, treacherous, among their friends stout, among their enemies cowardly; they have no fear of God, nor keep any faith with men; and so long only defer they the doing of mischief, till the enemy comes to assaile thee; and in time of peace thou art despoyled by them, in war by thy enemies: the reason hereof is, because they have no other love, nor other cause to keep them in the field, but only a small stipend, which is not of force to make them willing to hazard their lives for thee: they are willing indeed to be thy soldiers, till thou goest to fight; but then they fly, or run away; which thing would cost me but small pains to perswade; for the ruine of *Italy* hath not had any other cause now a dayes, than for that it hath these many yers rely'd upon mercenary armes; which a good while since perhaps may have done some man some service, and among themselves they may have been thought valiant: but so soon as any forrein enemy appeared, they quickly shewed what they were. Whereupon *Charles* the King of *France*, without opposition, made himself master of all *Italy*: and he that said, that the causes thereof were our faults, said true; but these were not those they beleeved, but what I have told; and because they were the Princes faults, they also have suffered the punishment. I will fuller shew the infelicity of these armes. The mercenary Captains are either very able men, or not: if they be, thou canst not repose any trust in them: for they will alwaies aspire unto their own proper advancements, either by suppressing of thee that art their Lord, or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy

thy purpose : but if the Captain be not valorous, he ordinarily ruines thee : and in case it be answered, that whoever shall have his armes in his hands, whether mercenary or not, will do so : I would reply, that armes are to be imployed either by a Prince, or Common-wealth. The Prince ought to go in person, and performe the office of a commander : the Republick is to send forth her Citizens : and when she sends forth one that proves not of abilities, she ought to change him then ; and when he does prove valorous, to bridle him so by the laws, that he exceed not his commission. And by experience we see, that Princes and Republicques of themselves alone, make very great conquests ; but that mercenary armes never do other than harme ; and more hardly falls a Republick armed with her own armes under the obedience of one of her own Citizens, than one that is armed by forrein armes. *Rome* and *Sparta* subsist d many ages armed and free. The *Swissers* are exceedingly well armed, and yet very free. Touching mercenary armes that were of old, we have an example of the *Carthagians*, who near upon were oppress'd by their own mercenary soldiers, when the first war with the *Romans* wa finished ; however the *Carthagians* had their own Citizens for their Captains. *Philip* of *Macedon* was made by the *Thebans* after *Epaminondas* his death, General of their Armies ; and after the victory, he took from them their liberty. The *Milanese*s when Duke *Philip* was dead, entertained *Francis Sforza* into their pay, against the *Venetians*, who having vanquishd their enemy at *Carraggio*, afterwards joyned with them, where

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by to usurp upon the *Milanefes* his Masters. *Sforza* his father, being in *Joan* the Queen of *Naples* pay, left her on a sudden disarmed; whereupon she, to save her Kingdom, was constrained to cast her self into the King of *Arragon's* bosome. And in case the *Venetians* and the *Florentines* have formerly augmented their State with these kind of armes, and their own Captains, and yet none of them have ever made themselves their Princes, but rather defended them: I answer, that the *Florentines* in this case have had fortune much their friend: for of valorous Captains, which they might any way fear, some have not been victors, some have had opposition, and others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way. He who overcame not, was *John Acuto*, of whose faith there could no proof be made, being he vanquish't not; but every one will acknowledge, that, had he vanquish't, the *Florentines* were at his discretion. *Sforza* had alwaies the *Bracceschi* for his adversaries, so that they were as a guard one upon another. *Francis* converted all his ambition against *Lombardy*. *Braccio* against the Church, and the Kingdome of *Naples*. But let us come to that which followed a while agoe. The *Florentines* made *Paul Vitelli* their General, a thoroughly advis'd man, and who from a private fortune had rose to very great reputation: had he taken *Pisa*, no man will deny but that the *Florentines* must have held fast with him; for had he been entertained in their enemies pay, they had no remedy; and they themselves holding of him, of force were to obey him. The *Venetians*, if we consider their proceedings, we shall see wrought both warily and gloriously, while

while themselves made war, which was before their undertakings by land, where the gentlemen with their own Commons in armes behav'd themselves bravely: but when they began to fight by land, they lost their valor, and follow'd the customes of *Italy*; and in the beginning of their enlargement by land, because they had not much territory, and yet were of great reputation, they had not much cause to fear their Caprains; but as they began to extend their bounds, which was under their Commander *Carminola*, they had a taste of this error: for perceiving he was exceeding valorous, having under his conduct beaten the Duke of *Milan*; and knowing on the other side, how he was cold in the war, they judg'd that they could not make any great conquest with him; and because they neither would, nor could cashier him, that they might not lose what they had gotten, they were forced for their own safeties to put him to death. Since they have had for their General *Bartholomew of Berganio*, *Robert of St. Severin*, the Count of *Petilian*, and such like: whereby they were to fear their losses, as well as to hope for gain: as it fell out afterwards at *Vaila*, where in one day they lost that, which with so much pains they had gotten in eight hundred years: for from these kind of armes grow slack and slow and weak gains; but sudden and wonderfull losses: And because I am now come with these examples into *Italy*, which now these many years, have been govern'd by mercenary armes, I will search deeper into them, to the end that their course and progress being better discoverd, they may be the better amended. You have to understand,

stand, that so soon as in these later times the yoke of the *Italian Empire* began to be shaken off, and the Pope had gotten reputation in the temporality, *Italy* was divided into several States: for many of the great cities took armes against their Nobility; who under the Emperors protection had held them in oppression; and the Pope favored these, whereby he might get himself reputation, in the temporality; of many others, their Citizens became Princes, so that henceupon *Italy* being come into the Churches hands as it were, and some few Republicks, those Priests and Citizens not accustomed to the use of armes, began to take strangers to their pay. The first that gave reputation to these soldiers was *Alberick of Como* in *Romania*. From his discipline among others descended *Braccio* and *Sforza*, who in their time were the arbitres of *Italy*; after these followed all others, who even till our dayes have commanded the armes of *Italy*; and the success of their va'or hath been, that it was overrun by *Charles*, pillaged by *Lewis*, forc'd by *Ferdinand*, and disgrac'd by the *Swissers*. The order which they have held, hath been, first whereby to give reputation to their own armes to take away the credit of the Infantry. This they did, because they having no State of their own, but living upon their industry, their few foot gave them no reputation, and many they were not able to maintain; whereupon they reduc'd themselves to cavallery, and so with a sup portable number they were entertained and honored: and matters were brought to such termes, that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers you should not find two thousand foot. They had moreover us'd all industry to  
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free themselves and their soldiers of all pains and fear, in their skirmishes, not killing, but taking one another prisoners, and without ransome for their freedom; they repaired not all to their tents by night, nor made palizado or trench thereabout, nor lay in the field in the summer: and all these things were thus contrived and agreed of among them in their military orders, whereby (as is said) to avoid pains and dangers, insomuch as they have brought *Italy* into slavery and disgrace.

## CHAP. XIII.

*Of Auxiliary Soldiers, mixt, and native.*

THE Auxiliary forces, being the other kind of unprofitable armes, are, when any puissant one is called in, who with his forces comes to assist and defend thee; such as in these later times did Pope *Julius* use, who having seen the evil proof of his mercenary soldiers in the enterprize of *Ferrara*, applied himself to the Auxiliaries, and agreed with *Ferdinand* King of Spain, that with his Forces he should aid him. These armes may be profitable and advantageous for themselves; but for him that calls them in, hurtfull; because in losing, thou art left defeated; and conquering, thou becomest their prisoner. And however true of these examples the ancient stories are full fraught; yet will I not part from this of Pope *Julius* the second, which is as yet fresh: whose course could not have been more inconsiderate, for the desire he had to get *Ferrara*, putting himself wholly into strangers hands: but his good fortune  
caused

caused another cause to arise, that hindred him from receiving the fruit of his evil choice; for his Auxiliaries being broken at *Ravenna*, and the *Swissers* thereupon arriving, who put the Conquerors to flight beyond all opinion, even their own and others, he chanced not to remain his enemies prisoner, they being put to flight, nor prisoner to his Auxiliaries, having vanquished by other forces than theirs. The *Florentines* being wholly disarmed, brought ten thousand *French* to *Pisa* for to take it. by which course they ran more hazzard, than in any time of their troubles. The Emperor of *Constantinople*, to oppress his neighbors, brought into *Greece* ten thousand *Turks*, who when the war was ended, could not be got out thence, which was the beginning of *Greeces* servitude under the Infidels. He then that will in no case be able to overcome, let him serve himself of these armes; for they are much more dangerous than the mercenaries; for by those thy ruine is more suddenly executed; for they are all united, and all bent to the obedience of another. But for the mercenaries to hurt thee, when they have vanquished, there is no more need of time, and greater occasion, they not being all united in a body, and being found out and paid by thee, wherein a third that thou mak'st their head, cannot suddenly gaine so great authority, that he can endamage thee. In summe, in the mercenaries their sloth and lazinesse to fight is more dangerous: in the auxiliaries their valour. Wherefore a wise Prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes. and betaken himselfe to his owne, and desired rather to losse with his owne, than conquer with



with anothers, accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes. I will not doubt to alleadge *Cesar Borgia*, and his actions. This Duke entred into *Romania* with auxiliarie armes, bringing with him all *French* souldiers: but afterwards not accounting those armes secure, bent himselfe to mercenari s, judging less danger to be in those, and tooke in pay the *Orfini* and the *Vitelli*, which afterwards in the proof of them, finding wavering, unfaithful, and dangerous, he extinguishd, and berook himselfe to his owne; and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes, considering the difference that was between the Dukes reputation, when he had the *French* men alone, and when he had the *Orfini* and *Vitelli*; but when he remaind with his own, and stood of himselfe, we shall find it was much augmented: nor ever was it of grate esteeme, but when every one saw, that he wholly possessed his owne armes. I thought not to have parted from the *Italian* examples of late memory; but that I must not let passe that of *Hiero* the *Siracusan*, being one of those I formerly nam'd. This man (as I said before) being made general of the *Siracusans* forces, knew presently that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings, as our *Italians* are; and finding no way either to hold, or cashier them, made them all bee cut to peeces, and afterwards waged warre with his owne men, and none others. I will also call to memory a figure of the old Testament serving just to this purpose. When *David* presented himselfe before

*Saul*

*Saul* to goe to fight with *Goliath* the *Philistims* Champion, *Saul* to encourage him, clad him with his owne armes, which *David* when he had them upon his back, refus'd, saying, he was not able to make any prooffe of himself therein, and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword. In summe, others armes either fall from thy shoulders, or cumber or streighten thee. *Charls* the seventh, Father of *Lewis* the eleventh, having by his good fortune and valour set *France* at liberry from the *English*, knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes, and settled in his Kingdome the ordinances of men at armes, and infantry. Afterwards King *Lewis* his sonne abolisht those of the infantry, and began to take the *Swissers* to pay; which error follow'd by the others, is (as now indeed it appeares) the cause of that Kingdomes dangers. For having given reputation to the *Swissers*, they have renderd all their own armes conremprible; for this hath wholly ruind their foot, and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes: for being accustomed to ferve with the *Swissers*, they think they are not able to overcome without them. From whence it comes that the *French* are not of force against the *Swissers*, and without them also against others they use not to adventure. Therefore are the *French* armies mixt, part mercenaries, and part natives, which armes are farre better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries, and much inferiour to the natives; and let the said example suffice for that: for the Kingdome of *France* would have been unconquerable, if  
*Charles*

Charles his order had been augmented and maintaind: but men in the'r small wisdom begin a thing, which then because it hath some favour of good, discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder, as I before said of the h. Stick seavers. Wherefore that Prince which perceives not mischieses, but as they grow up, is not truly wise; and this is given but to few: and if we consider the first ruine of the *Romane* Empire, we shall find it was from taking the *Goths* first into their pay; for from that beginning the forces of the *Romane* Empire began to grow weak, and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them. I conclude then that without having armes of their owne, no Principality can be secure, or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune, not having valour to shelter it in adversity. And it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men, that nothing is so weak and unsetled, as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces: which are those that are composed of thy subjects, or Citizens, or servants; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary; and the manner how to order those well, is easie to find out, if those orders above nam'd by me, shall be but run over, and if it shall be but consider'd, how *Philip Alexander* the Great his Father, and in what manner many Republicks and Princes have armd and appointed themselves, to which appointments I referre my selfe wholly.

*What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline.*

A Prince then ought to have no other ayme, nor other thought, nor take any thing else for his proper art, but warr, and the orders and discipline thereof; for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands, and is of so great excellency, that not only those that are borne Princes, it maintains so; but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity. And it is seene by the contrary, that when Princes have given themselves more to their delights, than to the warres, they have lost their States; and the first cause that makes thee lose it, is the neglect of that arte; and the cause that makes thee gaine it, is that thou art experienc'd and approv'd in that arte. *Francis Sforza* by being a man at armes, of a private man became Duke of *Milan*; and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging to those employments of Princes, became private men. For among oth:r mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee, it causes thee to be contem'd, which is one of those disgraces, from which a Prince ought to keepe himselfe, as hereafter shall be sayd: for from one that is disarm'd to one that is arm'd there is no proportion; and reason will not, that he who is in armes, should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnish'd of them, and that he that is disarm'd should be in security among his arm'd vassalls; for there being disdain in the

the one, and suspicion in the other, it is impossible these should ever well co-operate. And therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienc'd in matter of warre, besides the other infelicities belonging to him, as is said, cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers, nor yet trust in them. Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre, and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre; which he may be able to doe two wayes; the one practically, and in his labours and recreations of his body, the other theoretically. And touching the practick part, he ought besides the keeping of his own subjects well traind up in the discipline and exercise of armes, give himselfe much to the chase, whereby to accustome his body to paines, and partly to understand the manner of situations, and to know how the mountaines arise, which way the vallies open themselves, and how the plaines are distended flat abroad, and to conceive well the nature of the rivers, and marish ground, and herein to bestow very much care, which knowledge is profitable in two kinds: first he learns thereby to know his own countrey, and is the better enabled to understand the defence thereof, and afterwards by meanes of this knowledge and experience in these situations, easily comprehend any other situation, which a new he hath need to view, for the little hillocks, vallies, plaines, rivers, and marish places. For example, they in *Tuscany* are like unto those of other countries: so that from the knowledge of the site of one country, it is easie to attain to know that of others. And that  
Prince

Prince that wants this skill, failes of the principall part a Commander should be furnisht with; for this shows the way how to discover the enemy, to pitch the camp, to lead their armies, to order their battells, and also to besiege a town at thy best advantage. *Philopomenes* Prince of the *Achayans*, among other praises Writers give him, they say, that in time of peace, he thought not upon any thing so much as the practise of warre; and whensoever he was abroad in the field to disport himselfe with his friends, would often stand still, and discourse with them, in case the enemies were upon the top of that hill, and we here with our army, whether of us two should have the advantage, and how might we safely goe to find them, keeping still our orders; and if we would retire our selves, what course should we take if they retir'd, how should we follow them? & thus on the way, propounded them all such accidents could befall in any army; would heare their opinions, and tell his owne, and confirme it by argument; so that by his continuall thought hereupon, when ever he led any army no chance could happen, for which he had not a remedy. But touching the exercise of the mind, a Prince ought to read Histories, and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men, marke how they have behav'd themselves in the warrs, examine the occasions of their victories, and their losses; whereby they may be able to avoyd these, and obtaine those; and above all, doe as formerly some excellent man hath done, who hath taken upon him to imitate, if any one that hath gone before him hath left his memory glorious; the course he took, and kept alwaies near

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unto him the remembrances of his actions and worthy deeds: as it is said, that *Alexander* the great imitated *Achilles*; *Cesar Alexander*, and *Scipio Cyrus*. And whoever readsthe life of *Cyrus*, written by *Xenophon*, may easily perceiue afterwards in *Scipio's* life how much glory his imitation ga'nd him, and how much *Scipio* did conforme himselfe in his chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality with those things, that are writren by *Xenophon* of *Cyrus*. Such like wayes ought a wise Prince to take, nor ever be idle in quiet times, but by his paines then, as it were provide himself of store, whereof he may make some use in his aduersity, the end that when the times change, he may be able to resist the stormes of his hard fortune.

## CHAP. XV.

*Of those things, in respect whereof, men, and especially Princes, are praised, or dispraised.*

**I**T now remaines that we consider what the conditions of a Prince ought to be, and his termes of government over his subjects, and towards his friends. And because I know that many have written hereupon; I doubtr, lest I venturing also to treat thereof, may be branded with presumption, especially seeing I am like enough to deliver an opinion different from others. But my intent being to write for the advantage of him that understands me, I thought it fitter to follow the effectuall truth of the matter, than the imagination thereof; And many Principalities and Republicques, have been in imagination, which neither have been seen nor knowne to be indeed: for there is such a distance between how men doe live, and how men ought to live;

live; that he who leaves that which is done, for that which ought to be done, learns sooner his ruine than his preservation; for that man who will professe honesty in all his actions, must needs goe to ruine among so many that are dishonest. Whereupon it is necessary for a Prince, desiring to preserve himselfe, to be able to make use of that honestie, and to lay it aside againe, as need shall require. Passing by then things that are only in imagination belonging to a Prince, to discourse upon those that are really true; I say that all men, whensoever mention is made of them, and especially Princes, because they are placed aloft in the view of all, are taken notice of for some of these qualities, which procure them either commendations or blame: and this is that some one is held liberal, some miserable, (miserable I say, nor covetous; for the covetous desire to have, though it were by rapine; but a miserable man is he, that too much for bears to make use of his owne) some free givers, others extortioners; some cruell, others pitious; the one a Leaguebreaker, another faithfull; the one effeminate and of small courage, the other fierce and couragious; the one courteous, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other chaste; the one of faire dealing, the other wily and crafty; the one hard, the other easie; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other incredulous, and such like. I know that every one will confesse, it were exceedingly praise worthy for a Prince to be adorned with all these above nam'd qualities that are good: but because this is not possible, nor doe humane



humane conditions admit such perfection in virtues, it is necessary for him to be so discret, that he know how to avoid the infamie of those vices which would thrust him out of his State; and if it be possible, beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence; but where it cannot be, let them passe with lesse regard. And yet, let him not stand much upon it, though he incurre the infamie of those vices, without which he can very hardly save his State: for if all be thoroughly considerd, some things we shall find which will have the colour and very face of Vertue, and following them, they will lead the to thy destruction; whereas some others that shall as much seeme vice, if we take the course they lead us, shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being.

*The second blemish in this our Authours book, I find in his fifteenth Chapter: where he instructs his Prince to use such an ambidexterity as that he may serve himselfe either of vertue, or vice, according to his advantage; which in true policy is neither good in attaining the Principality nor in securing it when it is attained. For Politick, presuppose Ethiques, which will never allow this rule: as that a man might make this small difference between vertue, and vice, that he may indifferently lay aside, or take up the, one or the other, and put it in practise as best conduceth to the end he propounds himselfe. I doubt our Authour would have blamd Davids regard to Saul, when 1 Sam. 24. in the cave he cut off the lap of Sauls garment, and spared his head; and afterwards in the 26. when he forbade Abiathai to strike him as he lay sleeping. Worthy  
of*

of a Princes consideration is that saying of Abigail to David 1 Sam. 25. 30. *It shall come to passe when the Lord shall have done to my Lord according to all that he hath spoken concerning thee, & shall have appointed thee Ruler over Israel, that this shall be no grief to thee, nor offence of heart unto my Lord, that thou hast forborne to shed blood &c.* For surely the conscience of this evill ground whereupon they have either built, or underpropped their tyranny, causes men, as well meritis as spes in longum projicere, which sets them a work on further mischiefe.

## CHAP. XVI.

*Of Liberality, and Miserableness.*

**B**eginning then at the first of the above mentioned qualities, I say that it would be very well to be accounted liberall: nevertheless, liberality used in such a manner, as to make thee be accounted so, wrongs thee: for in case it be used vertuously, and as it ought to be, it shall never come to be taken notice of, so as to free thee from the infamie of its contrary. And therefore for one to hold the name of liberal among men, it were needfull not to omit any sumptuous quality, in somuch that a Prince alwayes so dispos'd, shall waste all his revenues, and at the end shall be forc'd, if he will still maintaine that reputation of liberality, heavily to burthen his subjects, and become a great exaetour; and put in practise all those things that can be done to get mony: Which begins to make him hatefull to his subjects, and fall into every ones contempt, growing necessitous: so that having with this liberality

berality wrong'd many, and imparted of his bounty but to a few; he feels every first mischance, and runs a hazard of every first danger: Which he knowing, and desiring to withdraw himself from, incurs presently the disgrace of being termed miserable. A Prince therefore not being able to use this vertue of liberality, without his own damage, in such a sort, that it may be taken notice of, ought, if he be wise, not to regard the name of Miserable; for in time he shall alwaies be esteemed the more liberal, seeing that by his parsimony his own revenues are sufficient for him; as also he can defend himself against whoever makes war against him, and can do some exploits without grieving his subjects: so that he comes to use his liberality to all those, from whom he takes nothing, who are infinite in number; and his miserableness towards those to whom he gives nothing, who are but a few. In our dayes we have not seen any, but those who have been held miserable, do any great matters; but the others all quite ruin'd. Pope *Julius* the second, however he serv'd himself of the name of Liberal, to get the Papacy, yet never intended he to continue it, to the end he might be able to make war against the King of *France*: and he made so many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax, because his long thrift supplied his large expences. This present King of *Spain* could never have undertaken, nor gone through with so many exploits, had he been accounted liberal. Wherefore a Prince ought little to regard (that he may not be driven to pillage his subjects, that he may be able to defend himself, that he

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may

may not fall into poverty and contempt, that he be not forced to become an extortioner) though he incur the name of miserable; for this is one of those vices, which does not pluck him from his throne. And if any one should say, *Cæsar* by his liberality obtained the Empire, and many others (because they both were, and were esteemed liberal) attained to exceeding great dignities. I answer, either thou art already come to be a Prince, or thou art in the way to it; in the first case, this liberality is hurtful; in the second, it is necessary to be accounted so; and *Cæsar* was one of those that aspired to the Principality of *Rome*. But if after he had gotten it, he had survived, and not forborne those expences, he would quite have ruined that Empire. And if any one should reply; many have been Princes, and with their armies have done great exploits, who have been held very liberal. I answer, either the Prince spends of his own and his subjects, or that which belongs to others: in the first, he ought to be sparing; in the second, he should not omit any part of liberality. And that Prince that goes abroad with his army, and feeds upon prey, and spoyle, and tributes, and hath the disposing of that which belongs to others, necessarily should use this liberality; otherwise would his soldiers never follow him; and of that which is neither thine, nor thy subjects, thou mayest well be a free giver, as were *Cyrus*, *Cæsar* and *Alexander*; for the spending of that which is anothers, takes not away thy reputation, but rather adds to it, only the wasting of that which is thine own hurts thee; nor is there any thing consumes it self so much as liberality, which whilst thou usest

usest, thou losest the means to make use of it, and becomest poore and abject; or to avoid this poverty, an extortioner and hatefull person. And among all those things which a Prince ought to beware of, is, to be dispised, and odious; to one and the other of which, liberality brings thee. Wherefore there is more discretion to hold the stile of Miserable, which begets an infamy without hatred, than to desire that of Liberal, whereby to incurre the necessity of being thought an extortioner, which procures an infamy with hatred.

## CHAP. XVII.

*Of Cruelty, and Clemency, and whether it is better to be belov'd, or feard.*

**D**Escending afterwards unto the other fore-alleged qualicities, I say, that every Prince should desire to be held pitiful, and not cruel. Nevertheless ought he beware that he ill uses not this pitty. *Casar Borgia* was accounted cruel, yet had his cruelty redrest the disorders in *Romania*, settled it in union, and restored it to peace, and fidelity: which, if it be well weighed, we shall see was an act of more pitty, than that of the people of *Florence*, who to avoyd the terme of cruelty, suffered *Pistoia* to fall to destruction. Wherefore a Prince ought not to regard the infamy of cruelty, for to hold his subjects united and faithful: for by giving a very few proofes of himself the other way, he shall be held more pittiful than they, who through their too much pitty, suffer disorders to

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follow,

follow, from whence arise murders and rapines: for these are wont to hurt an intire universality, whereas the executions practised by a Prince, hurt only some particular. And among all sorts of Princes, it is impossible for a new Prince to avoyd the name of cruel, because all new States are full of dangers: Whereupon *Virgil* by the mouth of *Dido* excuses the inhumanity of her Kingdom, saying,

*Res dura & Regni novitas me talia cogunt  
Moliri & latè fines custode tenere.*

My hard plight and new State force me to guard.

My confines all about with watch and ward.

Nevertheless ought he to be judicious in his giving beleaf to any thing, or moving himself thereat, nor make his people extreamly afraid of him; but proceed in a moderate way with wisdom, and humanity, that his too much confidence make him not unwary, and his too much distrust intolerable; from hence arises a dispute, whether it is better to be belov'd or feard: I answer, a man would wish he might be the one and the other: but because hardly can they subsist both together, it is much safer to be feard, than be loved; being that one of the two must needs fail; for touching men, we may say this in general, they are unthankful, unconstant, dissemblers, they avoyd dangers, and are covetous of gain; and whilest thou doest them good, they are wholly thine; their blood, their fortunes, lives and children are at thy service, as is said before, when the danger is remote; but when it approaches, they revolt. And that Prince who wholly relies upon their words, unfurnished  
of

of all other preparations, goesto wrack: for the friendships that are gotten with rewards, and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind, are dearly bought indeed; but they will neither keep long, nor serve well in time of need: and men do less regard to offend one that is supported by love, than by fear. For love is held by a certainty of obligation, which because men are mischievous, is broken upon any occasion of their own profit. But fear restrains with a dread of punishment which never forsakes a man. Yet ought a Prince cause himself to be belov'd in such a manner, that if he gains not love, he may avoid hatred: for it may well stand together, that a man may be feared and not hated; which shall never fail, if he abstain from his subjects goods, and their wives; and whensoever he should be forc'd to proceed against any of their lives, do it when it is to be done upon a just cause, and apparent conviction; but above all things forbear to lay his hands on other mens goods; for men forget sooner the death of their father, than the loss of their patrimony. Moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods, do never fail: and alwaies he that begins to live by rapine, finds occasion to lay hold upon other mens goods: but against mens lives, they are seldome found, and sooner fail. But where a Prince is abroad in the field with his army, and hath a multitude of soldiers under his government, then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it, though he be termed cruel: for unless he be so, he shall never have his soldiers live in accord one wth another, nor ever well disposed to any brave peice of service. Among *Hannibals* actions of mervail, this

is reckoned for one, that having a very huge army, gathered out of several nations, and all led to serve in a strange countrey, there was never any dissention neither amongst themselves, nor against their General, as well in their bad fortune as their good. Which could not proceed from any thing else than from that barbarous cruelty of his, which together with his exceeding many vertues, rendered him to his soldiers both venerable and terrible; without which, to that effect his other vertues had served him to little purpose: and some writers though not of the best advised, on one side admire these his worthy actions, and on the other side, condemn the principal causes thereof. And that it is true, that his other vertues would not have suffic'd him, we may consider in *Scipio*, the rarest man not only in the dayes he liv'd, but even in the memory of man; from whom his army rebel'd in *Spain*: which grew only upon his too much clemency, which had given way to his soldiers to become more licentious, than was well tolerable by military discipline: for which he was reprov'd by *Fabius Maximus* in the Senate, who termed him the corrupter of the *Roman* soldiery. The *Locrensiens* having been destroyed by a Lieutenant of *Scipio's*, were never reveng'd by him, nor the insolence of that Lieutenant punish'd; all this arising from his easie nature: so that one desiring to excuse him in the Senate, said, that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults, than to correct the faults of other men: which disposition of his in time would have wrong'd *Scipio's* reputation and gloory, had he therein continu'd in his commands: but living under



under the government of the Senate, this quality of his that would have disgrac'd him not only was conceal'd, but prov'd to the advancement of his glory. I conclude then, returning to the purpose of being feard, and belov'd; insomuch as men love at their own pleasure, and to serve their own turne, and their fear depends upon the Princes pleasure, every wise Prince ought to ground upon that which is of himself, and not upon that which is of another: only this, he ought to use his best wits to avoid hatred, as was said.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*In what manner Princes ought to keep their words:*

**H**OW commendable in a Prince it is to keep his word, and live with integrity, not making use of cunning and subtlety, every one knows well: yet we see by experience in these our dayes, that those Princes have effected great matters, who have made small reckoning of keeping their words, and have known by their craft to turne and wind men about, and in the end, have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth. You must then know, there are two kinds of combating or fighting; the one by right of the laws, the other meerly by force. That first way is proper to men, the other is also common to beasts: but because the first many times suffices not, there is a necessity to make recourse to the second; wherefore it behooves a Prince to know how to make good use of that part which belongs to a beast, as well as that which is proper to a man. This part hath been co-

vertly shew'd to Princes by ancient writers; who say that *Achilles* and many others of those ancient Princes were intrusted to *Chiron* the Senator, to be brought up under his discipline: the moral of this, having for their teacher one that was half a beast and half a man, was nothing else, but that it was needful for a Prince to understand how to make his advantage of the one and the other nature, because neither could subsist without the other. A Prince then being necessitated to know how to make use of that part belonging to a beast, ought to serve himself of the conditions of the Fox and the Lion; for the Lion cannot keep himself from snares, nor the Fox defend himself against the Wolves. He had need then be a Fox, that he may beware of the snares, and a Lion that he may scare the wolves. Those that stand wholly upon the Lion, understand not well themselves. And therefore a wise Prince cannot, nor ought not keep his faith given, when the observance thereof turnes to disadvantage, and the occasions that made him promise, are past. For if men were all good, this rule would not be allowable; but being they are full of mischief, and would not make it good to thee, neither art thou tyed to keep it with them: nor shall a Prince ever want lawfull occasions to give colour to this breach. Very many modern examples hereof might be alledg'd, wherein might be shewed how many peaces concluded, and how many promises made, have been violated and broken by the infidelity of Princes; and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath been nearest the Fox in condition. But it is necessary to understand how to set a good colour

lour upon this disposition, and to be able to  
fain and dissemble throughly; and men are so  
simple, and yeeld so much to the present ne-  
cessities, that he who hath a mind to deceive,  
shall alwaies find another that will be deceivd.  
I will not conceal any one of the examples  
that have been of late. *Alexander* the sixth,  
never did any thing else than deceive men, and  
never meant otherwise, and alwaies found  
whom to work upon; yet never was there  
man would protest more effectually, nor aver  
any thing with more solemn oaths, and ob-  
serve them less than he; nevertheless, his coun-  
sages all thriv'd well with him; for he knew  
how to play this part cunningly. Therefore is  
there no necessity for a Prince to be endued  
with all above written qualities, but it behoov-  
eth well that he seem to be so; or rather I will  
boldly say this, that having these qualities, and  
alwaies regulating himself by them, they  
are hurtfull; but seeming to have them, they  
are advantageous; as to seem pittiful, faithfull,  
mild, religious, and of integrity; and indeed  
to be so; provided withall thou beest of such  
a composition, that if need require to use  
the contrary, thou canst, and knowest how  
to apply thy self thereto. And it suffices to con-  
ceive this, that a Prince, and especially a  
new Prince, cannot observe all those things,  
for which men are held good; he being of-  
ten forc'd, for the maintenance of his State,  
to do contrary to his faith, charity, humani-  
ty, and religion: and therefore it behooves him  
to have a mind so disposd, as to turne and take  
the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and  
as formerly I said, not forsake the good, while  
he can; but to know how to make use of the

evil upon necessity. A Prince then ought to have a special care, that he never let fall any words, but what are all season'd with the five above written qualities, and let him seem to him that sees and hears him, all pitty, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to seem to have, than this last quality: for all men in general judge thereof, rather by the sight, than by the touch; for every man may come to the sight of him, few come to the touch and feeling of him; yvery man may come to see what thou seemest, few come to perceive and understand what thou art; and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who have the majesty of State to protect them: And in all mens actions, especially those of Princes wherein there is no judgement to appeale unto men, forbear to give their censures, till the events and ends of things. Let a Prince therefore take the surest courses he can to maintain his life and State: the means shall alwaies be thought honorable, and commended by every one; for the vulgar is over-taken with the appearance and event of a thing: & for the most part of people, they are but the vulgar: the others that are but few, take place where the vulgar have no subsistence. A Prince there is in these dayes, whom I shall not do well to name, that preaches nothing else but peace and faith; but had he kept the one and the other, several times had they taken from him his state and reputation.

*In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth Chap. our Author descends to particulars, persuading his Prince in his sixteenth to such*

a suppleness of disposition, as that upon occasion he can make use either of liberality or miserableness, as need shall require. But that of liberality is to last no longer than while he is in the way to some designe: which if he well weigh, is not really a reward of vertue, how ere it seems; but a bait and lure to bring birds to the net. In the seventeenth Chap. he treats of clemency and cruelty, neither of which are to be exercis'd by him as acts of mercy or justice; but as they may serve to advantage his further purposes. And lest the Prince should incline too much to clemency, our Author allows rather the restraint by fear, than by love. The contrary to which all stories shew us. I will say this only, cruelty may cut off the power of some, but causes the hatred of all, and gives a will to most to take the first occasion offerd for revenge. In the eighteenth Chap. our Author discourses how Princes ought to govern themselves in keeping their promises made: whereof he sayes they ought to make such small reckoning, as that rather they should know by their craft how to turne and wind men about, whereby to take advantage of all winds and fortunes. To this I would oppose that in the fifteenth Psal. v. 5. He that sweareth to his neighbor, and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance. It was a King that writ it, and me thinks the rule he gave, should well besit both King and Subject: and surely this persuades against all taking of advantages. A man may reduce all the causes of faith-breaking to three heads. One maybe, because he that promised, had no intention to keep his word; and this is a wicked and malicious way of dealing. A second maybe, because hee that promised, repents of his promise made; and that is ground-

ed.

ed on unconſtancy, and lightneſs in that he would not be well reſolved before he entred into covenant. The third may be, when it ſo falls out, that it lyes not in his power that made the promiſe to performe it. In which caſe a man ought to imitate the good debtor, who having not wherewithall to pay, hides not himſelf, but preſents his perſon to his creditor, willingly ſuffering imprisonment. The firſt and ſecond are very vitious and unworthy of a Prince: in the third, men might well be directed by the examples of thoſe two famous Romans, Regulus and Poſthumius. I ſhall cloſe this with the answer of Charles the fifth, when he was preſſed to break his word with Luther for his ſafe

*Gulielmus Xenocarus* return from Wormes; *Fides rerum in vit. Car. Quinti.* promiſſarum eſſi toto mundo exulter, tamen apud imperatorem eam conſiſtere oportet. Though truth be baniſht out of the whole world, yet ſhould it alwaies find harbour in an Emperors beaſt.

## CHAP. XIX.

*That Princes ſhould take a care, not to incurre contempt or hatred.*

**B**UT becauſe among the qualities, whereof formerly mention is made, I have ſpoken of thoſe of moſt importance, I will treat of the others more briefly under theſe qualities that a Prince is to beware, as in part is above ſaid, and that he fly thoſe things which cauſe him to be odious or vile: and when ever he ſhall avoid this, he ſhall fully have plaid his part, and in the other diſgraces he ſhall find no danger at all. There is nothing makes him ſo odious, as I ſaid, as his extortion of his ſubjects goods, and abuſe of their women,

men, from which he ought to forbear : and so long as he wrongs not his whole people, neither in their goods, nor honors, they live content, and he hath only to strive with the Ambition of some few : which many waies and easily too, is restrain'd. To be held various, light, effeminate, faint-hearted, unresolv'd, these make him be contemnd and thought base, which a Prince should shun like rocks, and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and valor; and that in all the private affairs of his subjects, he orders it so, that his word stand irrevocable : and maintain himself in such repute, that no man may think either to deceive or wind and turn him about : that Prince that gives such an opinion of himself, is much esteemed, and against him who is so well esteemed, hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects, or by foreigners any invasion, when once notice is taken of his worth, and how much he is reverence<sup>d</sup> by his subjects: For a Prince ought to have two fears, the one from within, in regard of his subjects; the other from abroad, in regard of his mighty neighbors; from these he defends himself by good armes and good friends; and alwayes he shall have good friends, if he have good armes; and all things shall alwaies stand sure at home, when those abroad are firme, in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them; and however the forrein matters stand but ticklishly; yet if he have taken such courses at home, and liv'd as we have prescribed, he shall never be able (in case he forsake not himself) to resist all possibility, force and violence, as I said *Nabis* the Sparran did:

did : but touching his subjects, even when his affairs abroad are settled, it is to be fear'd they may conspire privily; from which a Prince sufficiently secure him self by shunning to be hated or contemned, and keeping him self in his peoples good opinion, which it is necessary for him to compass, as formerly we treated at large. And one of the powerfulllest remedies a Prince can have against conspiracies, is, not to be hated nor dispised by the universality; for alwaies he that conspires, beleeves the Princes death is acceptable to the subject: but when he thinks it displeases them, he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter; for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side, are infinite. By experience it is plain, that many times plots have been laid, but few of them have succeeded luckily; for he that conspires, cannot be alone, nor can he take the company of any, but of those, who he beleeves are malecontents; and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a malecontent, thou givest him means to work his own content: for by revealing thy treason, he may well hope for all manner of favour: so that seeing his gain certain of one side; and on the other, finding only doubt and danger, either he had need be a rare friend, or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the Prince, if he keeps his word with thee. And to reduce this matter into short termes: I say, there is nothing but jealousy, fear, and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him; but on the Princes part, there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the defences of his friends and the State, which do  
so



so guard him, that to all these things the peoples good wills being added, it is impossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire; for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his mischiefe, in this case he is also to feare afterwards, having the people for his enemy when the fact is committed, and therefore for this cause, not being able to hope for any refuge. Touching this matter, many examples might be brought; but I will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the mem ry of our Fathers. *Annibal Bentivolii*, grand Father of this *Annibal* who now lives, that was Prince in *Bolonia*, being slaine by the *Canne-schi* that conspir'd against him, none of his race being left, but this *John*, who was then in swadling clouts; presently the people rose upon this murder, and slew all the *Canne-schi* which proceeded from the popular affection, which the family of the *Bentivolii* held then in *Bolonia*: which was so great, that being there remain'd not any, now *Annibal* was dead, that was able to manage the State; and having notice that in *Florence* there was one borne of the *Bentivolii*, who till then was taken for a Smiths sonne: the citizens of *Bolonia* went to *Florence* for him, and gave the government of their City to him, which was rul'd by him, untill *John* was of fit yeares to governe. I conclude then, that a Prince ought to make small account of treasons, whiles he hath the people to friend: but if they be his enemies and hate him, he may well feare every thing, and every one. And well ordered States, and discreet Princes have taken care withall diligence,  
not

not to cause their great men to fall into desperation, and to content the people, and so to maintaine them: for this is one of the most important busineses belonging to a Prince. Among the Kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes, is that of *France*, and therein are found exceeding many good orders, whereupon the Kings liberty and security depends: of which the chiefe is the Parliament, and the authority thereof: for he that founded that Kingdome, knowing the great mens ambition and insolence; and judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to cur e them; and on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones, grounded upon feare, intending to secure them, would not lay this care wholly upon the King, but take this trouble from him, which he might have with the great men, in case he favoured the Commonalty; or with the Commonalty, in case he favoured the great men: and thereupon set up a third judge, which was that, to the end it should keep under the great ones, and favour the meener sort, without any imputation to the King. It was not possible to take a better, nor wiser course then this; nor a surer way to secure the King, and the Kingdome. From whence we may draw another conclusion worthie of note, that Princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation; and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour. Here againe I conclude, that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his Nobility, but not thereby to incur the Commons hatred: It would seeme perhaps to many, considering the life & death  
of

of many *Romane* Emperours, that they were examples contrary to my opinion, finding that some have liv'd worthily, and shewd many rare vertues of the minde, and yet have lost the Empire, and been put to death by their owne subjects, conspiring against them. Intending then to answer these objections, I shall discourse upon the qualities of some Emperours, declaring the occasions of their ruine, not disagreeing from that which I have alledgd; and part thereof I will bestow on the consideration of these things, which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times: and it shall suffice me to take all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire from *Marcus* the Philosopher to *Maximinus*, who were *Mercus* and *Commodus* his sonne, *Pertinax*, *Julian*, *Severus*, *Antonius*, *Caracalla* his sonne, *Macrinus*, *Hellogabalus*, *Alexander*, and *Maximin*. And first it is to be noted, that where in the other Principalities, they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles, and the insolence of the people; the *Romane* Emperours had a third difficulty, having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers, which was so hard a thing, that it caused the ruine of many, being hard to satisfy the souldiers, and the people; for the people love their quiet, and therefore affect modest Princes; and the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage, that is insolent, cruell, and plucking from every one: which things they would have them exercise upon the people, whereby they might be able to double their spends, and satisfy their avarice and cruelty: whence it proceeds, that those Emperours who either  
by

by Nature or by Art, had not such a reputation, as therewith they could curbe the one and the other, were alwayes ruind: and the most of them, specially those who, as new men came to the principality, finding the difficulty of those two different humours, applyed themselves to content the souldiers, making small account of wronging the people, which was a course then necessary; for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one, ought first endeavour that they incurre not the hatred of any whole universality; and when they cannot attaine thereunto, they are to provide with all industry, to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty. And therefore those Emperors, who because they were but newly call'd to the Empire, had need of extraordinary favours, more willingly stuck to the soldiers, than to the people; which nevertheless turnd to their advantage, or otherwise, according as that Prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them. From these causes aforesayd proceeded it, that *Marcus Pertinax*, and *Alexander*, though all living modestly, being lovers of justice, and enemies of cruelty, courteous and bountifull, had all from *Marcus* onward, miserable ends; *Marcus* only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured: for he came to the Empire by inheritance, and was not to acknowledge it either from the soldiers, nor from the people: afterwards being accompanied with many vertues, which made him venerable, he held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits, and was never either hated, or contemned. But *Pertinax* was created  
Emperour

Emperour against the soldiers wills, who being accustomed to live licentiously under *Commodus*, could not endure that honest course that *Pertinax* sought to reduce them to: Whereupon having gotten himself hatred, and to this hatred added contempt, in that he was old, was ruind in the very beginning of his government. Whence it ought to be observed, that hatred is gained as well by good deeds as bad; and therefore as I formerly said, when a Prince would maintaine the State, he is often forced not to be good: for when that generality, whether it be the people, or soldiers, or Nobility, whereof thou thinkest thou standst in need to maintain thee, is corrupted, it behoves thee to follow their humour, and content them, and then all good deeds are thy adversaries. But let us come to *Alexander* who was of that goodnesse, that among the prayses given him, had this for one, that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire, he never put any man to death, but by course of justice; nevertheless being held effeminate, and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his mother, and thereupon fallen into contempt, the army conspired against him. Now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of *Commodus*, *Severus*, *Antonius*, *Caracalla*, and *Maximinus*, you shall find them exceeding cruell, and ravenous, who to satisfie their soldiers, forbore no kinde of injury that could be done upon the people; and all of them, except *Severus*, came to evill ends: for in *Severus*, there was such extraordinary valour, that while he held the soldiers his freinds, however the people were much burthend by him, he might

might alwayes reigne happily: for his valour rendred him so admirable in the souldiers and peoples sights; that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd, and those others reverencing and honoring him. And because the actions of this man were exceeding great, being in a new Prince, I will briefly shew how well he knew to act the Foxes and the Lions parts; the conditions of which two, I say, as before, are very necessary for a Prince to imitate. *Severus* having had experience of *Julian* the Emperours sloth, perswaded his army (whereof he was commander in *Sclavonia*) that they should doe well to goe to *Rome* to revenge *Pertinax* his death, who was put to death by the Imperiall guard; and under this pretence, not making any shew that he aspired unto the Empire, set his army in march directly towards *Rome*, and was sooner come into *Italy*, than it was knowne he had mov'd from his station. Being arriv'd at *Rome*, he was by the Senate chosen Emperour for feare, and *Julian* slaine. After this beginning, two difficulties yet remaind to *Severus*, before he could make himselfe Lord of the whole State; the one in *Asia*, where *Niger* the Generall of those armies had gotten the title of Emperour, the other in the West with *Albinus*, who also aspired to the Empire: and because he thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both, he purposed to set upon *Niger*, and cozen *Albinus*, to whom he writ, that being elected Emperour by the Senate, he would willingly communicate it with him; and thereupon sent him the title of *Cesar*, and by resolution of the Senate, tooke him

him to him for his Colleagues; which things were taken by *Albinus* in true meaning. But afterwards when *Severus* had overcome and slaine *Niger*, and pacified the affaires and in the East, being returned to *Rome*, he complained in the Senate of *Albinus*, how little weighing the benefits received from him, he had sought to slay him by treason, and therefore was he forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude: afterwards he went into *France*, where he bereft him both of his State and life. whoever then shall in particular examine his actions, shall finde he was a very cruell Lion, and as crafty a Fox: and shall see that he was alwayes feared and reverenc'd by every one, and by the armies not hated; and shall nothing marvell that he being a new man, was able to hold together such a great Empire: for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred, which the people for his extortions might have conceiv'd against him. But *Antonius* his sonne, was also an exceeding brave man, and endued with most excellent qualities, which causd him to be admird by the people, and acceptable to the souldiers, because he was a warlike man, enduring all kind of travell and paines, despising all delicate food, and all kinde of effeminacy, which gaind him the love of all the armies: neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such, and so hideous, having upon many particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of *Rome*, and all those of *Alexandria*, that he grew odious to the world, and began to be feared by those also that were neare about him; so that he was  
slaine

slaine by a Centurion in the very midst of his army. Where it is to be nored, that these kinde of deaths, which follow upon the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde, cannot by a Prince be avoyded: for every one that feares not to dye, is able to doe it; but a Prince ought to be lesse afraid of it, because it very seldome falls out. Only should he beware not to doe any extreame injury to any of those of whom he serves himself, or that he hath near about him in any imployment of his Principality, as *Antoninus* did: who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that Centurion; also threatned him every day, & neverthelesse entertained him still as one of the guards of his body, which was a rash course taken, and the way to destruction, as befell him. But let us come to *Commodus* for whom it was very easie to hold the Empire, by reason it descended upon him by inheritance, being *Marcus* his sonne, and it had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps, and then had he contented both the people and the soldiers: but being of a cruell and savage disposition, whereby to exercise his actions upon the people, he gave himselfe to entertaine armies, and those in all licentiousnesse. On the other part not maintaining his dignity, but often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers, and doing such other like base things, little worthy of the Imperiall majesty, he became contemptible in the soldiers sight; and being hated of one part, and despisd of the other, he was conspird against, and slaine. It remaines now, that we declare *Maximianus* his conditions, who was a very warlike



warlike man; and the armies loathing *Alexanders* effeminacy, whereof I spake before, when they had slain him, chose this man Emperour, who not long continu'd so, because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt; the one because he was very base, having kept cattell in *Thrace*, which was well knowne to every one, and made them to scorne him; the other, because in the beginning of his Principality having delayd to goe to *Rome*, and enter into possession of the Imperiall throne, he had gaind the infamy of being thought exceeding cruell, having by his Prefects in *Rome*, and in every place of the Empire, exercis'd many cruelties, insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for the baseness of his blood; on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for feare of his cruelty; first *Affrica*, afterwards the *Senate*, with all the people of *Rome* and all *Italy*, conspired against him, with whom his own army took part; which incamping before *Aquileya*, and finding some difficulty to take the town, being weary of his cruelties, and because they saw he had so many enemies, fearing him the lesse, slew him. I purpose not to say any thing either of *Helio-gabalus*, *Macrinus*, or *Lilian*, who because they were thoroughly base, were suddenly extinguish'd; but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse; and I say, that the Princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the Soldiers extraordinarily in their government; for notwithstanding that there be some considerations to be had of them, yet presently are those armies dissolv'd, because none of these  
Princes

Princes do use to maintaine any armies together, which are annex'd and inuerterated with the governments of the provinces, as were the armies of the *Romane* Empire. And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the soldiers than the people, it was because the soldiers were more powerfull than the people: now is it more necessary for all Princes, (except the *Turk* and the *Souldan*) to satisfie their people than their soldiers, because the people are more mighty than they; wherein I except the *Turk*, he alwayes maintaining about his person 12000 foot, and 15000 horse, upon which depends the safety and strength of his Kingdome; and it is necessary that laying aside all other regard of his people, he maintaine these his friends. The *Souldans* Kingdome is like hereunto, which being wholly in the souldiers power, he must also without respect of his people keep them his friends. And you are to consider, that this State of the *Souldans* differs much from all the other Principalities: For it is very like the Papacy, which cannot be term'd an hereditary Principality: nor a new Principality: for the sons of the deceased Prince are not heires and Lords thereof, but he that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them. And this order being of antiquity, cannot be term'd a new Principality, because therein are none of those difficulties that are in the new ones: for though the Prince be new, yet are the orders of that state ancient, and ordain'd to receive him, as if he were their hereditary Prince. But let us returne to our matter; whosoever shall consider our discourse before, shall perceive

perceive that either hatred, or contempt have caus'd the ruine of the afore-named Emperors; and shall know also, from it came that part of them proceeding one way, and part a contrary; yet in any of them the one had a happy success, and the others unhappy: for it was of no availe, but rather hurtful for *Pertinax* and *Alexander*, because they were new Princes, to desire to imitate *Marcus*, who by inheritance came to the Principality: and in like manner it was a wrong to *Caracalla*, *Commodus*, and *Maximus*, to imitate *Severus*, because none of them were endued with so great valor as to follow his steps therein. Wherefore a new Prince in his Principality cannot well imitate *Marcus* his actions; nor yet is it necessary to follow those of *Severus*: but he ought make choyce of those parts in *Severus* which are necessary for the founding of a State; and to take from *Marcus* those that are fit and glorious to preserve a State which is already established and settled.

## CHAP. XX.

*Whether the Citadels and many other things which Princes often make use of, are profitable or dammageable.*

Some Princes, whereby they might safely keep their State, have disarmed their subjects; some others have held the towns under their dominion, divided into factions; others have maintain'd enmities against themselves; others have appli'd themselves to gain them, where they have suspected at their entrance into the government; others have built

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Fortresses,

Fortresses; and others again have ruined and demolished them: and however that upon all these things, a man cannot well pass a determinate sentence, unless one comes to the particulars of these States, where some such like determinations were to be taken; yet I shall speak of them in so large a manner, as the matter of it self will bear. It was never then that a new Prince would disarm his own subjects; but rather when he hath found them disarm'd, he hath alwaies arm'd them. For being belov'd, those armes become thine; those become faithful, which thou hadst in suspicion; and those which were faithful, are maintaind so; and thy subjects are made thy partisans; and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes, when thou bestowest favors on those thou armeest, with the others thou canst deal more for thy safety; and that difference of proceeding which they know among them, obliges them to thee; those others excuse thee, judging it necessary that they have deserved more, who have undergone more danger, and so have greater obligation: but when thou disarmst them, thou beginst to offend them, that thou distrustest them, either for cowardise, or small faith; and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred against thee; and because thou canst not stand disarmed, thou must then turn thy self to mercenary Soldiery, whereof we have formerly spoken what it is, and when it is good; it can never be so much as to defend thee from powerful enemies, and suspected subjects; therefore as I have said, a new Prince in a new Principality hath alwaies ordaind them armes. Of examples to this purpose, Histories are full. But when

Prince gains a new State, which as a member he adds to his ancient dominions, then it is necessary to disarm that State, unless it be those whom thou hast discovered to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof; and these also in time and upon occasions, it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate, and so order them, that all the arms of thy State be in the hands of thy own Soldiers, who live in thy ancient State near unto thee. Our ancestors and they that were accounted Sages, were wont to say that it was necessary to hold *Pistoia* in factions, and *Pisa* with Fortresses; and for this cause maintained some town subject to them in differences, whereby to hold it more easily. This, at what time *Italy* was ballanc'd in a certain manner, might be well done; but mee thinks it cannot now a dayes be well given for a precept; for I do not beleieve, that divisions made can do any good; rather it must needs be, that when the enemy approaches them, Cities divided are presently lost; for alwaies the weaker part will cleave to the forrein power, and the other not be able to subsist. The *Venetians* (as I think) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons, maintained the factions of the *Guelfes* and *Gibellins*, in their townes; and however they never suffer'd them to spill one anothers blood, yet they nourish'd these differences among them, to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels, should not plot any thing against them: which as it prov'd, never serv'd them to any great purpose: for being defeated at *Vayla*, presently one of those two factions took courage and seizd upon their whole State. Therefore such like waies argue the Princes weakness; for in a strong principa-

lity they never will suffer such divisions; for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace, being they are able by means thereof more easily to mannage their subjects: but war coming, such like orders discover their fallacy. Without doubt, Princes become great, when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them; and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any new Prince great, who hath more need to gain reputation than an hereditary Prince, causes enemies to rise against him, and him to undertake against them: to the end he may have occasion to master them, and know that ladder, which his enemies have set him upon, whereby to rise yet higher. And therefore many thinke, that a wise Prince when he hath the occasion, ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the suppressing thereof, his greatness may grow thereupon. Princes, especially those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those men, who in the beginning of their State, have been held suspected, than in those who at their entrance have been their confidants. *Pandulphus Petrucci*, Prince of *Siena*, governd his State, more with them that had been suspected by him, than with the others. But of this matter we cannot speak at large, because it varies according to the subject; I will only say this, that those men, who in the beginning of a Principality were once enemies, if they be of quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support, the Prince might alwaies with the greatest facility gain for his; and they are the rather forced to serve him faithfully, insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds

deeds to cancel that sinister opinion, which was once held of them; and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage, than from those, who serving him too supinely, neglect his affairs. And seeing the matter requires it, I will not omit to put a Prince in mind, who hath anew made himself master of a State, by means of the inward helps he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that favor'd him to favor him, if it be not a natural affection towards him; for if it be only because they were not content with their former government, with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends, because it will be impossible for him to content them. By these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern affaires, searching into the cause hereof, we shall find it much more easie to gain those men for friends, who formerly were contented with the State, and therefore were his enemies: than those, who because they were not contented therewith, became his friends, and favor'd him in getting the mastery of it. It hath been the custome of Princes, whereby to hold their States more securely, to build Citadels, which might be bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them, and so to have a secure retreat from the first violencees. I commend this course, because it hath been used of old; notwithstanding *Nicholas Vitelli* in our dayes hath been known to demolish two Citadels in the town of *Castello*, the better to keep the State; *Guidubaldo* Duke of *Urbino* being to return into his State, out of which he was driven by *Cesar Borgia*, raz'd all the Fortresses of that

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Countrey,

Countrey, and thought he should hardlye lose that State again without them. The *Bentivodi* returning into *Bolonia*, used thelike courtes. Citadels then are profitable, or not, according to the times; and if they advantage thee in one part, they do thee harme in another; and this part may be argued thus. That Prince who stands more in fear of his own people than of strangers, ought to build Fortresses: but he that is more afraid of strangers than of his people, should let them alone. Against the house of *Sforza*, the Castle of *Milan*, which *François Sforza* built, hath and will make more war, than any other disorder in that State: and therefore the best Citadel that may be, is not to incurre the peoples hatred; for however thou holdest a Fortress, and the people hate thee, thou canst hardly scape them; for people, when once they have taken armes, never want the help of strangers at their need to take ther parts. In our dayes we never saw that they ever profited any Prince, unless it were the Countess of *Furli*, when Count *Hieronymo* of *Furli* her husband was slain; for by means thereof she escap'd the peoples rage, and attended aid from *Milan*, and so recover'd her State: and then such were the times that the stranger could not assist the people: but afterwards they serv'd her to little purpose, when *Cæsar Borgia* assailed her, & that the people which was her enemy, sided with the stranger. Therefore both then, and at first, it would have been more for her safety, not to have been odious to the people, than to have held the Fortresses. These things being well weigh'd then, I will commend those that shall build up Fortresses, and him also that shall not; and I will



will blame him, howsoever he be, that relying upon those, shall make small account of being hated by his people.

## CHAP. XXI,

*How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation.*

There is nothing gains a Prince such repute as great exploits, and rare tryals of himself in Heroick actions. We have now in our dayes *Ferdinand* King of *Arragon* the present King of *Spain*: he in a manner may be termed a new Prince; for from a very weak King, he is now become for fame and glory, the first King of *Christendome*, and if you shall well consider his actions, you shall find them all illustrious, and every one of them extraordinary. He in the beginning of his reign assailed *Granada*, and that exploit was the ground of his state. At first he made that war in security, and without suspicion he should be any waies hindered, and therein held the Barons of *Castiglia* minds busied, who thinking upon that war, never minded any innovation; in this while he gained credit and authority with them, they not being aware of it; was able to maintain with the Church and the peoples money all his soldiers, and to lay a foundation for his military ordinances with that long war, which afterwards gained him exceeding much honor. Besides this, to the end he might be able hereafter among to undertake greater matters, serving himself alwaies of the colour of religion, he gave himself to a kind of religious cruelty, chasing and dispoyling those *Jewes* out of the

Kindome; nor can this example be more admirable and rare: under the same cloke he invaded *Affrick* and went through with his exploit in *Italy*: and last of all hath he assailed *France*, and so alwaies proceeded on forwards contriving of great matters, which alwaies have held his subjects minds in peace and admiration, and busied in attending the event, what it should be: and these his actions have thus grown, one upon another, that they have never given leisure to men so to rest, as they might ever plot any thing against them. Moreover it much avails a Prince to give extraordinary proofs of himself touching the government within, such as those we have heard of *Bernard of Milan*, whensoever occasion is given by any one, that may offeend some great thing either of good or evil, in the civil government; and to find out some way either to reward or punish it, whereof in the world much notice may be taken. And above all things a Prince ought to endeavor in all his actions to spread abroad a fame of his magnificence and worthiness. A Prince also is well esteemed, when he is a true friend, or a true enemy; when without any regard he discovers himself in favor of one against another; which course shall be alwaies more profit, than to stand neuter: for if two mighty ones that are thy neighbors, come to fall out, or are of such quality, that one of them vanquishing, thou art like to be in fear of the vanquisher, or not; in either of these two cases, it will ever prove more for thy profit, to discover thyself, and make a good war of it: for in the first case, if thou discoverest not thy selfe, thou shalt alwaies be a prey to him

him that overcomes, to the contentment and satisfaction of the vanquish't; neither shalt thou have reason on thy side, nor any thing else to defend or receive thee. For he that overcomes, will not have any suspected friends that give him no assistance in his necessity: and he that loses, receives thee nor, because thou wouldest not with thy armes in hand run the hazard of his fortune. *Antiochus* passed into Greece, thertunto induc'd by the *Etolians*, to chace the *Romans* thence: and sent his Ambassadors to the *Achayans*, who were the *Romans* friends, to perswade them to stand newters; on the other side the *Romans* moved them to joyne armes with theirs: this matter came to be deliberated on in the council of the *Achayans*, where *Antiochus* his Ambassador encouraged them to stand newters, whereunto the *Romans* Ambassador answers: Touching the course, that is commended to you, as best and profitabest for your State, to wit, not to intermeddle in the war between us, nothing can be more against you: because, not taking either part, you shall remain without thanks, and without reparation a prey to the conqueror. And it will alwaies come to pass that he who is not thy friend, will require thy neutrality; and he that is thy friend, will urge thee to discover thy self by taking arms for him: and evil advised Princes, to avoyd the present dangers, follow often times that way of neutrality, and most commonly go to rhine: but when a Prince discovers himself strongly in favor of a party, if he to whom thou cleavest, overcomes, however that he be puissant, and thou remainest at his disposing, he is oblig'd to thee,

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and there is a contract of friendship made; and men are never so openly dishonest, as with such a notorious example of dishonesty to oppress thee. Besides victories are never so prosperous, that the conqueror is like neglect all respects, and especially of justice. But if he to whom thou stickst, loses, thou art received by him; and, while he is able, he aydes thee, and so thou becomest partner of a fortune that may arise again; the second case, when they that enter into the lists together, are of such quality, that thou needest not fear him that vanquisheth, so much the more is it discretion in thee to stick to him; for thou goest to ruine one with his assistance, who ought to do the best he could to save him, if he were well advised; and he overcomming, is left at thy discretion, and it is impossible but with thy ayd he must overcome. And here it is to be noted, that a Prince should be well aware never to joyn with any one more powerfull than himself, to offend another, unless upon necessity, as formerly is said. For when he overcomes, thou art left at his discretion, and Princes ought avoid as much as they are able, to stand at anothers discretion. The *Venerians* took part with *France* against the Duke of *Milan*, and yet could have avoided that partaking, from which proceeded their ruine. But when it cannot be avoyded, as it befel the *Florentines* when the Pope and the King of *Spain* went both with their armies to *Embardy*, there the Prince ought to side with them for the reasons aforesaid. Nor let any State think they are able to make such sure parties, but rather that they are all doubtfull; for in the order of things we find

find it alwaies, that whensoever a man seeks to avoid one inconvenient, he incurs another. But the principal point of judgement, is in discerning between the qualities of inconveni-  
ents, and not taking the bad for the good. Moreover a Prince ought to shew himself a lover of vertue, and that he honors those that excel in every Art. Afterwards ought he encourage his Citizens, whereby they may be enabled quickly to exercise their faculties as well in merchandise, and husbandry, as in any other kind of traffick, to the end that no man forbear to adorne and cultivate his possessions for fear that he be despoyled of them; or any other to open the commerce upon the danger of heavy impositions: but rather to provide rewards for those that shall set these matters afoot, or for any one else that shall any way amplifie his City or State. Besides he ought in the fit times of the year entertain the people with Feasts and Maskes; and because every City is divided into Companies, and arts, and Tribes, he ought to take special notice of those bodies, and some times afford them a meeting, and give them some proof of his humanity, and magnificence; yet withall holding firme the majestie of his State; for this must never fail in any case.

## CHAP. XXII.

*Touching Princes Secretaries.*

**I**T is no small importance to a Prince, the choyce he makes, of servants being ordinarily good or bad, as his wisdom is. And the

first conjecture one gives of a great man, and of his understanding, is, upon the sight of his followers and servants he hath about him, when they prove able and faithful, and then may he alwaies be reputed wise because he hath known how to discern those that are able, and to keep them true to him. But when they are otherwise, there can be no good conjecture made of him; for the first error he commits, is in this choyce. There was no man that had any knowledge of *Antony of Vanafro*, the servant of *Pandulfus Petrucci* Prince of *Siena*, who did not esteem *Pandulfus* for a very discreet man, having him for his servant. And because there are three kinds of understandings; the one that is advised by it self; the other that understands when it is informed by another; the third that neither is advised by it self nor by the demonstration of another; the first is best, the second is good, and the last quite unprofitable. Therefore it was of necessity, that if *Pandulfus* attained not the first degree, yet he got to the second; for whenever any one hath the judgement to discern between the good and the evil, that any one does and sayes, however that he hath not his invention from himself, yet still comes he to take notice of the good or evil actions of that servant; and those he cherishes, and these he suppresses; insomuch that the servant finding no means to deceive his master, keeps himself upright and honest. But how a Prince may thoroughly understand his servant, here is the way that never fails. When thou seest the servant study more for his own advantage than thine, and that in all his actions, he searches most after his

his own profit; this man thus qualified, shall never prove good servant, nor canst thou ever relie upon him: for he that holds the Sterne of the State in hand, ought never call home his cares to his own particular, but give himself wholly over to his Princes service, nor ever put him in minde of any thing not appertaining to him. And on the other side the Prince to keep him good to him, ought to take a care for his servant, honoring him, enriching, and obliging him to him, giving him part both of dignities and offices, to the end that the many honors and much wealth bestowed on him, may restrain his desires from other honors, and other wealth, and that those many charges cause him to fear changes that may fall, knowing he is not able to stand without his master. And when both the Princes and the servants are thus disposed, they may rely the one upon the other: when otherwise, the end will ever prove hurtfull for the one as well as for the other.

CHAP. XXIII.

*That Flatterers are to be avoyded.*

**I** Will not omit one principle of great importance, being an error from which Princes with much difficulty defend themselves, unless they be very discreet, and make a very good choice; and this is concerning flatterers; whereof all writings are full: and that because men please themselves so much in their own things, and therein cozen themselves, that very hardly can they esape this pestilence; and desiring to escape it, there is danger

ger of falling into contempt; for there is no other way to be secure from flattery, but to let men know, that they displease thee not in telling thee truth: but when every one hath this leave, thou loost thy reverence. Therefore ought a wise Prince take a third course, making choyce of some understanding men in his State, and give only to them a free liberty of speaking to him the truth; and touching those things only which he inquires of, and nothing else; but he ought to be inquisitive of every thing, and hear their opinions, and then afterwards advise himself after his own manner; and in these deliberations, and with every one of them so carrie himself, that they all know, that the more freely they shall speak, the better they shall be liked of: and besides those, not give eare to any one; and thus pursue the thing resolved on, and thence continue obstinate in the resolution taken. He who does otherwise, either falls upon flatterers, or often changes upon the varying of opinions, from whence proceeds it that men conceive but slightly of him. To this purpose I will alledge you a moderne example. *Peter Lucas* a servant of *Maximilians* the present Emperor, speaking of his Majesty, said that he never advised with any body, nor never did any thing after his own way: which was because he took a contrary course to what we have now said: for the Emperor is a close man, who communicates his secrets to none, nor takes counsel of any one; but as they come to be put in practise, they begin to be discovered & known, and so contradicted by those that are near about him; and he as being an easy man, is quickly wrought from them.

Whence:



Whence it comes that what he does to day, he undoes on the morrow; and that he never understands himself what he would, nor what he purposes, & that there is no grounding upon any of his resolutions. A Prince therefore ought alwayes to take counsell, but at his owne pleasure, & not at other mens; or rather should take away any mans courage to advise him of any thing, but what he askes: but he ought well to aske at larger and then touching the things inquired of, be a patient heare, of the truth; and perceiving that for some respect the truth were conceald from him, be displeased thereat. And because some men have thought that a Prince that gaires the opinion to bee wise, may bee held so, not by his owne naturall indowments, but by the good counsells he hath about him; without question they are deceivd; for this is a generall rule and never failes, that a Prince who of himselfe is not wise, can never be well advised, unlesse he should light upon one alone, wholly to direct and govern him, who himself were a very wise man. In this case it is possible he may be well governd: but this would last but little: for that governor in a short time would deprive him of his State; but a Prince not having any parts of nature, being advised of more then one, shall never be able to unite these counsells: of himself shall he never know how to unite them; and each one of the Counsellors, probably will follow that which is most properly his owne; and he shall never find the meanes to amend or discern these things; nor can they fall out otherwise, because men alwayes prove mischievous, unlesse upon some necessity they be

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be force'd to become good: we conclude therefore, that counsellis from whenceſoever they proceed, muſt needs take their beginning from the Princes wiſdome, and not the wiſdome of the Prince from good counsellis.

In this Chapter our Authour preſcribes ſome rules how to avoyd flattery, and not to fall into contempt. The extent of theſe two extreames is ſo large on both ſides, that there is left but a very narrow path for the right temper to walke between them both: and happy were that Prince, who could light on ſo good a Pilote as to bring him to Port between thoſe rocks and theſe quickſands. Where Maſteſty becomes familiar, unleſſe endued with a ſupereminent vertue, it loſes all awfull regards: as the light of the Sunne, becauſe ſo ordinary, becauſe ſo common, we ſhould little value, were it not that all Creatures feele themſelves quickned by the rayes thereof. On the other ſide, *Omnis inſipiens arrogantia & plauiſibus capitur*, Every foole is taken with his owne pride and others flatteryes: and this foole keeps company ſo much with all great wiſe men, that hardly with a candle and lantern can they be diſcern'd herewith. The greateſt men are more ſubject to groſſe and palpable flatteries; and eſpecially the greateſt of men, who are Kings and Princes: for many ſeek the Rulers favour. *Prov. 28. 26.* For there are divers meanes whereby private men are inſtructed; Princes have not that good hap: but they whoſe inſtruction is of moſt importance, ſo ſoone as they have taken the government upon them, no longer ſuffer any reproovers: for but few have acceſſe unto them, and they who familiarly converſe with them, doe and ſay all for favour. *Iſocrat. to Nicocles*

cles, All are afraid to give him occasion of displeasure, though by telling him truth. *Plutarch. de adulatione.* To this purpose therefore sayes one; a *tore & amico* Prince excels in learning to ride the *cicciomondo* great horse, rather than in any other exercise, because his horse being no flatterer, will shew him he makes no difference bet ween him and another man, and unlesse he keepe his seate well, will lay him on the ground. This is plaine dealing. Men are more subtile, more double-hearted, they have a heart and a heart, neither is their tongue their hearts true interpreter. Counsell in the heart of man is like deepe waters; but a man of understanding will draw it out. *Prov. 20. 5.* This understanding is most requisite in a Prince, inasmuch as the whole Globe is in his hand, and the inferiour Orbes are swayed by the motion of the highest. And therefore surely it is the honour of a King to search out such a secret: *Prov. 25. 2.* His counsellours are his eyes and eares; as they ought to be dear to him, so they ought to be true to him, and make him the true report of things without disguise. If they prove false eyes, let him pluck them out; he may as they use glasse eyes, take them forth without paine, and see never a whit the worse for it. The wisdom of a Princes Counsellours is a great argument of the Princes wisdom. And being the choyce of them imports the Princes credit and safety, our Authour will make him amends for his other errors by his good advice in his 22. Chap. whether I referre him.

## CHAP.

*Wherefore the Princes of Italy have lost their States.*

**W**HEN these things above said are well observ'd, they make a new Prince seeme as if he had been of old, and presently render him more secure and firme in the State, than if he had already grown ancient therein: for a new Prince is much more observ'd in his action, than a Prince by inheritance; and when they are known to be vertuous, men are much more gaind and oblig'd to them thereby, than by the antiquity of their blood: for men are much more taken by things present, than by things past, and when in the present they find good, they content themselves therein, and seeke no further; or rather they undertake the defence of him to their utmost, when the Prince is not wanting in other matters to himself; and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new Principality, adorn'd, and strengthnd it with good lawes, good arms, good friends, and good examples; as he shall have double shame, that is born a Prince, and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it. And if we shall consider those Lords, that in *Italy* have lost their States in our dayes, as the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and others; first we shall find in them a common defect, touching their armes, for the reasons which have been above discours'd at length. Afterwards we shall see some of them, that either shall have had the people for their enemies; or be it they had the people to friend, could  
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never know how to assure themselves of the great ones: for without such defects as these, States are not lost, which have so many nerves, that they are able to maintain an army in the field. *Philip of Macedon*, not the father of *Alexander the Great*, but he that was vanquished by *Titus Quintius*, had not much State in regard of the greatnesse of the *Romanes* and of *Greece* that assail'd him; nevertheless in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertaine the people, and assure himself of the Nobles, for many yeares he made the waire good against them: and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him, yet the Kingdome remaind in his hands still. Wherefore these our Princes who for many yeares had continued in their Principalities, for having afterwards lost them, let them not blame Fortune, but their own sloth; because they never having thought during the time of quier, that they could suffer a change (which is the common fault of men, while faire weather lasts, not to provide for the tempest) when afterwards mischiefes came upon them, thought rather upon flying from them, than upon their defence, and hop'd that the people, weary of the vanquishers insolence, would recall them; which course when the others faile, is good: but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that: for a man wou'd never go to fall, beleeving another would come to take him up: which may either not come to passe, or if it does, it is not for thy security, because that defence of his is vile, and depends not upon thee; but those defences only are good, certaine, and durable, which depend upon thy owne selfe, and thy owne vertues.

CHAP.

*How great power Fortune hath in humane, affaires, and what means there is to resist it.*

**I**T is not unknown unto me, how that many have held opinion, and still hold it, that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune, and by God, that men by their wisdom cannot amend or alter them; or rather that there is no remedy for them: and hereupon they would think that it were of no avails to take much paines in any thing, but leave all to be governd by chance. This opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes, by reason of the great alteration of things, which we have of late seen, and do every day see, beyond all humane conjecture: upon which, I sometimes thinking, am in some part inclin'd to their opinion: nevertheless not to extinguish quite our owne free will, I think it may be true, that Fortune is the mistrisse of one halfe of our actions; but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half, or little lesse. And I liken her to a precipitous torrent, which when it rages, overflows the plaines, overthrowes the trees, and buildings, removes the earth from one side, and laies it on another, every one flies before it, every one yeelds to the fury thereof, as unable to withstand it; and yet however it be thus, when the times are calmer, men are able to make provision against these excesses, with banks and fences so, that afterwards when it swels again, it shall all passe smoothly along, within its channell. or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurrfull. In like manner befalls it us with fortune, which there shewes her

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the one being wary the other headstrong; which proceeds from nothing else, but from the quality of the times, which agree, or not, with their proceedings. From hence arises that which I said, that two working diversly, produce the same effect: & two equally working, the one attains his end, the other not. Hereupon also depends the alteration of the good; for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience, times and affaires turne so favourably, that the carriage of his businesse prove well, he prospers; but if the times and affaires chance, he is ruind, because he changes not his manner of proceeding: nor is there any man so wise, that can frame himselfe hereunto; as well because he cannot go out of the way, from that whereunto Nature inclines him: as also, for that one having alwayes prosperd, walking such a way, cannot be perswaded to leave it; and therefore the respective and wary man, when it is fit time for him to use violence and force, knows not how to put it in practice, whereupon he is ruind: but if he could change his disposition with the times and the affaires, he should not change his fortune. Pope *Julius* the second proceeded in all his actions with very great violence, and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy successe. Consider the first exploit he did at *Bolonia*, even while *John Bentivoglio* lived: the *Venetians* were not well contented therewith; the King of *Spaine* likewise with the *French*, had treated of that enterprize; and notwithstanding al this, he stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse, personally undertook that expedition: which action

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her power where vertue is not ordeind to resist her, and thither turnes she all her forces, where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her. And if you shall consider *Italy*, which is the seat of these changes, and that which hath given them their motions, you shall see it to be a plaine field, without any trench or bank; which had it been fenced with convenient vertue as was *Germany*, *Spain* or *France*; this inundation would never heave caused these great alterations it hath, or else would it not have reach'd to us: and this shall suffice to have said, touching the opposing of fortune in generall. But restraining my selfe more to particulars, I say that to day we see a Prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruine; not seeing that he hath altered any condition or quality; which I beleeve arises first from the causes which we have long since run over, that is because that Prince that relies wholly upon fortune, runnes as her wheele turnes. I beleeve also, that he proves the fortunate man, whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time; and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ: for we see that men, in the things that induce them to the end, (which every one propounds to himselfe, as glory and riches) proceed therein diversly; some with respects, others more bold, and rashly; one with violence, and the other with cunning; the one with patience, th'other with its contrary; and every one by severall wayes may attaine thereto; we see also two very respective and wary men, the one come to his purpose, and th'other not; and in like manner two equally prosper, taking divers course; the

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action of his put in suspence and stopt *Spaine* and the *Venetians*; those for feare, and the others for desire to recover the Kingdome of *Naples*; and on the other part drew after him the King of *France*; for that King seeing him already in motion, and desiring to hold him his friend, where by to humble the *Venetians*, thought he could no way deny him his souldiers, without doing him an open injury. *Julius* then effected that with his violent and heady motion, which no other Pope with all humane wisdom could ever have done; for it he had expected to part from *Rome* with his conclusions settled, and all his affaires ordered before hand, as any other Pope would have done, he had never brought it to passe: For the King of *France* would have devised a thousand excuses, and others would have put him in as many feares. I will let passe his other actions, for all of them were alike, and all of them prov'd lucky to him; and the brevity of his life never suffered him to feele the contrary: for had he list upon such times afterwards, that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects, there had been his utter ruine; for he would never have left those wayes, to which he had been naturally inclin'd. I conclude then, fortune varying, and men continuing still obstinate to their own wayes, prove happy, while these accord together: and as they disagree, prove unhappy: and I think it true, that it is better to be heady than wary; because Fortune is a mistresse; and it is necessary, to keep her in obedienne, to ruffle and force her: and we see, that she suffers her self rather to be masterd by those, than by others that proceed coldly. And therefore,

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as a mistresse, thee is a friend to young men ; because they are lesse respective, more rough , and command her with more boldnesse.

I have considered the 25 Chapter , as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning : yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a Christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things. The life of man is like a game at Tables ; skill availes much I grant, but that's not all: play thy game well, but that will not winne: the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play. Examine this ; play never so surely, play never so probably, un'esse the chance thou castest, lead thee forward to advantage, all hazards are losses, and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch. The sum of this is set down in Ecclesiastes chap, 9.v.11. The race is not to the swift , nor the battell to the strong; neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill ; but time and chance hapeneth to them all. Our cunning Author for all his exact rules he delivereth in his books , could not fence against the despight of Fortune , as he complaines in his Epistle to this booke. Nor that great example of policy, Duke Valentine, whome our Author commends to Princes for his crafts-master, could so ruffle or force his mistresse Fortune, that he could keep her in obedience. Man can contribute no more to his actions that vertue and wisdom : but the successe depends upon a power above. Surely there is the finger of god ; or as Prov. 16. v.33. The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. It was not Josephs wisdom made all things thrive under his hand ; but because the Lord was with him, & that which he did, the Lord made it to prosper, Gen 39. Surely  
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this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence, which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes, as that their effects prove answerable, and sometimes (that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes) the success returns with such a supereminency of worth, that it far exceeds the virtue of the ordinary causes.

## CHAP. XXVI.

*An Exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarians.*

HAVING then weigh'd all things above discours'd, and devising with my self, whether at this present in *Italy* the time might serve to honor a new Prince, & whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valorous Prince, to introduce such a forme, that might do honor to him, and good to the whole generality of the people in the countrey: me thinks so many things concur in favor of a new Prince, that I know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose. And if as I said, it was necessary, desiring to see *Moses* his virtue, that the children of *Israel* should be inthrall'd in *Aegypt*; and to have experience of the magnanimity of *Cyrus* his mind, that the *Persians* should be oppress'd by the *Medes*; and to set forth the excellency of *The Jews*, that the *Athenians* should be dispersed; so at this present now we are desirous to know the valor of an *Italian* spirit, it were necessary *Italy* should be reduc'd to the same termes it is now in, and were in more slavery than the *Hebrews* were; more

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subject than the *Persians*; more scatterd than the *Athenians*; without head, without order, battered, pillaged, rent asunder, overrun, and had undergone all kind of destruction. And how ever even in these later dayes, we have had some kind of shew of hope in some one, whereby we might have conjectur'd, that he had been ordained for the deliverance hereof, yet it prov'd afterwards, that in the very height of all his actions he was curb'd by fortune, inso much that this poore countrey remaining as it were without life, attends still for him that shall heal her wounds, give an end to all those pillagings and sackings of *Lombardy*, to those robberies and taxations of the Kingdome, and of *Tuscany*, and heal them of their soars, now this long time gangren'd. We see how she makes her prayers to God, that he send some one to redeem her from these Barbarous cruelties and insolencies. We see her also wholly ready and disposed to follow any colours, provided there be any one take them up. Nor do we see at this present, that she can look for other, than your Illustrious Family, to become Cheifstain of this deliverance, which hath now by its own vertue and Fortune been so much exalted, and favored by God and the Church, whereof it now holds the Principality: and this shall not be very hard for you to do, if you shall call to mind the former actions, and lives of those that are above named. And though those men were very rare and admirable, yet were they men, and every one of them began upon lels occasion than this; for neither was their enterprize more just than this, nor more easie; nor was God more their friend, than yours. Here is very great justice:

for

For that war is just, that is necessary; and those armes are religious, when there is no hope left elsewhere, but in them. Here is an exceeding good disposition thereto: nor can there be, where there is a good disposition, a great difficulty, provided that use be made of those orders, which I propounded for aim and direction to you. Besides this, here we see extraordinary things without example effected by God; the sea was opened, a cloud guided the way, devotion poured forth the waters, and it rain'd down Manna; all these things have concurred in your greatness, the rest is left for you to do. God will not do every thing himself, that he may not take from us our free will, and part of that glory that belongs to us. Neither is it a marvel, if any of the aforementioned *Italians* have not been able to compass that, which we may hope your illustrious family shall: though in so many revolutions of *Italy*, and so many feats of war, it may seem that the whole military vertue therein be quite extinguisht; for this arises from that the ancient orders thereof were not good; and there hath since been none that hath known how to invent new ones. Nothing can so much honor a man rising anew, as new laws and new ordinances devised by him: these things when they have a good foundation given them, and contain in them their due greatness, gain him reverence and admiration; and in *Italy* their wants not the matter wherein to introduce any forme. Here is great vertue in the members, were it not wanting in the heads. Consider in the single fights that have been, and duels, how much the *Italians* have excel'd in their strength, activity and address;

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but

but when they come to armies, they appear  
 nor, and all proceeds from the weakness of  
 the Chieftaines; for they that understand the  
 managing of these matters, are not obeyed;  
 and every one presumes to understand; hither-  
 to there having not been any one so highly rais-  
 ed either by fortune or vertue, as that others  
 would submit unto him. From hence proceeds  
 it, that in so long time, and in so many battls  
 fought for these last past 20 years, when there  
 hath been an army wholly *Italian*, it alwaies  
 hath had evil success; whereof the river *Tä-  
 rus* first was witness, afterwards *Alexandria*,  
*Capua*, *Gen a*, *Vayla*, *Bolonia*, *Mestri*. Your  
 Illustrious family then being desirous to tread  
 the footsteps of these Werthyees who redeem'd  
 their countreys, must above all things as the  
 very foundation of the whole sabrick, be fur-  
 nished with soldiers of your own natives: be-  
 cause you cannot have more faithfull, true, nor  
 better soldiers; and though every one of them  
 be good, all together they will become better  
 when they shall find themselves entertained,  
 commanded, and honored by their own  
 Prince. Wherefore it is necessary to provide  
 for those armes, whereby to be able with the  
*Italian* valor to make a defence against forreign-  
 ers. And however the *Swisse* infantry and  
*Spanish* be accounted terrible; yet is there de-  
 fect in both of them, by which a third order  
 might not only oppose them, but may be con-  
 fident to vanquish them: for the *Spaniards* are  
 not able to indure the Horse, and the *Swisse*  
 are to feare the foot, when they incounter  
 with them, as resolute in the fight as they;  
 whereupon it hath been seen, and upon ex-  
 p*er*ience shall be certtain, that the *Spaniards*  
 are

are not able to beare up against the French Cavalery, and the *Swisses* have been routed by the *Spanish* Foot. And though touching this last, there hath not been any entire experience had, yet was there some proof thereof given in the battel of *Ravenna*, when the *Spanish* Foot affronted the *Dutch* battalions, which keep the same rank the *Swisses* do, where the *Spaniards* with their nimbleness of body, and the help of their targets entred in under their Pikes, and there stood safe to offend them, the *Dutch* men having no remedy: and had it not been for the Cavalery that rushd in upon them, they had quite defeated them. There may then (the defect of the one and other of these two infantries being discovered) another kind of them be anew ordained, which may be able to make resistance against the Horse, and not fear the Foot, which shall not be a new sort of armes, but change of orders. And these are some of those things which ordained a new, gain reputation and greatness to a new Prince. Therefore this occasion should not be let pass, to the end that *Italy* after so long a time may see some one redeemer of hers appear. Nor can I express with what dearness of affection he would be received in all those countreys which have suffered by those forrein scums, with what thirst of revenge, with what resolution of fidelity, with what piety, with what tears. Would any gates be shut again him? Any people deny him obedience? Any envy oppose him? Would not every *Italian* fully consent with him? This government of the *Barbarians* stinks in every ones nostrils. Let your *Illustrious* Family then undertake this worthy

exploit with that courage and those hopes  
wherewith such just actions are to be attempt-  
ed ; to the end that under your colours, this  
countrey may be enabled, and under the pro-  
tection of your fortune that saying of *Petrarch*  
be verified.

*Vertu contr' al fuore  
Prendera l'arme, & fia il combatter corto :  
Che l'antico valore  
Ne gli Italici cor. non è anchor morto.*

Vertue 'against fury shall advance the fight,  
And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight:  
For th' old Roman valor is not dead,  
Nor in th' *Italians* breasts extinguished.

THE



# The life of *Castruccio*

*Castracani* of *Lucca*, composed

by *Nicholas Machiavelli*, and

presented to *Zanobiglioudilmon-*

*ti* and *Lingi Alomanni* his very

good friends.



ANOBI and LINGI,

my very good friends, it seems a matter of great mervail to those that take it into consideration, how that all they, or the greater part of them, who have effected great things

n this world, and borne up their heads above others their contemporaries, have taken their rises and births from obscure and base beginnings, or such as have been by fortune extraordinarily afflicted. For all of them have been either exposed to the mercy of savage creatures, or had such base Sires, that as ashamed of them, they have feigned themselves sons to *Jupiter*, or some other Diety; who these have been, every one having knowledge of many of them, we shall omit to relate, as superfluous, yeelding rather distaste than delight to the Reader. I am indeed of o-

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pinion

pinion that it proceeds from hence, viz in that fortune willing to demonstrate unto the world, that she, and not wisdom, gives men their greatness, therefore begins to shew her strength at such a time, when wisdom can challenge no interest, but all rather is to be attributed as due to her alone. *Castruccio Castracani* of *Lucca* was then one of those, who in regard of the times he liv'd in, and the City where he was borne, effected very great matters, and had, as others in this kind, neither a very fortunate nor known birth, as in my further discourse of his life it shall appear: which I thought fit to bring to memory, as having found therein a subject of very great example, as well in regard of valor, as fortune. And I thought I might the better direct this discourse unto you two, who of all that I know most delight in such glorious achievements. I say then, that the Family of the *Castracani* is reckoned among the noble Families of the City of *Lucca*, however that in these daies it be much decayed, according to the course of all other worldly things. Of this there was one *Antony* borne, who took upon him religious orders, and was a *Canon* of *S. Michaelss* at *Lucca*, and in honor thereof was entituled *Master Antony*. He had but one sister, who was married to *Buonaccorso Cennami*; but *Buonaccorso* being dead, and she remaining a widow, betook her self to live with her brother, with intention not to marry any more. *Mr. Antony* had behind his house where he dwelt, a vineyard, whereinto by reason of divers gardens bordering thereupon on several sides, the passage was very ordinary. It happened that one morning a little after the Sun rise,

Dame



Dame *Dionora*, for so was Master *Antonyes* sister, cald, walking out into the vineyard, as she was gathering some herbs, after the manner of women, to make a sallet withall; she heard somekind of rusteling under a vine amongst the leaves, and casting her eye that way, she perceived some little cry there, whereupon drawing near to the noise, she discovered the hands and face of an infant wrapt in the vine leaves, which seemed as if it asked her assistance: so that she partly marvailing, partly frighted, full of pittie and amazement, took it up in her armes, and having carried it home, and wash'd it, and swaddled it in clean clouts, as they use children, at her return presented it to Master *Antony*: who considering the accident, and seeing the child, was as much amaz'd and compassionate as was his sister: and advising together what they should do in this case, resolved to bring it up, he being a Priest, and she not having any children. Having then taken a nurse into the house, they nourished it with as much tenderness as if it had been their own child; and causing it to be baptized, named it *Castruccio* after the name of their own father. *Castruccio* as he increased in years, so he grew in person and feature, and in every thing he shewed wit and discretion: and quickly, according to his age, he learned whatsoever his Master *Antony* taught him: who purposing to make him a Priest, and to turne over unto him his Canonicate, and his other benefices, instructed him in that way: but he found him not a subject fit for that regular life: For so soon as *Castruccio* came to 14 years of age, he began to grow a little masterfull towards Master *Antony* and Dame *Dionora*, so

that he stood no longer in fear of them, laying aside all Church books, he began to handle armes, and took not delight in any thing more than to mannage them, or with others his equals to run, leap, or wrastle, and such other like exercises: wherein he shewed such courage and strength, that he far surpassed all others of his age; and if any time he gave himself to reading, he took pleasure in nothing else than discourses of wars, and the actions of most famous men: for which cause Master Antony was much greived at heart. In the Citty of *Lucca* there happened to dwell a Gentleman of the Family of the *Guinigi*, call'd Master Francis, who for fortunes, esteem, and valour, out-went all others the Citizens of *Lucca*: who was alwaies trained up in bearing of armes, and who had a long time serv'd under the Viscounts of *Milan*; and because he was a *Gibelline*, he was accounted of above all that followed that faction in *Lucca*. This man being then in *Lucca*, and assembling morning and evening with the rest of the citizens under the Governors Palace, which is in the head of the Palace of *S. Michael*, being the prime place of *Lucca*, oftentimes saw *Castruccio* using of those exercises with other lads of the town, wherein I formerly said he took delight; and perceiving that besides the marring of them, he held over them a kind of Princely authority, and that they again lov'd and reverenc'd him, he became very desirous to know what he was, whereof being inform'd by some there present, he became the more desirous to take him home to him; and calling him one day to him, ask'd him, where he had rather live, either in a Cavaliers house, where

where he might learn to ride and use his armes, or abide in a Priests house, where nothing else were to be heard but their Offices and Masses? Master *Francis* perceiv'd how much *Castruccio* was cheared upon the mention of horses and armes; yet he standing a little out of countenance, Master *Fran* is again encouraging him to speak, he answerd, that if his Patron would therewith be content, he could not have a greater pleasure than to quit this calling of Priest, and betake himself to that of a soldier. Master *Francis* was much satisfied with this reply: and in a short time so negotiated in this matter, that Master *Antony* gave him up to his charge, whereunto he was the rather moved by the lads inclination, judging thereby that he could not hold him much longer in his former course. *Castruccio* then being prefer'd from Mr. *Antony Castracani* the Priests house to the Palace of Mr. *Francis Guinigi* the Commander, it was a marvail to think in how short a time he attained to those vertues and good qualities, which are required in a compleat Cavalier. First he became an excellent horseman: for he was able to mannage the roughest horse at ease; and, though but a youth, in jousts and tournaments he was of prime remarque; so that in any action of strength or activity, none could exceed him. These perfections besides were season'd with such manners, and good qualities, as that touching modesty, it was incredible how that either in word or deed he gave no distast to any; to his superiors he yeelded reverence; he was modest with his equals, and pleasant with his inferiors; which gain'd him favor, not only in the whole Family of *Guinigi*, but also in the whole City of *Lucca*. It chanced:

chanced in those times, *Castruccio* being now arrived to eighteen years of age, that the *Gibellins* were chased by the *Guelphes* from *Pavia*, in favor of whom Master *Francis Guinigi* was sent for by the Viscounty of *Milan*, with whom went *Castruccio*, as he on whose shoulders lay the charge of the whole troops: in which employment, *Castruccio* gave such proofs of his judgement and courage, that not one in this expedition gained so much esteem as he, and his name became honorable, not only in *Pavia*, but throughout all *Lombardy*. *Castruccio* being then returned to *Lucca* of far greater esteem than before his departure he was failed not (to his power) to gain himself friends, practising means to win them. But Master *Francis Guinigi* now chancing to dye, and having left behind him a son named *Paul* of 13 years of age, appointed *Castruccio* his Tutor, and the Governor of his estate; having first caused him to be called to him before his death, and intreated him, that he would take upon him the care to bring up his son with that faithfulness he had found himself; and that what kindnesses he could not return to the father, he would requite to the son. And now at length Master *Francis Guinigi* being dead, *Castruccio* left Tutor and Governor to *Paul*, grew in such credit and power, that the favor he was wont to find in *Lucca*, in some part was turned into envy, and he was calumniated by many, as who they doubted had some projects upon a tyranny. Among whom the Principal was *M. George Opizi*, head of the *Guelfes* faction. This man hoping by the death of *Mr Francis* to remain without competitor in *Lucca*, thought that *Castruccio*, being left with that trust, by  
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the grace & favor of his discreet carriage gaind him, had bereav'd him of all means to attain thereto; and hereupon sowed many seeds of scandal against him, whereby to choak his well grown credit. Which at first *Castruccio* disdain'd, but afterwards grew jealous of it: for he thought that Master George would never rest, til he had so far disgrac'd him with King Robert of Naples his Lieutenant, as to cause him to chase him out of *Lucca*. At that time there was one *Uguccion* of *Fagginolo* of *Arezo*, then Lord of *Pisa*, who by the *Pisans* was first chosen for their commander, and afterwards made himself their Lord. Divers out-lawed *Luccheses* of the *Gibellin* faction abode with *Uguccion*, whom *Castruccio* practis'd to restore again with *Uguccions* aid; and this design he communicated also with his friends at home, who could no way endure the *Opizies* authority. Having therefore given order, as was requisite, to this purpose, *Castruccio* fortified the tower of the *Hadusti*, and furnished it with munition and store of victuals whereby upon occasion he might be able to defend himself therein for some time: and the night being come, which was agreed of with *Uguccion*, he gave the signe to him, who was gone down into the plain with much people between the mountains and *Lucca*; and having seen the signal, he came close to Saint Peters gate, and fired the antiport: *Castruccio* on the other side raised a great cry, calling the people to armes, and forced the gate on the other side within: so that *Uguccion* entring with his men, forced the town, and slew Master George with all those of his family, and many others his friends and partisans, and chased out the governor.

vernor, and changed the State of the City, as *Uguccion* liked best, to the great dammage thereof; for it appeard then, that there were above a hundred families chased out of *Lucca*. Those that fled, part went to *Florence*, and part to *Pistoia*, which Cities were then governed by the *Guelfes* faction; and hereupon they became enemies to *Uguccion* and the *Luccheses*. And upon this the *Florentines* and the rest of the *Guelfes* thinking the *Gibellines* faction grown too mighty in *Tuscany*, accorded together to restore again these exiled *Luccheses*, and having Levyed a huge army, they came to the vale of *Nievole*, and seizing upon Mount *Catino*, from hence they went to incampe at Mount *Carlo*, whereby to have the passage open to *Lucca*. Whereupon *Uguccion* having gathered a good army of *Pisans* and *Luccheses* besides many *Dutch* horse which he drew out of *Lombardy*, went to find the *Florentines* camp, which perceiving the enemies approach was removed from Mount *Carlo*, and settled between Mount *Catino* and *Pescia*; and *Uguccion* sat down under Mount *Carlo* about some two miles of the enemy, where for some daies between the horse of the two armies there passed some slight skirmishes: for *Uguccion* being faine sick, the *Pisans* and *Luccheses* refused to come to battel with the enemy. But *Uguccions* malady augmenting, he retired to mount *Carlo* for his recovery, and committed the charge of the army to *Castruccio*, which was the *Guelfes* destruction: for hereupon they took courage, esteeming the Enemies armies as left without a head: which *Castruccio* understood, and lay still some few dayes, the more to confirm this their opinion, making  
shew

shew of feare, and not suffering any one to goe out of the trenches: and on the other side the *Guelfes* the more they saw this feare, the more insolent they became, and every day being orderd for fight, they presented themselves before *Castruccios* army, who thinking he had now enough, emboldned them, and having had full notice of what order they kept, resolved to come to the tryall of a day: and first with his speeches he confirmed his soldiers courage, and shewd them the victory certaine, if they would follow his directions. *Castruccio* had scene how the enemy had plac'd all his strength in the body of the army, & the weak sort in the wings thereof: whereupon he did the cleane contrary; for he put his best soldiers in his wings, and his slightest people in the body: and issuing out of his trenches with this order, so soone as ever he came within view of the enemy, which solently, as before they had wont, came to find them out, he commanded that those squadrons in the middle should goe on leisurely, but that the rest should move with speed, insomuch that when they came to ioine battell with the enemy, onely the wings of each army fought, and the roops in the middle stood unemployd, because the middle part of *Castruccio's* army had lagguerd so much behind, that the enemies body had not yet reach'd to them: and thus the ablest of *Castruccio's* army came to fight with the weakest of the enemies, and the enemies strength lay idle, not able to endamage those they were to encounter with, nor could they ayd any of their owne party: so that without much difficulty, the enemies two wings were both put to flight, and they in the middle seeing

seeing themselves left naked on each flanke, without having wherupon to shew their valour, fled likewise. The rout and the slaughter were great : for there were slaine above ten thousand men, with many Officers, and great Cavaliers of the *Guelfes* faction throught out all *Tuscany*, and many Princes who came thither in favour of them : to wit, *Peter King Roberts* Brother, and *Charles* his nephew, and *Philip* Lord of *Taranto* : but of *Castruccio's* side they came not to above three hundred : among which *Francis Uguccians* sonne was slaine : who being yong and over-venturous, was kild at the first onser. This overthrow much augmented *Castruccio's* credit, so that *Uguccion* grew so jealous and suspicious of his owne State, that he continually busied his brains how to bring him to destruction; thinking with himselfe that that victory had rather taken his power fro him, than settled it: and being in this thought, while he awaited some faire colour to effect his designs, it happned that *Pieragnolo Michaeli* was slaine in *Lucca*, a man of good worth and esteeme, and the *Assassine* fled into *Castruccio's* house : where the Captaines and Serjeants going to apprehend him, were affronted, and hindered by *Castruccio*, so that the murderer by his ayd escaped, which thing *Uguccion*, who was then at *Pisa*, hearing, and deeming then he had just occasion to punish him, calld unto his owne sonne *Neri*, to whom he had now given the command of *Lucca*, and chargd him, that under colour of inviting *Castruccio*, he should lay hold on him, and put him to death. Whereupon *Castruccio* going



going familiarly into the commanders  
 palaces, not fearing any injury, was first by  
*Neri* entertain'd at supper, and afterwards  
 seiz'd on. And *Neri* doubting, lest by putting  
 him to death, without any publick justification  
 the people might bee enraged, kept him alive,  
 till he were better inform'd by *Uguccion* what  
 was farther to be done in that case: who  
 blaming his sonnes slownesse and cowardise,  
 for the dispatching hereof went out of *Pisa*  
 with four hundred Horse towards *Lucca*: and  
 hardly yet was he arriv'd at the Baths, but  
 the *Pisans* took armes, and slew *Uguccions*  
 Lieutenant, and the rest of his family, that re-  
 main'd at *Pisa*, and made *CountaGddo* of  
*Gerardisca* their Lord: *Uguccion* before he  
 came to *Lucca*, had notice of this accident be-  
 fallne in *Pisa* yet thought; he it not fit to turne  
 back, lest the *Luccheses*, like as the *Pisans*,  
 should also shut their gates against him. But  
 the *Luccheses* understanding the chance at *Pisa*  
 notwithstanding that *Uguccion* was enter'd  
*Lucca*, taking this occasion to free *Castruccio*,  
 first began at their meetings in the *Piazza* to  
 speake slightly of him, afterwards to make  
 some hub-bub, and from thence came to  
 armes, demanding *Castruccio* to be set free; in-  
 somuch that *Uguccion* for feare of worse, drew  
 him out of prison: Whereupon *Castruccio*  
 suddenly rallying his friends, with the peoples  
 favour made an assault upon *Uguccion* who  
 finding no other remedy, fled thence with his  
 friends and so went into *Lombary* to the  
 Lords of *Scala*, where afterwards he dy'd  
 poorly. But *Castruccio* being of a prisoner be-  
 come as Prince of *Lucca*, prevail'd so by his  
 friends, and with this fresh gale of the peoples  
 favour,

favour that he was made Generall of their Forces for a yeare; which being compassed, to gaine himselfe further credit in armes, he purposed to recover for the *Luccheses* severall townes which rebelld after *Uguccions* departure, and went also by the *Pisans* favour, with whom he had enterd into league at the campe, to *Serezana*; and to winne that he had built over it a fort, which, being afterwards changed by the *Florentines*, is now calld *Serezanello*, and in two monthes space tooke the towne, and afterwards in strength of this credit, he wonne *Massa*, *Carrara*, and *Lavenza*, and in short time all *Lunigiana*: and to stop the passage that comes from *Lombarby* into *Luginiana*, he tooke *Pontremoli* and drew out thence Mr. *Anastasia Palivicini*, who was Lord thereof. Returning then to *Lucca* with this victory, he was met by the whole people: whereupon *Castruccio* resolving not to deferre longer to make himselfe Prince, by meanes of *Pazzino* of *Poggio Puccinello* of *Perico*, *Francisco Boccanfecchi*, and *Cecco Guinigi* at that time of great repute in *Lucca*, but corrupted by him, made himself Lord thereof, and so solemnely and by resolution of the people was elected their Prince. At this time *Frederek* of *Baviere* King of the *Romans* came into *Italy* to take the Imperiall crown, whom *Castruccio* made his friend, and went to him with five hundred Horse, having left for his Lieutenant at *Lucca* *Paulo Guinigi*, whom in remembrance of his father, he made account of as his owne child. *Castruccio* was entertained very honourably by *Frederick*, who gave him many priviledges, and made him his Deputy in *Tuseany*, and because the *Pisans* had expell'd *Gad-*  
do

do of *Gerardescia*, and for feare of him askd succours of *Frederick*, he made *Castruccio* their Lord, whom the *Pisans* accepted for feare of the *Guelphes* faction, and in particular because of the *Florentines*. *Frederick* then being returned into *Germany*, and having left at *Rome* a governour for his affairs in *Italy*, all the *Gibellins* as well *Tuscans* as *Londarbs* that followd the Imperial faction, had their recourse to *Castruccio*, and each promised him the Principality of their native country; provided that by his meanes they might be restord: among whom was *Mattheo Guidi*, *Nardo Scolare*, *Lapo Uberti*, *Gerozzi Nardi* and *Piero Buonacorsi*, all *Gibellins*, and outlawd *Florentines*: and *Castruccio* plotting by helpe of these, and with his owne forces to become Lord of all *Tuscany*, to gaine himselve credit the more, entred into amity with Mr. *Metthem Visconti* Prince of *Milan*: and trained up all the men of his owne city and country to armes: and because *Lucca* had five gates, he divided the country into five parts, armed them, and distributed them under Captaines and colours, so that on a sudden he was able to bring together above twenty thousand men into the field, besides the help he might have from *Pisa*. He then being enviroind with these forces and freinds, it fortun'd that Mr. *Mattheo Visconti* was assayled by the *Guelphes* of *Piaenza*; who had driven out the *Gibellins*, in whose behalfe the *Florentines* and King *Robert* had sent their troopes. Whereupon Mr. *Mattheo* intreated *Castruccio* to assaile the *Florentines*, that they being constrained to defend their owne homes, should call back their men out of *Londarby*. So *Castruccio* with a good army entered

entred the Vale *Arno*, tooke *Fucachio*, and *St. Miniato* with great dammage of the country; and upon this occasion the *Florentines* were forc'd to call back their troopes: who were hardly return'd into *Tuscany*, but *Castruccio* was compeld upon another necessity to haste back to *Lucca*. And in that City the Family of *Poggio* being of such power and authority as that it had made *Castruccio* not only great, but Prince also, and not taking themselves to have been requited as they had deserv'd, agreed with other Families of *Lucca* to move the city to rebellion, and to chase *Castruccio* thence; whereupon taking occasion one morning they came arm'd upon the Deputy, whom *Castruccio* had there ordain'd over Justice, and slew him, and further purposing to raise the people to commotion; *Steven* of *Poggio* an ancient and peaceable man, who had no hand at all in this conspiracy, came before them, constrain'd his friends by his authority amongst them, to lay aside their armes offering himselfe to mediate with *Castruccio* for them, that he should satisfie their desires. Thus they layd down their armes, but not with greater discretion than they had taken them up; for *Castruccio* having had notice of these novelties befallne in *Lucca*, without making any delay, with part of his troops, leaving *Paul Guinigi* Commander of the residue, came thence to *Lucca*, where having found the tumult appeas'd beyond his expectation, deeming he might with the more ease secure himselfe, dispos'd those of his party in severall places, as best was for his turne. *Steven* of *Poggio* thinking with himselfe, that *Castruccio* was beholding to him, went to him, and

and ietreatnd , not for himfelfe , becaufe he thought it no way needfull for him , but for the others of his Family , praying that many things he would pardon ; in refpect of their youth , and many things in regard of the ancient amity, and obligation he had to the whole kindred. Whereunto *Castruccio* answered courteouflye and bid him be of good cheere , and told him that he received more content the tumult was appeased , than he had had trouble that it was rayfed , and perfwaded *Steven* to caufe them all to come to him , faying , that he thank'd God he had given him opportunity to make a fhow of his clemency, and bounty. They all then prefenting themfelves upon *Stevens* word and *Castruccios*, were together with *Steven* imprifond , and put to death. In this meane while the *Florentines* had recoverd *S. Miniato* ; whereupon *Castruccio* thought fit to ftay that war : confidering that as yet he was not fecure of *Lucca* , being that he could not fately part from him ; and having cauld the *Florentines* to be felt whether they would admit of a truce , he found them eafily yeelding thereto ; for they alfo were weary of the charge, and defirous to ftop the expence. Whereupon they made a truce , of two yeares , and that every one fould keep what they had gotten. In the meane while *Castruccio* being freed from the war , that he might not again incurre thofe dangers and hazards which formerly he had run , under divers colours and pretences , cut off all thofe in *Lucca* , who could have any ambition to to afpire to the Principality , and pardoned not one of them , depriving them of their Country and Fortunes , and thofe he could  
get

get in his clutches, of their lives: affirming that he had found it by experience, that none of them would abide true; and for his better safeguard, built a Fortresse in *Lucca*, and made use of the materials of their Towers, whom he had banish'd and murthered. While *Castruccio* was thus quiet with the *Florentines*, and that he strengthened himselfe in *Lucca*, he fail'd not to do all that he could, without entring into open hostility to increase his greatnesse: and having a great desire to take *Pistoia*, thinking with himselfe that by the possession of that City, he had gotten one foot into *Florence*, gain'd himselfe by divers wayes the whole mountaine to friend, and by the factions he made in *Pistoia*, so behav'd himselfe, that every one rely'd much on him. At that time the City was divided (as always it was) into the *Bianchi* and *Neri*; head of the *Bianchi* was *Bastiano* of *Possente*; and of the *Neri*, *James* of *Gia*: each of which held streight correspondence with *Castruccio*, & one desir'd to expell the other, so that the one and the other after many suspicions came to blowes; *James* made himselfe strong at the gate towards *Florence*. *Bastiano* at that towards *Lucca*, and the one and the other of them relying more upon *Castruccio*, than upon the *Florentines*, judging him more ready and quick of dispatch in any thing touching the warre, each of them sent to him secretly for ayd: which *Castruccio* promis'd to them both, letting *James* know that he would come in person, and telling *Bastiano*, he would send *Paul Guinigi* his Foster son: and appointing a set time, sent *Paul* by way of *Pescia*, and himselfe went straight on to *Pistoia*; so that about midnight, for thus

was it agreed between *Castruccio* and *Paul*, they both arrived at *Pistoia* and there receiv'd as friends : being both entred, when *Castruccio* found his time ; he gave the watchword to *Paul*, whereupon he slew *James* of *Gia*, and the other *Bastiano* of *Possente*; and all their partakers were partly taken, partly slaine, whereupon they forced *Pistoia* without resistance ; and for the government of the towne, *Castruccio* constrained the people to yeeld him obedience, remitting to them many old debts and dutyes, and thus did he to the whole Country there abouts, who all flock't together: partly to see the new Prince, so that every one fraught with hopes, or admiring his valour, set his heart at rest. It happened about this time, that the people of *Rome* mutinied upon the extreame dearth of provision there, which was caused by the Popes absence, who was then at *Avignon*, and they blamed the *Germane* government, insomuch that every day murders and other disorders were committed, which *Henry* the Emperours Deputy could no way remedy; whereupon he had a great suspicion that the *Romanes* would call in King *Robert* of *Naples*, and chace him from *Rome* and, so restore it to the Pope: And having no nearer Allie, whom he could make recourse unto, than *Castruccio*, he sent to intreat him, that he would be pleased, not only to send him aid, but to come himself also in person. *Castruccio* thought this voyage was no way to be put off, as well to render some service of merit to the Emperour, as because now the Emperour was absent from *Rome*, there was some necessity of it: leaving *Paul Guinigi* at *Lucca*, he went thence with two hundred

hundred horse to *Rome*, where he was entertain'd by *Henry*, with very much honour; and his presence in a short time gave so much credit to the Imperials, that without blood or other violence, all things were wel quieted: for *Castruccio* having caused a good quanty of corne to be brought by sea out of the Countrey about *Pisa*, took away all occasion of offence. Afterwards, partly by admonishing, partly by chastising the cheif Officers of *Rome*, he reduc'd them freely under *Henries* government; & *Castruccio* was created a *Roman* Senator, besides many other honors he received of the people, and that Order he took with very great pomp, putting on a gown of cloth of tissue with great letters before to this purpose, *This man is what it pleases God*; and again behind, *And shall be what God will*. In this mean while the *Florentines*, who were displeased that *Castruccio* during the truce, had made himself Lord of *Pistoya*, devis'd which way they might make it rebel, which by reason of his absence, they thought might easily be effected. Amongst the banished *Pistoyeses*, who were then at *Florence*, there was *Baldo Cocchi*, and *James Baldini*, both men of authority, and ready for any hazard. These men held correspondence with some friends they had within; so that with the *Florentines* helpe they entred by night into *Pistoya*, and chased thence *Castruccios* friends and officers, and some of them they slew, and restored the City her liberty, which news much displeased *Castruccio*; so that having taken leave of *Henry*, he came with his men by great dayes journeys to *Lucca*. The *Florentines* when they had word of *Castruccios* return, thinking he would



would not take much rest, resolv'd to prevent him, and with their forces to enter first into the Vale of *Nievola*, before him : supposing, that if they first made themselves masters of that valley, they should cut off from him all means of possibility to recover *Pistoia* ; and so having put in order a great army of all the friends of the *Guelfes* faction, they came into the territory of *Pistoia*. On the other side, *Castruccio* came with his troops to Mount *Carlo*, and having learned where the *Florentines* army was, determined not to meet them in the plain of *Pistoia*, nor to attend them in the plain of *Pescia*, but if it might be, to encounter them in the straight of *Saravalla* ; deeming that by bringing his designe to pass, he should surely gain the victory ; for he understood the *Florentines* had got together some forty thousand men, and he had made choyce of some twelve thousand out of all his ; and however he was confident of his own industry, and their valor, yet doubting he, lest if he set on them in a large place, he might be environed by the multitude of the enemies. *Saravalla* is a Castle between *Pescia* and *Pistoia*, plac'd upon a hill that shuts in the Vale of *Nievole*, not upon the very passage, but above to that some two bow-shots of the place, by which a man passes, is more straight than on the sudden ; for of every side it rises gently but in a straight manner, especially upon the hill, where the waters are divided ; so that twenty men on the one side and the other would wholly possess it. In this place *Castruccio* had a designe to encounter with the enemy, as well because his small troops should have the advantage, as not to discover the enemy but just upon the skirmish,

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mish,

mish, fearing lest his men seeing the number of  
 the enemies, should be startled. Mr. *Manfredi*  
 of the *German* nation, was then Lord of the  
 Castle of *Saravalla*, who before that *Castruc-*  
*cio* was Lord of *Pistoia*, had been left in that  
 Castle, as in a place that was neuter between  
 the *Luccheses* and *Pistoieses*: nor afterward  
 beset it either of them to offend him, he pro-  
 mising to abide neuter, and not to apply him-  
 self to the one or the other: So that for this  
 cause, and for that the situation was strong,  
 he had kept himself thus: but upon this acci-  
 dent *Castruccio* became desirous to possess this  
 place. And having very near acquaintance  
 with one of the inhabitants of the place, he  
 so appointed his business with him, that the  
 night before the skirmish was to begin, he  
 should take into the town 400 men of his,  
 and slay the commander; and abiding thus  
 prepared, he stirred not his army from Mount  
*Carlo*, the more to encourage the *Florentines* to  
 pass, who, because they desired to carry the war  
 far of from *Pistoia*, and to bring it into the Vale  
 of *Nievole*, encamped under *Saravalla*, with  
 intention the day following to pass the hill, but  
*Castruccio* having without any noise taken the  
 Castle in the night, parted from Mount *Carlo* a-  
 bout mid-night, and quietly arrived in the mor-  
 ning at the foot of *Saravalla*, so that at the same  
 instant both the *Florentines* and he began to a-  
 scend the side of the hill. *Castruccio* had sent his  
 infantry by the rode way, & a troop of 400 Horse  
 he had sent upon the left hand towards the  
 Castle: on the other side the *Florentines* had sent  
 400 horse before them, and after those their  
 foot moved, not any way thinking they should  
 find *Castruccio* upon the top of the hill; for they  
 knew

knew nothing of that he had made himself  
 master of the Castle. Thus at unawares the  
*Florentine* Horse having got to the top of the hill  
 discovered *Castluccios* Foot, and were so near  
 approached them, that they had hardly time  
 to lace on their helmets. These men then that  
 were unprovided, being assailed by the others  
 that were prepared, and in order, were  
 fiercely set upon, and with much ado made  
 resistance, and indeed some few of them made  
 head a while: but so soon as the noyse hereof  
 defended into the *Florentines* camp, all was full  
 of confusion. The Horse were oppressed by  
 the Foot; the Foot by the Horse, and their  
 carriages; the Commanders because of the  
 straitsness of the place could neither ad-  
 vance nor retire: so that no man in this con-  
 fusion knew what could or should be done:  
 insomuch that the Horse which were at  
 blowes with the enemies Foot, were cut to  
 pieces, and they not able to defend themselves  
 because the malignity of the scite did not suffer  
 them, yet made they resistance more of ne-  
 cessity than of valor; for being hemmed in  
 by the mountains on both sides behind by their  
 friends, and before by their enemies, they  
 had no way open for flight. Hereupon *Ca-*  
*stluccio* having perceived that his troops were  
 not able to break the enemy, sent a thousand  
 Foot by way of the Castle, causing them to de-  
 fend with the 400 Horse which he had sent be-  
 fore, who struck them so rudely upon the flank  
 that the *Florentines* unable longer to resist that  
 violence, vanquishd rather by the place than  
 by the enemy, all took them to flight; and  
 the flight began from those who were behind  
 towards *Pissoya*, who dispersing themselves

all along the plain, every one where he best could, provided for his safeguard. This defeat was very great and bloody; many Commanders were taken, among which was *Bandino of Rossi*, *Francesco Brunnelleschi*, and *John of Toza*, all noble *Florentines*, and many other *Tuscans*, besides divers of the Kingdom of *Naples*, who being sent by King *Robert* in favor of the *Guelfes*, served under the *Florentines*. The *Pistoieses* hearing of this rout, without delay chasing out the faction of the *Guelfes*, yielded themselves to *Castruccio*. Who not contented herewith, took *Pisto*, and all the Castles of the plain, as well on this as on the other side of *Arno*, and set himself down with his army in the plain of *Perettola* some two miles off from *Florence*; where he abode many dayes to divide the spoyle, and to feast for joy of the victory gotten, causing moneys to be stamped in scorn of the *Florentines*, and races to be run by horse-men and queans: neither failed he to endeavor to corrupt some noble Citizens, to open to him in the night the gates of *Florence*; but the conspiracy being discovered, they were taken and beheaded, among whom was *Thomas Lupacco*, and *Lambertuccio Frescobaldi*. Hereupon the *Florentines* being affrighted upon his defeat, hardly knew any remedy to preserve their liberty; and to the end they might be sure of ayd, sent Ambassadors to *Robert King of Naples*, to give him the City, and the Dominion thereof, which that King accepted of, not so much for the honor the *Florentines* had done him, as for that he knew well how much it imported his State that the *Guelfes* faction should maintain the

State

State of *Tuscany*: and having agreed with the *Florentines* to have of them two hundred thousand *Florentines* by the year, he sent *Charles* his son with four thousand Horse to *Florence*: so that the *Florentines* were somewhat eased of *Castruccio's* troops: for they were constrained to leave their territories and to goe to *Pisa*, there to repress a conspiracy made against him by *Benedicto Lanfranchi*, one of the cheif of *Pisa*, who not being able to endure that his native countrey should be enthralled to a *Lucchese*, conspired against him, plotting to seize upon the Cittadel, and to chase out the garrison, and to slay those of *Castruccio's* party. But because in such matters, if the small number be fit to keep the secret, yet suffices it not to put it in execution: while he went about to gain more men to this purpose, some there were that bewrayed his plot to *Castruccio*: neither passed this discovery without the infamy of *Bonifacio Cerchi* and *John Guidi Florentines*, who were near neighbors to *Pisa*; whereupon *Benedicto* being layd hand on, was put to death, and all the rest of that family banisht, and many other Noble Citizens beheaded: and thinking with himself that *Pistoya* and *Pisa* were not very faithfull unto him, he took care both by his industry and forces to secure himself thereof: which gave leisure to the *Florentines* to recover their strength, and to be able to attend the return of *Charles*: who being arrived, they determined to lose no longer time, and gathered a great number of men; for they called together to their ayd in a manner all the *Guelphes* in *Italy*, and made an exceeding great army: of more than 30000 Foot, and 10000 Horse,

and having advised, which were first to be assailed, either *Pistoia* or *Pisa*, they resolved it were better to set first upon *Pisa*, being a thing more likely to succeed, by reason of the late conspiracy there, as also of more profit, deeming that if *Pisa* were once gotten, *Pistoia* would soon render it self. The *Florentines* then going forth with this army in the beginning of May 1328, suddenly took *Lastra Signia*, Mount *Lupo*, and *Empoli*, and came with their army to *St. Miniato*; *Castruccio* on the other part perceiving this great army, which the *Florentines* had brought againo him, was nothing startled, but rather thought that this was the time, when Fortune was to give him in his hand the whole dominion of *Tuscany*, beleeving they should have no better success in this of *Pisa*, than formerly they had in that of *Serravalle*; and that now they could not hope to repair themselves again, as then; whereupon assembling twenty thousand Foot and 4000 Horse, he brought his army to *Fucchio*, and sent *Paul Guinigi* with 5000 Foot to *Pisa*. *Fucchio* is seated in a stronger place than any other Castle, upon the territory of *Pisa*, because it is in the midst between the *Gosciana* and the *Arno*, and a little raised from the plain; where he abiding, the enemies were not able, unless they divided their army into two parts, to hinder his provision either from *Lucca*, or *Pisa*; neither could they but upon disadvantage either come upon him, or goe towards *Pisa*: for in one case, they might be inclosed in the midst between *Castruccio's* troops, and those of *Pisa*; in the other case, having the *Arno* to pass, they could not do it with the enemy on their backs, without

out very great danger. And *Castruccio* for their encouragement to undertake the passage, had not placed himself with his troops along the bank of *Arno*, but a little aside near unto the walls of *Fucebio*, and had left distance enough between the River and him. The *Florentines* having gotten *St. Miniato*, advised whether were to be done, either to goe to *Pisa*, or to find out *Castruccio*; and having measured the difficulties of both courses, they resolved to goe and invest him; the river *Arno* was so low that a man might wade over it; but yet not so, but that the infantry was wet to the shoulders, and the Horse even to the saddle. Upon the tenth day then of June in the morning, the *Florentines* in battel array, caused part of their Cavalry to begin to pass, and a body of ten thousand Foot. *Castruccio* who stood ready, and intent to what he had in his mind to do, with a battalion of five thousand Foot, and three thousand Horse fell upon them: neither gave he them any time to get out of the water but that he was at blowes with them; he sent a thousand light armed Foot up by the bank on that part, under the *Arno*, and a thousand above it. the *Florentines* Foot were much distressed with the water and weight of their armes, nor had they all yet got over the channel of the river. When some of the Horse had passed, by reason that they had moord the bottom of the *Arno*, they made the passage the uneasier for them that came after them; for the bottom proving rotten and miry, some of the Horse came over and over on their riders, and many stuck so fast in the mud that they were there stabled: whereupon the *Florentine* Commanders seeing the diffi-

cultry to pass on that part, caused them to retire and make proof of a higher part of the river, whereby to find a sounder bottom, and the channel more favorable for their passage: against whom those whom *Castruccio* had sent under the bank, made resistance, who slightly armed with targets and darts, in their hands, with huge outcries, wounded them both in the face and brest, insomuch that the horses affrighted both with the cries and stroaks, would in no wise pass forwards, but fell foule one upon another; the fight between *Castruccio's* men and those that were already past, was sharp and terrible, and of each side there fell many, and every one used all his skill and strength to overcome his adversary. *Castruccio's* men would force them back into the river; the *Florentines* striv'd to put forwards to make place for others, that being come forth of the water, they might be able to stand to the fight, to which obstinacy there was added the Captains encouragements. *Castruccio* put his men in mind, that these were the same enemies, which but a little while ago they had beaten at *Seravalle*. The *Florentines* reproached theirs, that they being many, should suffer a few to overcome them. But *Castruccio* perceiving that the fight lasted, and that his own and his adversaries were well wearied, and that on each side many were hurt and slain, he sent out another band of five thousand Foot, and when he brought them up to the very back of his own that fought, he gave order that they before should open, and wheele about, one on the right hand, the other on the left, and so retire; which thing done gave room to the  
*Florentines*



*Florentines* to advance and gain some ground. But when once they came to handy blowes, the fresh men with those that were tir'd, they staid not long ere they forc'd them back into the river, between the Horse of the one side, and the other, yet there was not much advantage: whereupon *Castruccio* knowing his own inferior, had given order to the leaders, that they should only maintain fight, as he that hoped to overcome the Foot; which done, he might be able with more ease to overcome the Horse; which out as he purposed: for having seen the Foot forc'd back into the river, he sent the rest of his infantry against the enemies Horse, who with lances and darts wounding them, and the Cavalery also pressing them with greater fury, put them to flight. The *Florentine* Commanders seeing the difficulty that their Horse had to pass, strove to make their Foot pass on that part beneath the river, to fight with the flank of *Castruccio's* troops. But the channel being deep, and all above already possess'd by his men, all this prov'd vain. Whereupon the whole army was put to rout, to *Castruccio's* great glory and honor, and of so great a multitude there escap'd not a third. Many Chieftains were taken, and *Charles* son of King *Robert*, together with *Michaelangelo Falconi*; and *Taddeo* of the *Albizzi Florentine* Commissaries, fled thence to *Empoli*. The spoyle taken was great, the slaughter exceeding great, as a man may imagine in such and so great a conflict: for of the *Florentine* army 20231, & of *Castruccio's* part 1570 were left dead upon the place. But Fortune being enemy to his glory, when as she should have given him life, took it from him, and interrupted those

designes which he a long time before had purposed to put in effect: neither could any thing but death hinder him. *Castruccio* had royl'd himself all that day in the battel, when at the end thereof all weary and sweaty, he stayd about the port of *Fucchio*, to attend the soldiers, as they should return from the victory, and in person receive and thank them, and partly if peradventure any thing should arise from the enemies, that ithey had made head in any place, he might be ready to give order thereto: judging it the office of a good Commander, to be the first to get a horseback, and the last to light off. Whereupon he standing exposed to a wind, which ordinarily about mid-day rises upon the *Arno*, and uses to be pestiferous, he was all over chil'd, which thing not being made account of by him, was the occasion of his death: for the night following he was taken with a dangerous feaver, which continually augmenting, and the sickness being judged mortal by all the Physicians, and *Castruccio* perceiving of it, called *Paul Guinigi*, and spake to him these words; Had I beleev'd, my son, that Fortune would have cut of my course in the midst of the way, to arrive unto that glory which I by my so many good successes had promis'd my self, I should have less wearied my self; and to thee as I should have left a smaller estate, so also fewer enemies, and less envy: for I would have been content with the dominion of *Lucca & Pisa*, and never subdu'd the *Pistoyses*, nor with so many injuries provoked the *Florentines*; but by making the one and the other of these people my friends, I should have led a life, though not longer,

yet

yet surely more quiet; and to thee should I have left an estate, though less, without doubt more secure and firm; but Fortune, who will dispose of all human affairs, gave me not so much judgement, that I was able first to know it, or so much time, that I was able to overcome it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I never denyed it to thee, how I came into thy fathers house, being yet a young lad, and voyd of all those hopes which every generous spirit ought to conceive, and how I was by him brought up, and beloved by him as much as if I had been of his own blood; whereupon under his government I became valorous and grew capable of that fortune in which thou hast and dost see mee: and because at his death, he committed thee and all his fortunes to my fidelity, I have brought thee up with that affection, and increased them with that fidelity, that I was and am bound to. And because not only whether that alone which was left thee by thy father, but that also which my fortune and valor got, were thine, I never would marry, to the end that the love of children should never take me off, from shewing in any part that thankfulness towards thy fathers blood, which I thought I was obliged to shew. I leave thee therefore a very fair State, whereat I am much pleased: but for that I leave it thee weak and unsetled, I am exceedingly grieved: there remains to thee the City of *Lucca*, wick will never be content to live under thy government: *Pisa* is also thine: wherein there are men naturally inconsistent, and full of treachery: which, however it be divers times accustomed to serve, yet will it alwaies disdain to have a *Lucchesse* for its Lord.

Lord. *Pistoia* likewise is left to thee, very little faithfull to thee, because it is divided, and by fresh injuries provok'd against our Family. Thou hast the *Florentines* for thy neighbors, and those offended, and divers waies injured by us, and not extinguisht, to whom the news of my death would be more welcome than the Conquest of all *Tuscany*. Thou canst not rely upon the Princes of *Milan*, nor upon the Emperor, because they are far hence, lazy, and very slow with their succors: wherefore thou oughtst not to hope in any thing, but in thy own industry, and the remembrance of my valor, and in the reputation which this present victory gains thee: which if thou shalt know with discretion how to make use of, will ayd thee to make an accord with the *Florentines*, who being affrighted at this present defeat, ought with desire to condescend thereto: whom though I sought to make them mine enemies, and thought it would procure me both power and glory, yet thou art by all means to seek to gain for thy friends; for their friendship will prove thy security and advantage. It is a thing of very much importance in this world for a man to understand his own self, and to know how to measure the forces of his own courage and State; and he that finds himself unfit for war, should endeavor to settle his government by the rules of peace, whereunto thou shalt do well if by my advice thou address thy self, and strive by this way to enjoy my pains and dangers, which shall easily prove successful to thee, when thou shalt account these my advertisements true: and herewithall thou shalt be doubly oblig'd to me, first that I have left thee this State, and secondly

secondly that I have taught thee how to keep it. Afterwards having caused those Citizens to come to him, who of *Lucca*, *Pisa*, and *Pistoja*, served in the wars under him; and having recommended *Paul Guinigi* to them, and made them swear obedience to him, he died, leaving to all those, that ever knew him, a happy remembrance of him; and to those that had been his friends, so great a desire of him, that never any Prince, that died at any time, left more. His funerals were most honorably solemnized, and he was buried at *St. Francesco* in *Lucca*. But neither valor, nor fortune were so favorable to *Paul Guinigi*, as to *Castruccio*; for not long after, he lost *Pistoja*, and after *Pisa*; and with much ado held he the government of *Lucca*: which continued in his family till *Paul* the grand-child. *Castruccio* then was, by what is here shewed, a man of rare note, not only for those times he lived in, but for many ages that had past long before. He was of a stature higher than ordinary, and his limbs were well answerable each to other; & of such a grace he was in his aspect, and entertain'd all men with that humanity, that he never spake with any that he sent from him discontent; his hair inclin'd to a reddish colour, and he wore it always cut above his ears; and always in all seasons, whether it rained or snow, he went with his head uncover'd; he was very pleasing to his friends, and terrible to his enemies, just among his subjects, treacherous with foreigners: nor where he could vanquish by fraud, did he ever strive to do it by force: for he said the victory, and not the manner how it was got, gained a man glory; no man enter'd more boldly into dangers, nor was  
more

more wary to get out of them : and he was wont to say, that men ought to prove every thing, but to be astonish'd at nothing, and that God favors valiant men, who alwaies chastises the feeble with the mighty. He was also very admirable in replying or biting sharply or gently; and as in this kind he spared not any, so likewise he was nothing mov'd, when himself was not spared : so that we have many things he said wittily, and heard patiently, as these : Having caus'd a Duckat to be given for a Starling, and a friend of his reproving him for it, said *Castruccio* Thou wouldst not have given above a peny for it, and his friend saying it was true, he reply'd, a Duckat is less to mee. Having a flatterer about him, and in scorn having spat upon him, the flatterer said, that Fisher men to take a little Fish suffer themselves to be all moyl'd in the Sea ; I will let my self be daub'd by a little spittle, to catch a Whale : which *Castruccio* not only heard patiently, but rewarded. When one told him, that he liv'd too sumptuously ; said *Castruccio*, if this were a vice, there would not be so splendid entertainments at the Saints Feasts. Passing through a street, & seeing a young man comming out of a whore-house all blushing because he had been seen by him, he said to him, Be not asham'd when thou goest out, but when thou entrest in. A friend of his giving him a knot to loose, that was curiously tyed, said, O foole, dost thou think I will loosen such a thing, which being tyed gives me so much trouble ? *Castruccio* saying to one that profest himself a Philosopher, You are of the condition of dogs, that alwaies go about those who can best give them meat ; No says the party, we are like Physicians

Physitians, who visit the houses that have most need of them. Going from *Pisa* to *Ligorne* by water, and a dangerous storme there arising, and thereupon being much preplex'd, was reprehended by one of his company as pusillanimous, saying himself was not afraid of any thing; to whom *Castruccio* reply'd, that he nothing marvayl'd thereat; for every one valu'd his life, according to its worth. Being ask'd by one, what he should do to gaine a good esteeme? answered him; See when thou goest to a Feast, that a blocke sit not upon a blocke. When one boasted that he had read many things, said *Castruccio*, It were better thou couldst brag thou hadst remembred much. Another bragging though he had ripled much, he was not drunk; he reply'd, an Oxe does the same. *Castruccio* kept a young lass, which he lay with ordinarily, and thereupon being reprov'd by a friend, telling him that it was a great wrong to him that he had suffer'd himselfe to be so taken by a Wench; Thou art mistaken, quoth *Castruccio*, I rook her, not she me. Also when one blam'd him that he was too delicious in his dyet, he said to him, I warrant thou wouldest not spend herein so much as I doe; That is true, quoth the other; then reply'd he Thou art more covetous than I am gluttonous. Being invited to supper by *Tadeo Cernardi* a *Lucchese*, a rich and magnificent citizen; and in the house *Tadeo* shewing him a chamber all furnish'd with cloth of gold, and that it was all pav'd with curious stones, which were diversly wrought with sundry colours, and represented flowers, leaves, and such like green things: *Castruccio* having got together a great deale of spittle in his

his mouth, spat it full in *Tadeos* face; at which he shewing himselfe much troubled, says *Castruccio*, I knew not where to spee that I might offend thee lesse. Being ask'd how *Cesar* dyed? saith he, Would to God I might dye like him. Being one night in a house of one of his Gentlemen, where there were divers Ladyes invited to a Feast, and he dancing, and sporting with them, more than befitting his condition, was reprov'd by a friend, answered, He that is held a wise man in the day time, will never be thought a foole in the night. One comming to aske a favour at his hands, and *Castruccio* seeming as if he heard not, fell down upon his knees before him, whereat *Castruccio* chiding him, he answered, Thou art the cause thereof, who carryest thine eares in thy feet: and thereby he gain'd double the favour he asked. He used to say, that the way to Hell was easie, because men went thither downwards, and blindfold. When one ask'd him a favour with many and superfluous wordes, *Castruccio* said to him, Hereafter when thou wouldst any thing with me, send another. Such another man having wearied him with a tedious speech, and telling him in the latter end, Perhaps I may have tir'd you with my long speaking; No, thou hast not, said he, for I heard not one word of all that thou hast spoken. He was wont to say of one who had been a handsome boy, and afterwards became a comely man, that he was too injurious, having first distracted the husbands from their wives, and afterwards the wives from their husbands. To an envious man that laugh'd, he said, Laughst thou because thou art well, or because




because another suffers evill? When he was also under the rule of Master *Francis Guinigi*, one of his playfellows saying to him, What wilt thou that I shall give thee, for a blow on the mouth? *Castruccio* answered him, a Helmer. Having caused a citizen of *Lucca* to dye, who had helped him in his rising to his greatnesse, when it was said to him, He had ill done to put to death one of his old friends; he reply'd, You are deceivd, I have put to death a new enemy. *Castruccio* commended much those that betrothd wives, but never married them, like men that say they will go to Sea, but never do. He said he wondred much at men, that when they bought any vessell of earth or glasse, they sound it first whether it be good; but in taking a wife they are content only to see her. When he was neare death, one asking him, how he would be buried? he answered, with my face downwards: for I know, that as soon as I am dead, this Country shall go upside down. Being asked, whether he never thought to become a Fryer to save his Soule? he said No, for it was strange to him, that *Lazarus* should go to Paradise, and *Ugucion* of *Faggiuola* to Hell. Being asked, when it was best to eate, to preserve the health? he answered, if a man be rich when he is hungry; if he be poore, when he may. Seeing a Gentleman a friend of his, that made his servant trusse his points, he said, I hope one day too thou wilt make his feed thee. Seeing that one had written upon his house in Latine, God keep the wicked hence; said, The master then must not enter here. Passing by a way where there was a little house with a great gate, he said, This house will run out of doores. Treating with an Ambassadour of the King

King of *Naples* touching some good of the borderers, whereat he was some what angry, when the Ambassadour said, Feare you not the King then? *Castruccio* said, Is this your King good or bad? and he answering that he was good, *Castruccio* reply'd, Wherefore then should I be afraid of those that are good? We might relate many others of his sayings, wherein he shewd both acutenesse of wit, and gravity; but these shall suffice in testimony of his worthy qualities. He liv'd forty four yeares, and behav'd himselfe like a Prince in all his fortunes: and as of his good fortunes there are enough monuments left, so likewise would he there should be seene some of his evill fortunes; for the manacles wherewith he was chain'd in prison, are yet to be seene fastned in the tower of his dwelling house, where they were put by him, that they might beare witnessse of his adversity. And because he was no way inferiour to *Philip of Macedon*, *Alexanders* father, nor to *Scipio of Rome*, he dy'd in the same age they two did; and doubtlesse he would have exceeded the one and the other, if in exchange of *Lucca* he had had *Macedon*, or *Rome* for his Countrey.

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A



A Relation of the course  
taken by Duke *Valentine* in the  
murdering of *Vitellozzo Vitelli*  
*Oliverotto of Fermo*, *Paul*, and the  
Duke of *Gravina*, all of them of  
the Family of the *Orsini*;  
composed by *Nicholas*  
*Machiavelli*.



Duke *Valentine* was return'd  
from *Lombardy*, whither he  
had gone to excuse himselfe  
to King *Lewis* of *France*,  
touching those many cal-  
umnies which the *Floren-*  
*tines* charg'd him with, for  
the rebellion of *Arezzo* and  
the other Townes of the Vale of *Clicana*, and  
was thence come to *Imola*; where he plotted  
his enterprise against *Iohn Bentivogh* tyrant of  
*Bolonia*: for he had a mind to reduce that City  
into his subjection, and make it head of his  
Duchy of *Romania*: which thing being knowne  
to the *Virelli* and *Orsini*, and their other com-  
plices, they thought the Duke would grow  
too powerfull and that it was to be feared, lest  
that taking *Bolonia*, he should seeke their ut-  
ter ruine, that he might remaine the only  
Champion of *Italy*: and hereupon they made  
a diet at the *Magione*, in the territories of  
*Perusia*

*Perusia* : where there met Cardinal *Paulo*, and the Duke of *Gravina* of the Family of the *Orsini*; *Vitellazzo Vitelli*, *Oliverotti* of *Fermo*, *John Paulo Baglioni* tyrant of *Perusia*, and Master *Antonio* of *Venofro*, sent by *Pandulfo Petrucci* head of *Siena* : where it was argued amongst them touching the Dukes greatness, and touching what his further intentions were: and that it was necessary to bridle his appetite: otherwise they ran hazard together with others, all to goe to ruine : and they determined not to abandon the *Benivoli*, and to seek to gain the *Florentines* ; to one and the other of which places they dispatch'd men, promising ayd to the one, and encouraging the other to unite with them, against the common enemy. This Diet was suddenly known throughout all *Italy*, and those people that under the Dukes government were discontented, among whom were the *Urbinate*s, began to hope they might be able to inovare some things from whence it proceeded, that their minds being thus held in suspence by some of *Urbino*, it was plotted to take the Rock of *Leo*, which held for the Duke, and these took occasion from hence. The governor fortifi'd the Castle, and causing timber to be carried thither, they of the conspiracy contrived that some great peices of timber, which they were drawing into the Castle, should be brought upon the bridge, to the end that being thus clogged, it could not be lift up by them within : which occasion being taken, they leaped upon the bridge, and thence into the Rock, by which surprisal, so soon as it was understood, all that State rebelled, and called home again their old Duke. Hope now being laid hold on, not so much by the taking

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of the Rock, as for the Diet held at the *Magione*, by means whereof they thought to be assisted : who having heard the rebellion of *Urbino*, imagined it not fit to lose the occasion : and getting their men together, they put forward, intending if there were any town of all that State remaining in the Dukes hands, to assail it : and they sent afresh again to *Florence* to sollicite that Commonwealth to joyne with them in extinguishing this common calamity : shewing the party already gained, and such an occasion offered as the like was not to be expected. But the *Florentines* for the hate they bare to the *Vitelli* and the *Orsini* upon divers occasions, not cruelly clave not to them, but sent *Ni bolas Machiavelli* their Secretary, to offer receipt to the Duke, and aid against these his new enemies, who was then in *Imola* full of fear, because of a sudden and beyond his opinion, his soldiers being become his enemies, he unarmed met with a war at hand : but having taken heart upon the *Florentines* proffers, he purposed to temporise, and hold off the war with those few people which he had, and with treaties of agreement, and partly to prepare aides, which he provided two waies, by sending to the King of *France* for men, and partly by taking into his pay all men at armes, and what others else made profession to serve a Horse-back, and to all he gave money. Notwithstanding all this, the enemies advanc'd, and thence came towards *Fossombrone* ; where some of the Dukes troops had made head : which by the *Vitelli* and *Orsini* were broken : which thing caused the Duke to turn himself wholly to see if he with treaties of accord could stop this humor : and being an  
exceeding

exceeding great dissembler, he said not of any means to give them to understand who had taken armes against him, that what he had gotten he was willing should be theirs; and that it suffic'd him to enjoy the title of Prince, but he was content the Principality should be theirs, and so effectually perswaded he them, that they sent *Paul* to the Duke to treat of peace, and so stayed their armes: but now the Duke staid not his preparations, and with a great deal of care increased both his Horse and Foot, and to the end these provisions should not appear, he went and scattered all his soldiers in several places throughout *Romans*. In this while also came there to him five hundred *French* lances: and however he was now so strong, that with open force he was able to right himself upon his enemies; yet thought he it the more safe and profitable way to beguile them, and for all this not to stop the treaty for peace: and this matter was so far labored in, that he made a peace with them, and assured to them their old pays, gave them four thousand Duckats in hand, promised not to molest the *Bentivolio*, and made alliance with *John*, and moreover that he could not constrain any of them to come in person to him, more than he thought good himself. On the other side they promised to restore unto him the *Dutchy of Urbin*, and all the other places taken by them, and to serve him in any expedition he should undertake; nor without his permission to war with any one, or take pay of any one. This accord being made, *Guidubaldo* Duke of *Urbin* fled again to *Venice*, having first caused all the fortresses of that State to be demolished: for relying upon the people he

he would not that those forts, which he thought he could not defend, should fall into the enemies hands, whereby to bridle his friends. But Duke *Valentine* having made this agreement, and divided all his troops throughout all *Romania*, with the *Frenchmen* at armes, at the end of November departed from *Imola*, and from thence went to *Cesena*, where he abode many dayes to contrive with those that were sent by the *Vitelli* and the *Orsini*, who were ready then with their forces in the Dutchy of *Urbino*, what action they should then anew enter in, but not concluding any thing, *Oliverotto* of *Fermo* was sent to offer him that if he would adventure an expedition against *Tuscany*, they were at his service; in case he would not, they would be ready to serve him against *Sinigallia*; to whom the Duke answered, that in *Tuscany* he would not make any war, because the *Florentines* were his friends: but he was well content they should goe to *Sinigallia*: whence it came to pass that not long after, advice was brought, that the town was yielded to them, but the Fort would not: for the Governor would render it to the Duke in person, and to none else; and thereupon they perswaded him to come before it, the Duke thought this occasion very good, and that it would not any way skare them, being he was called by them, and not going of himself: and the more to secure them, he dismiss'd all his *French* forces, which returned thence into *Lombardy*, save only a hundred lances of *Monsieur Candales* his kinsman, and parting about the middle of December from *Cesena*, he went thence to *Fano*; where withall his wiles and craft he could, he perswaded the *Vitelli* and the *Orsini*,

*Orsini*, to expect him at *Sinigallia*; shewing them that such strangeness would make their accord to be neither faithfull nor durable; and that he was a man that desired he might avaike himselfe both of the forces and advice of his friends: and however *Vincellozzo* was very unwilling, and that his brothers death had taught him, that he should not offend a Prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, being wrought to it by *Paulo Orsino* who had been corrupted by the Duke with gifts and faire promises, he agreed to attend him: whereupon the Duke before the 30 day of December, 1502, that he was to goe from *Fano*, communicated his purpose to eight of his chiefe confidents, among whom were *Don Michael*, and the Lord of *Enna* who was afterwards Cardinal: and gave them charge, that presently as soone as *Vincellozzo*, *Paulo Orsino*, the Duke of *Gravina*, and *Oliverotto* had met them, each two of them should get one of them between them: cor signing each one by name to certaine two, who should traine them along even into *Sinigallia*, nor suffer them to part, till they had brought them to the Dukes lodging, and that they were there taken. He afterwards tooke order that all his Horse and Foot, which were better than two thousand Horse and ten thousand Foot, should be in the morning at breake of day upon the *Metaure*, a River some five miles from *Fano*, where they should attend him; being then the last day of December, upon the *Metaure* with those troops, he caused some two hundred Horse to go before him, afterwards the Foot mov'd, and after them himselfe in person, with the rest of his men at armes. *Fano* and *Sinigallia*

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thence towards *Sinigallia*, & when the first head of the Horse troops came up to the bridge, they pass'd it not, but making stand, they turn'd their horse, the one part towards the river, the other to the open field, and so left away in the midst, whereby the infantry pass'd, which without stop enter'd the Town. *Vitelozzo*, *Paulo*, and the Duke of *Gravina* upon their mules, accompanied with a few horse, went to meet the Duke: & *Vitelozzo* disarmed having a cloak all lined with green, being exceeding melancholy, as presaging his own death near at hand, caus'd a certain admiration of himself in all, the valor of the man being well known, and the fortune he had pass'd; and it is said, that when he left his soldiers to come into *Sinigallia*, there to meet the Duke, that he did in a manner take his last leave of them; to his Captains he recommended his house, and the welfare thereof, and admonish'd his Nephews, that they should not so much mind the great fortunes of their Family, as the valor of their Ancestors. These three then being come up to the Duke, and done their obsequence, were receiv'd by him with a chearfull countenance, and presently by those, who had charge to look to them, taken between them. But when the Duke saw that *Oliverotto* was wanting, who had staid with his men at *Sinigallia*, and attended before at the broad place by his lodging, above the river, to keep them in order, and exercise them: he wink'd upon *Don Michael*, to whom the care of *Oliverotto* was committed, that he should take such order that *Oliverotto* should not escape him. Whereupon *Don Michael* rode before, and being come to *Oliverotto*, to told him,

him, that now it was not a time to hold his men together out of their lodgings; because then they would be taken from them by the Dukes soldiers, and therefore perswaded him to send them to their lodgings, and goe with him to meet the Duke: which when *Oliverotto* had done, the Duke came, and having seen him, called him; to whom *Oliverotto* having made reverence, he joyn'd in troop with the rest, and entred into *Sinigallia*, where all dismounting at the Dukes Lodging, entred with him into a private chamber, they were held prisoners to the Duke, who presently got a horseback, and commanded that *Oliverotto* and the *Orfinies* Souldiers should be all risted. *Oliverotto's* were all pillag'd, by reason they were near at hand; those that belong'd to the *Orfini* and the *Vitelli*, being more remote having before heard of the ruine of their Masters, had time to get together, where calling to mind the valor and discipline of the Families of the *Orfini* and *Vitelli*, joynly all in one body, in despite of the countrey, and their enemies power, they sav'd themselves. But the Dukes soldiers not satisfied with the pillage of *Oliverotto's* soldiers, began to sack *Sinigallia*. And had not the Duke by the death of many stopped their insolence, they would utterly have sackt it. But night being come, and all stirs quiet, the Duke thought fit to put *Vitelozzo* and *Oliverotto* to death, and having brought them together, caused them to be strangled. Where neither of them spake any thing worthy of their life past; for *Vitelozzo* prayed, that supplication should be made to the Pope, to grant him a plenary Indulgence of all his sins; *Oliverotto* much lamenting himself, cast all the

fault of the injuries against the Duke on *Vite-  
lozzo's* back. *Paul*, and the Duke of *Gravina*  
were kept alive, til the Duke had word, that  
at *Rome*, the Pope had laid hold on the Cardinal  
*Orsini*, the Archbishop of *Florence*, and  
Master *James* of the Holy Cross. After which  
news upon the 18 of *January*, at the Castle  
of *Pieve*, they also were strangled in the like  
manner.

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THE

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